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A NEW MENS REA FOR RAPE: MORE CONVICTIONS AND LESS
 
PUNISHMENT
 
Kari Hong* 
INTRODUCTION 
In what is now the “Post-Weinstein era,” victims of sexual assault and harass­
ment are finally being believed. As much as this is overdue, in the context of rape, 
simply believing victims will not be enough to fix endemic problems arising in 
how rape is defined, prosecuted, and punished. This Article grapples with two 
problems presented by contemporary prosecutions of acquaintance rape. The first 
problem is that it is too difficult to obtain a conviction for rape under existing 
definitions of the crime: of every 1000 rapes that are estimated to occur, seven will 
result in a conviction.1 
The Vast Majority of Perpetrators Will Not Go to Jail or Prison, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK 
(RAINN), https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justice-system (last visited Nov. 13, 2017). The numbers are 
that out of 1000 rapes, 310 are reported, 57 lead to arrests, 11 are referred to prosecution, and 7 lead to conviction. 
Id. 
By contrast, of every 1000 estimated robberies, twenty-two 
will result in a conviction.2 Of every 1000 estimated assault and batteries, 
forty-one result in conviction.3 Stated another way, reported rapes are convicted at 
only 1/3 of the rate of robberies and 1/6 the rate of assaults. This discrepancy is odd 
because a rapist is known to the victim in approximately 80% of the attacks, and 
the robber is known to the victim in approximately 25% of those crimes.4 
The reports of rape by non-strangers range from 71% to 82%. Perpetrators of Sexual Violence: Statistics, 
RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK (RAINN), https://www.rainn.org/statistics/perpetrators-sexual-violence 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (reporting that 28% of rapes are by strangers, 45% by a friend or acquaintance, 1% by a 
non-spouse relative, and 25% by spouse or partner for a total of 71% of attacks by those known to the victim); 
Rape Treatment Ctr., Facts & Quotes, UCLA MED. CTR., http://www.911rape.org/facts-quotes/statistics (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2017) (citing two reports that claim that 82% and 80% of rapes were by those known by the 
victim). For information on robberies, see generally CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
ROBBERY VICTIMS 1, 3 (1987) (reporting that robbery offenders were strangers in 75% of the 14.6 million reported 
Knowing 
the identity of one’s assailant should make the conviction rate for rape higher than 
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robberies between 1973 and 1984 and that “[r]obbery victims were more likely than rape or assault victims to 
encounter multiple offenders, strangers, or offenders with weapons”). 
that of robberies and assaults; the fact that it does not suggests that something is 
amiss in how rape is legally defined. 
When discussing rape, this Article focuses exclusively on what people think of 
as acquaintance rapes. All states have an aggravated form of rape, usually defined 
as a situation with an offender using a weapon, the victim being a child, or both.5 
For clarification, aggravated rape is not the subject of this Article. This Article is 
focused on rape without these aggravating circumstances, defined as the crime 
involving one adult (usually a man) who engages in sexual contact with another 
adult (usually a woman) who did not intend or desire to have the sexual contact. 
Limiting an inquiry to just acquaintance rapes is not misplaced because approxi­
mately 80% of all rapes that occur are committed by people known to the victim.6 
The second problem is that when a rapist is convicted, the offender is subjected 
to excessive and disproportionate punishment. Although convictions are rare, 
when they occur, an offender is punished with a prison term approximately 95% of 
the time, which is more than double than the approximate 40% rate of prison 
sentences that other convicted felons serve.7 These prison sentences are lengthy: 
over 1/3 of all states (nineteen to be precise) authorize maximum sentences of life 
terms for rape; twelve states have minimum sentences for rape that start at ten 
years or more.8 Although comprehensive national sentencing data is not collected, 
where information is known, actual prison terms range from eight to thirty years 
long.9 By contrast, other Western countries punish the same criminal acts with 
much shorter prison sentences that are between one and seven years in length.10 
These two problems share a common solution: reforming rape law to increase the 
numbers of those who are convicted, but also, reduce the length of incarceration 
and include science-based treatment that other countries successfully use to cure 
5. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61(a)(3)(2017) (defining rape in the first degree as arising when a person 
sixteen or older “engage[d] in sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex who is less than 12 years 
old”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1423(A) (2017) (defining “violent sexual assault” as arising when a person 
commits sexual assault and the “offense involved the discharge, use or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon 
or dangerous instrument . . .  .”). 
6. See supra note 4. 
7. See infra notes 52, 322 and accompanying text (statutes listing maximum terms); infra notes 327–34 and 
accompanying text (actual lengths of sentences); infra notes 335–42 and accompanying text (international 
comparisons); infra notes 279, 333, 342 and accompanying text (rates for prison terms imposed in state and 
federal courts for rape convictions). In addition, according to Bureau of Justice Statistics data from 2000, state 
courts “sentenced 40% of convicted felonies to a state prison, 28% to a local jail and 32% to straight probation.” 
MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 198821, FELONY SENTENCES IN 
STATE COURTS, 2000, at 1 (2003). In 2006, the rate was similar, with 41% of convicted felonies punished in state 
prison and 28% in local jails. SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 226846, FELONY 
SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2009). 
8. See infra notes 52, 323 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 327–34 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 335–42 and accompanying text. 
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offenders. Increasing convictions will never be enough to mete out justice. Only 
when sentences are fair, shorter, and effective can the most amount of offenders be 
held accountable. 
As a practical matter, a state legislature must clearly define a crime by using 
elements, which enumerate the discrete conduct (actus reus) and mental state 
(mens rea) that an actor must engage in to be prosecuted. As set forth in Part I, the 
crime of rape, by contemporary standards, is the social harm of a person having 
unwanted sex with another. But, due to sexism, the vast majority of states fail to 
define the crime of rape in this manner. 
Rather, forty-five states and the District of Columbia require rape to be 
prosecuted if the unwanted sex also has an additional element of force.11 Referred 
to here as “rape by force,” the reason for the additional element arises from sexist 
origins: rape was not initially understood as a crime involving unwanted sex. 
Instead, the crime originally was prosecuted to aggrieve the honor of the father or 
husband of a violated woman rather than as redress for the harm a woman who had 
been raped experienced.12 
In addition, in the United States, up until the 1960s, all sex outside of marriage 
was a crime.13 The element of force was necessary to separate rape from the crimes 
of adultery (sex with a married person) and fornication (sex outside of marriage), 
which the victim would be confessing to when reporting the rape. The crime of 
rape then was never developed to respond to the social harm of unwanted sex. The 
contemporary definition of rape by force reflects this limitation, being unable to 
reach all forms of unwanted sex instead of unwanted sex accompanied by weapons 
and violence.14 
Through reform efforts that began in the 1980s, rape was redefined to be a crime 
without force and with an actus reus of consent, or technically non-consent. As a 
result, thirty-six jurisdictions now include an element of non-consent, often 
supplementing their definitions of rape by force with non-consent as an alternative 
means to violate the statute.15 Referred to here as “rape by non-consent,” the legal 
definition still fails to define a large amount of unwanted sex as criminal conduct. 
Only eight jurisdictions define rape exclusively as sex with another without the 
person’s consent.16 Rather, twenty-eight of these thirty-six jurisdictions qualify 
and condition the element of non-consent to specific circumstances such as the 
parties’ age, employment status, or state of intoxication.17 
11. See infra note 98 (listing states and statutory provisions). 
12. See infra notes 78–84 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 102–15 and accompanying text. 
14. See People v. Brown, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589, 595 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017); People v. Anderson, 314 N.E. 2d 
651, 652–53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974). These cases are further discussed infra notes 85–97 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 126–30 (listing states and statutory provisions). 
16. See infra notes 126–27 (listing states and statutory provisions). 
17. See infra notes 128–30 (listing states and statutory provisions). 
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Although rape defined by a lack of consent should have expanded the actionable 
types of unwanted sex, in reality, it too has been rendered underinclusive by 
sexism. Men’s fears of false accusations stunted the reach of rape defined by 
non-consent to arise only in codified power imbalances (where the offender is a 
state officer or medical professional with power over the victim) or when the 
victim is incapable of giving consent (most often defined as mental disability or 
impairment and more recently intoxication). 
More contemporary efforts at reforms, including rape by affirmative consent 
and rape by intoxication, also do not reach the social harm of unwanted sex. These 
reforms present an additional overinclusive problem of proscribing sex based on a 
failure to communicate or a failure of sobriety, which can occur when the parties 
are engaged in what both consider consensual intimacy. 
When thinking about criminal law, many think of non-vagueness and non­
retroactivity as bedrock principles. However, it is actually the criminal law’s 
evolution that has given it the most legitimacy. Horseless carriages forced states to 
update manslaughter statutes to apply to drivers. Computers challenged states to 
develop hacking offenses. It is now time for rape too to reflect contemporary 
norms of unwanted sex when defining sex crimes, free from the lens of sexist 
presumptions of conduct, behavior, and entitlements. 
As set forth in Part I, the existing definitions of rape that focus on actus reus fail 
to define the social harm of unwanted sex as a crime. Accordingly, Part II then sets 
forth a proposed offense of a “rape by malice” that has an actus reus of 
non-consent and a mens rea of malice. The preliminary value of this proposed new 
crime is that it more effectively targets unwanted sex as the definition of actionable 
rape. In the book Missoula, Jon Krakauer interviewed a juror about her reasons for 
acquitting a rapist under Montana’s definition of rape, which is one of the eight 
states that defines rape in its broadest reach as sex without the consent of another.18 
An important insight from this interview is that even when rape is defined broadly, 
the mens rea of knowledge requires proof that the defendant in fact knew he was 
having sex without his partner’s consent. When framed in this manner, it is 
possible for the jury to both believe a woman’s testimony that she was raped but 
not have evidence that the defendant knew the victim was not consenting. The 
proposed crime of rape by malice responds to this problem. 
Affirmative knowledge is one of the most difficult mental states to prove in 
criminal law. The crimes of larceny and homicide have avoided this roadblock by 
evolving into myriad offenses (larceny by trick, embezzlement, vehicular homi­
cide, murder by malice) that consider sophisticated and varied mental states. But 
rape has not adopted more nuanced mental states, which is a glaring omission. 
Malice is a legal term of art that is more than simply a desire to inflict harm on 
another. In the homicide context, malice is a capacious term that captures the 
18. See JON KRAKAUER, MISSOULA: RAPE AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN A COLLEGE TOWN 302–05 (2015). 
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mental state that arises when someone intentionally wants to kill another, reck­
lessly causes the death of another, or acts with “an abandoned and malignant 
heart,” with such extreme indifference towards human life that she has no regard 
over whether her conduct harms another. Although thoughtful scholars have 
argued that the term malice is too vague, unworkable, or implicates character 
instead of conduct,19 those criticisms do not arise from the prosecutors, defen­
dants, and judges that use that term each and every day to effectively adjudicate the 
thousands of homicide cases in common law jurisdictions. To the contrary, the 
mens rea of malice has resulted in murder convictions for socially contemptuous 
conduct that would have otherwise not been prosecuted or prosecuted only for 
negligent or vehicular manslaughter. 
One example is the Knoller case involving a woman who owned a vicious and 
uncontrollable 150-pound dog, unhabituated to humans, who attacked others, and 
lived with this dog in a residential apartment building in San Francisco.20 The dog 
attacked and killed a neighbor.21 In the immediate aftermath, the dog owner 
returned to the crime scene, not to call 911 or check on the victim, but to look for 
lost keys.22 Another is Fleming, in which a drunk driver with a 0.315 blood alcohol 
level who, akin to the Frogger video game, drove against rush hour traffic up to 80 
mph in a 45 mph zone before killing a person in a head-on collision.23 In both 
instances, malice expanded the reach of murder to also include killings that arose 
from people who held contempt for the safety and well-being of others. 
As applied to the crime of rape, the value of the malice mens rea is that it is 
nimble enough to capture rapes arising from a defendant’s deliberate plan to 
engage in sex without the victim’s consent, reckless disregard of risk that he is 
having sex without the victim’s consent, and extreme indifference over whether he 
is having sex without the consent of victim. It also includes evidence after the 
encounter to gauge if the accused had a malignant heart when engaging in sexual 
conduct. Like the dog owner in Knoller, whose disinterest in calling 911, lack of 
inquiry about the victim, and return to the crime scene to look for her keys all 
helped prove inferences that she held the same extreme indifference toward the 
well-being of victim before the dog attack, so too can evidence of how a man acts 
after a sexual encounter prove whether he knew or cared if the encounter was 
consensual or not.24 For example, in the famous rape case profiled in Missoula, 
would the college quarterback also have been acquitted if the jury was directed to 
consider factors such as the fact that he abruptly ended the sexual encounter 
19. See infra Part II.B (defining malice); infra Part II.C (discussing criticisms and responses to such criticisms 
of the definition of malice). 
20. People v. Knoller, No. A123272, 2010 WL 3280200, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2010). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at *43. 
23. See United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945, 946–47 (4th Cir. 1984). 
24. See infra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing Knoller); infra Part II.D (explaining how different 
facts would become relevant in a rape by malice prosecution). 
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without any efforts to kiss, cuddle, or provide her with sexual gratification, actions 
consistent with consensual activity? Or why, after weeks of endless texts with the 
woman, did the quarterback suddenly cease all communication after their sexual 
encounter? The mens rea of malice would direct the jury to consider whether the 
defendant’s indifference towards the victim’s well-being after their encounter was 
also evidence of indifference over whether the sex act was consensual when it was 
happening.25 
Rape by malice would more effectively police and convict those for engaging in 
unwanted sex than do current definitions of rape. As a result, more rapists will be 
convicted. But under our current punishment practices, punishing more rapists 
must give us pause. In 1897, Oliver Wendell Holmes stressed “we must consider 
the criminal rather than the crime.”26 Part III attempts to do both. Our society is 
painfully aware of how our Tough-on-Crime era increased our prison population 
by 400% in only one generation.27 The United States has 5% of the world’s 
population and over 20% of the world’s prison inmates.28 
The Prison Crisis, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/prison-crisis (last visited Nov. 4, 2017). 
It is widely recognized 
that mass incarceration has been too costly with respect to long prison sentences, 
the loss of human capital, the racial disparities in convictions, the financial toll of 
mass incarceration, and the ineffectual nature of prisons to stop crime.29 
25. See infra notes 254–61 and accompanying text (discussing facts from the prosecution of the college 
quarterback who was acquitted of rape). 
26. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 470 (1897) (quoting Franz Joseph 
Gall’s theory regarding his studies of nature versus nurture). 
27. JONATHAN WROBLEWSKI, U.S. DEP’T OF  JUSTICE, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS REFORM: WHERE WE ARE 
AND WHERE WE’RE HEADED 5 (2016) (on file with author). This current mass incarceration has not been the norm. 
To the contrary, in 1972, there were 196,092 prisoners in federal and state prisons. By 2014, the numbers had risen 
over 400%, to a population of 1,508,636. Id.; see also Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the 
Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 886–87 (2009) (“Over the last 35 years, the population of America’s 
prisons and jails has soared from approximately 360,000 to over 2.3 million people. More than one in a hundred 
American adults is currently behind bars.”). 
28. 
29. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 93–94 (rev. ed. 2012) (discussing racial 
disparities and the exponential rise in the U.S. prison population); Emily Badger, The Meteoric, Costly and 
Unprecedented Rise of Incarceration in America, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/wonk/wp/2014/04/30/the-meteoric-costly-and-unprecedented-rise-of-incarceration-in-america/?utm_ 
term=.f0edc1583594; Alana Semuels, What Incarceration Costs American Families, ATLANTIC (Sept. 15, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/the-true-costs-of-mass-incarceration/405412/ (describing the 
ongoing financial burdens faced by families of those who have been incarcerated). 
Potential and actual sentences for rape are excessive. Nineteen states have 
maximum sentences of 99, 100 years, or life terms. Twelve states have minimum 
sentences that begin at ten years and range as high as twenty-five years. Although 
reliable and accurate statistics are hard to come by, where data has been made 
available, it shows that a person convicted of rape is sentenced to prison terms in 
approximately 95% of cases (as opposed to 40% for other felonies), and the length 
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of those sentences are between eight and thirty years long.30 By contrast, countries 
in Western Europe impose a sentence for rape at lengths that are half to one-fifth 
these terms.31 
In reforming rape law, it is not naı¨ve or misguided then to recognize that lighter 
sentences have enormous value to society, victims, and defendants. This Article 
proposes a five-year maximum prison term for acquaintance rape. This proposed 
lighter sentence neither suggests that the crime of rape is not serious and worthy of 
serious consequences nor that the offender is not depraved. To the contrary, the 
reasons for this proposal arise from the following three factors that seek to hold 
more offenders accountable for rape: 
First, lengthy prison terms may be causing more crime than whatever deterrence 
and incapacitation from prison time prevents.32 Nationally, state and federal 
governments spend $80 billion—each year—on maintaining prisons,33 an invest­
ment that results in three of every four prisoners reoffending within five years of 
being released.34 
Recidivism, NAT’L INST. JUST., http://www.nij.gov/topics/corrections/recidivism/pages/welcome.aspx (last 
updated June 17, 2014) (reporting a 76.6% recidivism rate for persons within five years of their prison release 
date). 
Are prisons simply an expensive means to maintain an unusually 
high prison population, or are efforts being made to rehabilitate? For those 
answering with the latter, rehabilitation is not advanced simply for the sake of 
saving the offender. The Republican-activist Koch Brothers have joined with 
left-leaning organizations to support criminal justice reform efforts.35 
See, e.g., Molly Ball, Do the Koch Brothers Really Care About Criminal-Justice Reform?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 
3, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/do-the-koch-brothers-really-care-about-criminal­
justice-reform/386615 (discussing the alliance between liberal activists and the conservative Koch brothers on 
criminal justice reform efforts). The general counsel for Koch Industries explained, “[C]riminal-justice reform is 
good for all of us—the rich, the poor, and everyone else.” Id. 
Whether 
motivated by money or morality, ending recidivism is more benefical for all 
sectors in society.36 
The starting point in sentencing reform is the reality that 95% of all state 
prisoners are released when their sentences are over.37 
Timothy Hughes & Doris James Wilson, Reentry Trends in the United States, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/reentry/reentry.cfm (last visited Nov. 4, 2017). 
State and federal jurisdic­
tions that have successfully reduced recidivism have provided means for offenders 
to reattach to the community with jobs, family ties, community ties, and educa­
30. See infra notes 52, 322 and accompanying text (statutes listing maximum terms); infra notes 327–34 and 
accompanying text (actual lengths of sentences); infra notes 279, 333, 342 and accompanying text (rates for 
prison terms imposed in state and federal courts for rape convictions). 
31. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., FINDING DIRECTION: EXPANDING CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPTIONS BY CONSIDERING 
POLICIES OF OTHER NATIONS 22 (2011); infra notes 335–42 and accompanying text (international comparisons). 
32. See infra Part III.D. 
33. See Semuels, supra note 29. 
34. 
35. 
36. See id. 
37. 
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tion.38 Lighter sentences increase the likelihood of maintaining positive commu­
nity ties, which will in turn reduce the cost of incarceration and repeat offenders.39 
See James Gilligan, Opinion, Punishment Fails. Rehabilitation Works., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012), https://www. 
nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/12/18/prison-could-be-productive/punishment-fails-rehabilitation-works. 
A criminal sentence cannot just be an outlet of community outrage—the pitchforks 
and torches of yore—but must meaningfully engage the societal goods of rehabili­
tation of the wrongdoer and include post-conviction reintegration into the 
community. 
Second, efforts to reform rape laws are being stalled without penal reforms. The 
American Law Institute—an elite and influential group of judges, attorneys, and 
law professors—created the Model Penal Code, a set of proposed crimes.40 
Although there is varying influence on any given proposed crime and defense, 
every state has adopted some aspect of the Model Penal Code at least in part, and 
about half of all states have adopted it to a large degree.41 Despite the Model Penal 
Code being heralded as a thoughtful and influential code, its definition of rape (first 
created in 1962 and reformed in 1980) is laden with sexist and limited definitions. 
Over a dozen years ago, Professor Deborah Denno, among others, criticized this 
definition in detail and called for “the Model Penal Code’s sexual offense 
provisions . . . be  pulled, revised, and replaced.”42 On its own website, the Ameri­
can Law Institute recognizes these limitations, cautioning readers that its model 
definition of rape is “outdated and no longer a reliable guide for legislatures and 
courts.”43 
Sexual Assault and Related Offenses, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/sexual-assault-and­
related-offenses/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2017). 
Despite this remarkable internal rebuke, in May 2017, members of the 
American Law Institute again failed to agree on how to reform its definition of 
38. See infra notes 346–52 and accompanying text; see also MINN. STAT. § 364.01 (2017) (“The legislature 
declares that it is the policy of the state of Minnesota to encourage and contribute to the rehabilitation of criminal 
offenders and to assist them in the resumption of the responsibilities of citizenship. The opportunity to secure 
employment or to pursue, practice, or engage in a meaningful and profitable trade, occupation, vocation, 
profession or business is essential to rehabilitation and the resumption of the responsibilities of citizenship.”). 
39. 
40. See MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
41. DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 13 (3d ed. 2013) (“The 
‘Model Penal Code’ . . . was  the  result of nine years of work by a group of experts working with the American 
Law Institute to provide a model for states to use in reforming their own criminal codes. Since its promulgation in 
1962, it has been enormously—although unevenly—influential . . .  .”). For instance, the Model Penal Code’s 
recommendation to eliminate the defense of impossibility has been adopted in most states but its recommenda­
tions to provide for generous defenses based on mental illness and insanity have not. See Matthew C. Campbell, 
Crossing the Rubicon: An Argument for Adopting the Model Penal Code Formulation of Criminal Attempt in 
Massachusetts, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 949, 957 n.79 (2013) (impossibility defense); Henry F. Fradella, From 
Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental Illness and Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7, 25 (2007) (discussing how the states and federal government rejected the Model Penal Code 
insanity defense after the attempted assassination of President Reagan). 
42. Deborah W. Denno, Why the Model Penal Code’s Sexual Offense Provisions Should Be Pulled and 
Replaced, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207, 207 (2003). 
43. 
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rape.44 
See Ashe Schow, Campus Rape Polices as Law for All? Legal Group Says No, REALCLEARINVESTIGATIONS 
(May 29, 2017), http://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2017/05/29/legal_group_rejects_endorsing_ 
campus_rape_policies.html. 
A sizeable number of experts resisted reform because improving the 
definition of rape would lead to more convictions, which creates a larger social 
problem of mass incarceration without an end in sight.45 Combining sentencing 
reforms alongside statutory reforms then is neither misguided nor overly ambi­
tious. To the contrary, because our prisons are at the breaking point, discussing any 
reform to conviction rates without addressing the penological consequences is 
myopic at best. Rape by malice then strives to both provide a better definition of 
the crime and a meaningful attempt to redress what is the best punishment for the 
offenders, victims, and society. 
Third, it is not unreasonable to attribute the low rate of rape convictions, at least 
in part, to jurors’, prosecutors’, and victims’ concerns about overpunishment. 
There are of course instances of acquaintance rape in which the facts of the case, 
on their face, are despicable and revealing of a predatory and craven offender.46 
But there are other instances, too, that arise from more ambiguous circumstances 
of intoxication or which involve an offender who committed a harm animated from 
confusion and stupidity.47 In all scenarios, a reasonable juror or prosecutor might 
pause in seeking a conviction, even though the criminal conduct is morally 
reprehensible, because of the excessive punishment that often comes with that 
conviction. 
Forty years ago, states had an analogous problem in figuring out the best 
punishment for a driver who killed another while operating a car. The crime could 
be punished with either misdemeanor offenses or involuntary manslaughter, which 
carried a sentence of twenty years. “[P]rosecutors faced with this choice hesitated 
to proceed on a manslaughter theory, even when the facts so warranted, because of 
the reluctance of jurors to convict fellow drivers on such a serious charge.”48 This 
44. 
45. See id. 
46. See KRAKAUER, supra note 18, at 12–15 (discussing Beau Donaldson’s sexual assault of a childhood friend 
while she was sleeping); id. at 153–57 (describing Donaldson’s unreported rape of another woman that stopped 
when friends knocked down a locked door in response to her screams); id. at 19–21 (describing unreported sexual 
assault by an acquaintance while the victim was intoxicated and unconscious); id. at 34–40 (describing a sexual 
assault on an intoxicated woman by four football players); id. at 119–21 (interview with a rapist describing other 
encounters where he physically held down the victim during the assault); id. at 327–28 (report of a woman who 
reported being sexually assaulted and statement by alleged rapist that he placed Xanax in the woman’s drink 
before the alleged assault occurred). 
47. Id. at 69–70, 74–83 (discussing Calvin Smith, who had been a virgin, who sexually assaulted a woman by 
engaging in aggressive, unusual conduct he learned from pornography that he thought was commonplace); id. at 
51–53 (describing an attempted sexual assault that occurred after drinking, consensual activity, and clear 
communication). 
48. Commonwealth v. Jones, 416 N.E.2d 502, 505 (Mass. 1981). The court stated: 
Before the enactment of [the vehicular manslaughter statute] in 1976, a defendant who had killed 
another person unintentionally by reason of his improper operation of a motor vehicle might have 
been prosecuted for any of a variety of misdemeanor offenses, such as driving so as to 
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recognition of this problem is significant because jurors often are not told of the 
potential sentence, or if they are, are routinely told to disregard it when deciding 
guilt.49 
See Andrew Fleischman, Why Don’t Prosecutors Want Jurors to Know the Sentence?, MIMESIS L. (Sept. 
25, 2015), http://mimesislaw.com/fault-lines/why-dont-prosecutors-want-jurors-to-know-the-sentence/3350. 
Nonetheless, policy makers properly diagnosed that jurors did not convict 
obviously guilty people to avoid excessive punishment. In response, state legisla­
tures developed the crime of vehicular manslaughter that carried approximately 
two-year prison terms for the precise purpose of developing a crime that had 
serious consequences but not excessive prison terms that deterred convictions.50 
So, too, can rape reformers learn that reducing punishment for rape can result in 
more convictions and be the needed reform that holds more wrongdoers accountable. 
In some states, rape is punished with an actual prison term of thirty years,51 and 
in nineteen states, rape carries a maximum sentence of either 99 years, 100 years, 
or life.52 Those numbers need to be digested. A person convicted of second-degree 
endanger . . . or  for  involuntary manslaughter, which carries a maximum penalty of twenty years 
imprisonment in State prison. The legislative history of [the vehicular manslaughter statute] 
indicates that prosecutors faced with this choice hesitated to proceed on a manslaughter theory, 
even when the facts so warranted, because of the reluctance of jurors to convict fellow drivers on 
such a serious charge . . . . On  the  other hand, the penalties established for the misdemeanor of 
driving to endanger did not seem commensurate with the crime of causing a death. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
49. 
50. See Jones, 416 N.E.2d at 505 (“From this history, it seems clear that the purpose of [the vehicular 
manslaughter statute] was to provide a middle ground between the felony of manslaughter and the misdemeanor 
of driving so as to endanger.”). The court noted that the punishment for manslaughter was twenty years, as 
opposed to the 2.5-year prison term for vehicular manslaughter. Id. at 505 n.6. 
51. In Alaska, for the 579 reported rapes in 2012, thirteen ended in convictions, and the average sentence 
imposed was 29.9 years. See REBECCA ROENFANZ, ALASKA DEP’T OF  PUB. SAFETY, CRIME IN ALASKA 2012, at 33 
(2012). 
52. The following states have the maximum terms for the crimes of rape that would include acquaintance rape 
listed as 99 years, 100 years, or life: ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61(b) (2017) (stating rape in the first degree is a Class A 
felony, where the sentence shall be for “life or not more than 99 years” per § 13A-5-6); ALASKA STAT. 
§ 12.55.125(i)(1) (2016) (99 years); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 773 (2017) (stating rape in the first degree is a Class 
A felony, where the sentence shall be fifteen years to life per § 4205(b)(1)); D.C. CODE §§ 22-3002, 22-3020(a) 
(2013) (stating a person convicted of first degree sexual abuse combined with aggravating circumstances may be 
subject to life in prison); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(b) (2017) (“A person convicted of the offense of rape shall be 
punished by death, by imprisonment for life without parole, by imprisonment for life, or by a split sentence that is 
a term of imprisonment for not less than 25 years and not exceeding life imprisonment, followed by probation for 
life.”); IDAHO CODE § 18-6104 (2017) (one year to life); IOWA CODE § 709.2 (2017) (stating sexual abuse in the 
first degree is a class A felony, subject to life imprisonment per § 902.1(1)); LA. STAT. ANN. § 42(D)(1) (2017) 
(“life imprisonment at hard labor”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-303(d)(1)(LexisNexis 2017) (life); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 750.520b(2)(a) (2017) (life); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65(4)(a) (2017) (“imprisoned for life in the 
State Penitentiary if the jury by its verdict so prescribes; and in cases where the jury fails to fix the penalty at life 
imprisonment, the court shall fix the penalty at imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for any term as the court, in 
its discretion, may determine”); MO. REV. STAT. § 566.030(2) (2017) (life); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503(2)-(3)(a) 
(2017) (life imprisonment or a term of four to 100 years); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 2017) (twenty-five 
years to life); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-3 (2017) (ten years to life); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402(3) (LexisNexis 
2017) (life); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(f)(1) (2017) (three years to life); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(B) (2017) 
(five years to life); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.040(2), 9A.44.050(2) (2017) (rape in first and second degree are 
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murder is sentenced to between four to forty years in prison.53 Why is acquain­
tance rape often punished more harshly than murder? To the extent that concerns 
about overpunishment lead a single victim to not report, a prosecutor not to charge, 
and a juror not to convict, the sentence for a rape conviction must be reformed. 
The 2016 conviction of Brock Turner, the Stanford swimmer who attacked an 
unconscious woman brought with it much attention and public outrage.54 
Emanuella Grinberg & Catherine E. Shoichet, Brock Turner Released from Jail After Serving 3 Months for 
Sexual Assault, CNN (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/02/us/brock-turner-release-jail/index.html 
(“The case drew national attention after the victim’s wrenching impact statement went viral. The brevity of 
Turner’s sentence triggered outrage against the judge and controversy over how the justice system treats sexual 
assault survivors.”). 
Even 
though the conviction did not technically involve the charge of rape, the public 
believed it did and was outraged by what was seen as an over-privileged white man 
who received a “free pass” by getting a light sentence.55 The outrage arose in part 
because the sentencing judge spoke of Mr. Turner’s equities and sentenced him to 
what amounted to only a three-month prison term. Much has been written about 
the racial and class disparities arising from this sentence.56 
See Gabby Bess, How Racial Bias Influenced Stanford Swimmer’s Rape Case, VICE (June 7, 2016), 
https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/bjgg95/brock-turner-rape-case-sentencing-racial-bias; Jospeh Margulies, 
Racism, Classism, Feminism . . .  and Brock Turner, VERDICT (Sept. 6, 2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/09/ 
06/racism-classism-feminism-brock-turner. 
But this Article asks, 
what if Brock Turner deserved this proverbial break? And what if the lesson 
learned should be that all acquaintance rapists must have the same opportunity for 
rehabilitation and reform—even when, and especially when, the acts are depraved, 
despicable, and worthy of unequivocal condemnation? 
Many recoil at light sentences for rapists, on the assumption that a light sentence 
is letting a very bad person off. But it is a mistake to contend that the problem with 
mass incarceration starts and ends with drug offenders. Retribution for even the 
most craven of conduct is no longer a tenable option for prisons, prisoners, and the 
society that must reintegrate offenders. Moreover, national surveys of crime 
victims lend support to the policy goals of rehabilitation over lengthier sentences: 
82% support “[i]ncreasing education and rehabilitation services for the people in 
the justice system.”57 Of the male crime victims, 87% attribute crime to alcohol 
and drug addiction or poor parenting; 81% of the female crime victims agree.58 
Class A felonies and may be punishment with a sentence up to life per § 9A.20.021(1)(a)); see also notes 322–23 
and accompanying text (compiling sentences from states where data is available). 
53. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a) (West 2014) (fifteen years to life); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/5-4.5-30 (2017) (four to twenty years); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103(4) (2017) (murder punished from two to 
forty years), VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 (2017) (second-degree murder punished from five to forty years). 
54. 
55. See Michael Vitiello, Brock Turner: Sorting Through the Noise, MCGEORGE L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file 
with author) (discussing the complicated legal issues that justify the shorter sentence and factors that compel 
against judicial recall). 
56. 
57. DAVID BINDER RESEARCH, CRIME SURVIVORS’ VIEWS ON TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
AGENDA 7 (2017); see also ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUSTICE, CRIME SURVIVORS SPEAK: THE FIRST-EVER NATIONAL 
SURVEY OF VICTIMS’ VIEWS ON SAFETY AND JUSTICE 4 (2016). 
58. DAVID BINDER RESEARCH, supra note 57, at 5. 
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Figure 1. Ideal definition (all conduct to the right of the line would be convicted as a 
crime and conduct to the left, including some unwanted sex, would be non-actionable). 
Only 4% of all surveyed crime victims attribute “too few people in prison” as a 
cause of crime.59 In this respect, reforms to rape sentences must be accompanied 
by a call for more effective criminal justice intervention rather than simply 
incarceration and more of it. Instead of channeling outrage for the first rape, 
sentencing must also meaningfully seek to rehabilitate and prevent a second. This 
Article advances the normative position that a lighter sentence for acquaintance 
rape serves retribution, and just as importantly, serves the societal goals of ending 
crime by increasing convictions and reintegrating offenders who complete shorter 
sentences. 
I. CONTEMPORARY DEFINITIONS OF ACQUAINTANCE RAPE FAIL TO REFLECT THE 
SOCIAL HARM OF UNWANTED SEX 
Because criminal law is most effective when it captures and criminalizes social 
harm, the current definitions of rape fail this test. The crimes of rape by force and 
rape by non-consent are both underinclusive in their reach, failing to capture 
numerous instances of unwanted sex. Part I explores how and why this came to be. 
A. Current Rape Laws Do Not Adequately Criminalize Unwanted Sex, The 
Social Harm in The Offense of Acquaintance Rape 
In 1998, Professor Stephen Schulhofer offered an elegant definition of the social 
harm of contemporary rape as simply being unwanted sex.60 In his groundbreaking 
book, Professor Schulhofer discussed the problems of rape law as it was then 
formulated and how the definition lacked a way to distinguish wanted sex from 
unwanted sex. Building on this insight, as argued in more detail below, criminal 
law is effective when it both evolves to reflect emerging social harms and separates 
out legal conduct from criminal behavior. In the context of rape then, an ideal 
definition of rape would not criminalize wanted sex and would define unwanted 
sex as a crime. As shown in Figure 1, all lawful sex, which is in the white box, 
would not fall within the definition of rape. And, most—but not all—of unwanted 
sex, which is in the gray box, would be captured by the statutory definition. 
59. See id. 
60. See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 274 
(1998) (“Of all our rights and liberties, few are as important as our right to choose freely whether and when we 
will become sexually intimate with another person.”). 
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Figure 2. Contemporary low conviction rate (all conduct to the right of the line would be 
convicted as a crime, which leaves the majority of unwanted sex as not being a crime). 
Of note, the line demarcating lawful from unlawful conduct is not drawn 
perfectly between the two categories. There will always be conduct that easily falls 
in the definition of wanted sex and conduct that that easily falls in what the 
reasonable jury would deem unwanted sex. But at the margins, the legal standard 
requiring a jury to convict a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, will permit 
some unwanted sex to be non-actionable as a crime. This error rate that favors 
defendants is the reality and, as many can defend, a normative good of our legal 
system. As most poignantly defended by Supreme Court Justice John Marshall 
Harlan, “I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal 
case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far 
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”61 
However, the contemporary conviction rate for rape is low, which is estimated to 
be around seven convictions for every 1000 rapes that occur.62 
See supra note 1. The data from RAINN is generally viewed as reliable, but the reported data can range 
from a 3% to 18% conviction rate. See Tyler Kingkade, Prosecutors Rarely Bring Charges in College Rape Cases, 
HUFFPOST (June 17, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/17/college-rape-prosecutors-press-charges_ 
n_5500432.html. One reason for the discrepancy is that it is difficult to accurately estimate how many unreported 
rapes exist. As demonstrated in this Article, comparing the definitions of rape from one state to another is not 
always comparing the same crime, and not all states keep statistics. See infra note 98 (providing various 
definitions of what “force” establishes rape by force); infra notes 76–77, 320–22 (discussing limitations of 
available data and comparisons between states). 
Such a low 
conviction rate demands reconsideration of how rape is currently defined. A 
conviction rate that barely prosecutes any unwanted sex as a crime establishes a 
disconnect between the contemporary social harm of rape constituting unwanted 
sex and contemporary definitions of the crime. As illustrated in Figure 2, the line 
demarcating what is criminal from what is not is no longer slightly to the right of 
the gap between wanted and unwanted sex. 
Rather, current definitions of what constitutes rape classify only a very small 
number of acts of unwanted sex as the crime of rape.63 In the gray box, containing 
all “unwanted sex,” a line would be at the very far right, capturing only a small 
number of unwanted sex as a crime. As a corollary, the contemporary definition of 
rape is equally flawed in permitting the majority of unwanted sex to be non­
61. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
62. 
63. See infra Part I.B (discussing limitations of defining rape by force); infra Part I.C (discussing limitations of 
defining rape by non-consent). 
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actionable. For the victims who experience sexual assault, as explained in more 
detail below, the contemporary definitions of the crime of rape laws are inadequate. 
In any given criminal offense, the legislature defines the mental state, known as 
the mens rea, as what a defendant must have when engaging in the prohibited 
conduct—known as the actus reus. Together the bad thoughts and the bad act 
combine to constitute the elements of the crime.64 If murder was defined as a 
person with the purpose to kill who causes the death of another, then Person X who 
wishes to kill her neighbor, but does not, does not commit the crime of murder, 
even if the neighbor dies from some unrelated accident. Person X had the needed 
mens rea (a desire to kill), but lacked the actus reus (any conduct that “causes the 
death”) to meet all elements of the crime. 
State legislatures have enormous power in defining what conduct constitutes a 
crime. As relevant both to Part I and Part II, how a state defines a crime and which 
elements it requires the prosecution to prove deserves attention because what 
conduct is criminal reflects policy choices over what social harm is the target of 
criminal law and what conduct will be let alone by the criminal code. For instance, 
before 1990, the crime of stalking—obsessive attention towards another that 
presents a threat of harm—did not exist as an actionable offense.65 It was only after 
the 1989 murder of a well-known actress by her obsessive fan that California 
become the first state to define the stalker’s obsessive and threatening behavior as a 
criminal offense.66 Likewise, the recent legalization of marijuana in eight states 
and the District of Columbia is an example of how conduct once the target of 
criminal law—possessing, growing, and consuming marijuana—is no longer 
deemed (at least by the jurisdictions pursuing legalization) a social harm worthy of 
policing and criminalization.67 
See State Marijuana Laws in 2017 Map, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana­
laws-map-medical-recreational.html (last updated Sept. 14, 2017); see also Gina Belafonte et al., What Jeff 
Sessions Is Getting Wrong About Legal Weed, CNBC (July 18, 2017), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/18/jeff­
sessions-misguided-marijuana-crackdown-commentary.html (discussing reasons to support legalization of mari­
juana, the social good that arises from legalization marijuana, and social harms that arise from criminalizing 
recreational marijuana use). 
For some newly-emerging behavior and technologies, legislatures needed to 
create new types of crimes previously unimaginable to prior generations. For 
instance, Congress defined new types of intangible property—honest services—to 
capture the social harms of government corruption that were not captured by theft 
or state bribery law alone.68 “Hacking” needed its own set of laws to capture the 
64. CRUMP ET AL., supra note 41, at 21–22. 
65. Melissa A. Knight, Stalking and Cyberstalking in the United States and Rural South Dakota: Twenty-Four 
Years After the First Legislation, 59 S.D. L. REV. 392, 394 (2014). 
66. Id. at 394–95. 
67. 
68. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 400 (2010). The court stated: 
[T]he honest-services theory targeted corruption that lacked similar symmetry. While the offender 
profited, the betrayed party suffered no deprivation of money or property; instead, a third party, 
who had not been deceived, provided the enrichment. For example, if a city mayor (the offender) 
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social harm that arises when a computer user entered into a computer system and 
the cyber-burglars were no longer “disenchanted teenagers” but sophisticated 
actors seeking to “potentially destabilize society.”69 
Eric J. Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes: A Practical Approach to the Application of Federal 
Computer Crime Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 177, 229 (2000) (“Over the course of the 
past ten years, cyber-crimes have progressed from being malicious pranks by disenchanted teenagers to a serious 
threat that will tax the resources of crime enforcement and potentially destabilize society. Successful criminal 
prosecution and civil litigation will require that members of the legal community familiarize themselves with the 
various hacking techniques to ensure that the perpetrators are tried and convicted under the relevant statutes.”); 
see also Ben Yagoda, A Short History of “Hack”, NEW YORKER (Mar. 6, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/tech/ 
elements/a-short-history-of-hack. 
More recently, “upskirting” is 
a new crime responding to the social harm of strangers taking photographs of 
someone’s underwear in public spaces.70 In 2014, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts held that the state’s Peeping Tom statute used to prosecute a man in 
that case did not apply to the conduct of upskirting.71 Peeping Tom statutes 
responded to the surreptitious surveillance of people in various states of nudity; 
taking photos of a person’s underwear on public transportation did not involve 
nudity.72 In the last footnote of the case reversing the conviction, however, the 
Supreme Judicial Court listed other state statutes that did adequately reach and 
criminalize upskirting as a means to suggest a legislative fix if the legislature 
deemed the reversal inappropriate.73 The public outcry from the reversal motivated 
the legislature to act, and act quickly. The decision was issued on March 5, 2014, 
and within two days of this decision, on March 7, 2014, the Massachusetts 
legislature passed, and the governor signed, a new law criminalizing upskirting, 
capturing the social harm that ubiquitous smart phones presented.74 
Jessica Ravitz, ‘Upskirt’Ban in Massachusetts Signed into Law, CNN (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2014/03/07/justice/massachusetts-upskirt-bill/index.html. 
All of these examples illustrate how new social harms borne from new social 
interactions and technology demanded the invention of new, previously unknown 
crimes. In each example, the criminal law has been effective in being nimble, 
creative, and responsive to newly-recognized social harms. It then is all the more 
accepted a bribe from a third party in exchange for awarding that party a city contract, yet the 
contract terms were the same as any that could have been negotiated at arm’s length, the city (the 
betrayed party) would suffer no tangible loss. Even if the scheme occasioned a money or 
property gain for the betrayed party, courts reasoned, actionable harm lay in the denial of that 
party’s right to the offender’s “honest services.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
69. 
70. See Commonwealth. v. Robertson, 5 N.E.3d 522, 529 n.17 (Mass. 2014) (“Other States, recognizing that 
women have such an expectation of privacy, have enacted provisions specifically criminalizing the type of 
upskirting the defendant is alleged to have attempted.”). 
71. Id. at 529 (“At the core of the Commonwealth’s argument to the contrary is the proposition that a woman, 
and in particular a woman riding on a public trolley, has a reasonable expectation of privacy in not having a 
stranger secretly take photographs up her skirt. The proposition is eminently reasonable, but § 105(b) in its current 
form does not address it.”). 
72. Id. at 527–28. 
73. Id. at 529 n.17 (discussing statutes from Florida and New York) 
74. 
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glaring that rape law has not evolved to capture the modern social harm of 
unwanted sex. 
Comparing crimes across states is inherently difficult, given that states have 
different definitions and often different names for similar conduct. In comparing 
statutes that covered what is thought of as burglary, Judge Posner observed that the 
same conduct would be prosecuted as “theft” in Indiana, “entry into a locked 
vehicle” in Wisconsin, “burglary” in Illinois, and one of seven grades of “breaking 
and entering” in Michigan.75 
Despite these limitations, generalities about rape law can be made. For acquain­
tance rape, the actus reus of the offense is defined either as rape by force or rape by 
non-consent. As an example of rape by force, Connecticut defines rape by the 
elements of a person who: 
compels another person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force 
against such other person or a third person, or by the threat of use of force 
against such other person or against a third person which reasonably causes 
such person to fear physical injury to such person or a third person . . . .76 
As an example of rape by non-consent, Missouri defines the crime of second-
degree rape as occurring when a person “has sexual intercourse with another 
person knowing that he or she does so without that person’s consent.”77 As an 
important starting point, both definitions of the actus reus in rape are underinclu­
sive in capturing the majority of unwanted sexual encounters as crime. In the 
following sections, I explore how and why this is so and the failure then of existing 
law to capture the social harm in unwanted sex. 
B. The Contemporary Actus Reus of Rape by Force Is Underinclusive to the 
Social Harm of Unwanted Sex 
Statutes that define rape by force fail to capture the majority of unwanted sex. As 
explained in this section, the reason for this underinclusive reach is that when these 
statutes were formed, the social harm was never identified as unwanted sex. The 
social harm of rape was either the wounded honor of a male relative of a rape 
victim or the act of sex occurring outside of the confines of marriage. The Roman 
Empire recognized rape as a crime, but the social harm of that offense was not 
concern over the violation of a woman’s autonomy. Instead, the crime was a salve 
to the wounded honor of the victim’s father, husband, or brother.78 Even in 
75. Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869, 873–75 (7th Cir. 2000). 
76. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-70(a)(1) (2017). 
77. MO. REV. STAT. § 566.031(1) (2017). 
78. Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in 
Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 57 (2008) (observing that the Roman law 
criminalized rape “because of its meaning to the men in [the rape victim’s] family or culture, or that it harmed a 
wife, daughter, or sister because it impugned a husband’s, father’s, or brother’s honor”). 
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contemporary times, a number of countries in the Middle East have laws that 
permit a rapist to avoid criminal prosecution if he marries his victim. “The laws 
were built around patriarchal attitudes that link a family’s honor directly to a 
woman’s chastity; the marriage option is aimed at shielding the victim’s family 
from ‘the scandal,’ as one victim’s brother put it in an interview.”79 
Somini Sengupta, One by One, Marry-Your-Rapist Laws Are Falling in the Middle East, N.Y. TIMES (July 
22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/22/world/middleeast/marry-your-rapist-laws-middle-east.html?_ 
r=0. 
Likewise, when rape was first defined in America, the social harm was not 
responding to unwanted sex. In the first rape statutes, the actus reus also was 
limited to vaginal penetration, preventing men from being victims of rape and 
women from being perpetrators80 
In 2012, the federal government first expanded its definition of rape to account for same-sex rape and the 
victimization of men. Roni Caryn Rabin, Men Struggle for Rape Awareness, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/health/as-victims-men-struggle-for-rape-awareness.html. 
(even today, some states such as Alabama 
continue to limit rape to heterosexual encounters only, and it was not until 2017 
when Maryland contemplated rape as involving more than vaginal penetration).81 
Husbands were immune from raping their wives (a now sexist idea originating 
from legal coverture doctrine that marriage collapses the legal identity of a married 
woman into her husband’s and unsophisticated presumptions that marriage entitled 
a husband to sex on demand).82 
Between 1975 and 1993, all states formally abolished the marital rape exemption as a doctrine providing 
full immunity to the husband. In 1975, South Dakota was the first state to abolish the marital rape exemption, and 
in 1993, North Carolina was the last. See J.C. Barden, Martial Rape: Drive for Tougher Laws Is Pressed, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 13, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/13/us/marital-rape-drive-for-tougher-laws-is-pressed.
html; Samantha Allen, Marital Rape is Semi-Legal in 8 States, DAILYBEAST (June 9, 2015), https://www. 
thedailybeast.com/marital-rape-is-semi-legal-in-8-states. 
Most important and relevant to how rape continues 
to be defined in contemporary jurisdictions, the definition of force was surprisingly 
restrictive, usually requiring proof that the defendant engaged in substantial 
physical violence and the victim engaged in physical resistance (and usually by her 
“utmost”), which limits the number of defendants who can be guilty of rape.83 By 
contrast, modern domestic violence statutes often define the force element very 
broadly as force resulting in minor injury, which captures many more crimes than 
79. 
80. 
81. Alabama defines rape in the first and second degree and both definitions are defined as “engag[ing] in 
sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex.” ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61(a) (rape in the first degree) (2017); 
id. § 13A-6-62(a) (rape in the second degree); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-304(a) (LexisNexis 2017) (rape in 
the second degree). In 2017, first degree rape was amended to include “sexual act” alongside “vaginal 
intercourse.” See id. § 3-303(a)(1). In both states, lesser crimes expand liability without regard to a victim’s 
gender. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a) (2017) (the crime of “sexual misconduct” is not limited to heterosexuality); 
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-307 (LexisNexis 2017) (partially defining the crime of “sexual offense in the third 
degree” without regard to specific genitalia). 
82. 
 
83. Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 962 (“Rape law has 
traditionally emphasized a woman’s physical resistance to evaluate her lack of consent and the defendant’s use of 
force. At common law, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the woman resisted her assailant to 
the utmost of her physical capacity to prove that an act of sexual intercourse was rape.”); see also Kari Hong, 
Rape by Malice, 78 MONT. L. REV. 187, 199–202 (2017) (citing to commentary and cases discussing reforms to 
rape by force statutes). 
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what rape by force does.84 
Up until modern reforms, the degree of force required to be used before 
unwanted sex was actionable as a crime was astonishingly high. In a 1974 Illinois 
case, People v. Anderson, an 18-year-old woman was walking on a public street at 
5:00 p.m.85 A man approached her from the rear, put his right arm around her 
shoulder, and told her: “Do as I say or I’m going to shoot. I have a gun.”86 She felt 
what she believed to be a gun against her side and returned to his apartment, where 
he choked her, struggled with her, and then engaged in acts of intercourse.87 A 
doctor who examined her after the incident reported a bruise under her eye, a 
scratch on her neck, abrasions on her cheek and forehead, vaginal bleeding, and the 
presence of sperm in her vagina.88 
The Illinois appellate court reversed the rape conviction because the victim did 
not see the gun (negating proof of force), and the victim did not resist because she 
failed to cry out for assistance or attempt to escape during the encounter.89 Stated 
another way, proof of bruises, abrasions, and the threat of death did not rise to the 
force needed to secure a rape conviction. Such a conclusion should be surprising to 
most readers as the facts do not describe consensual sexual contact. This case 
shows that when rape is defined by force, many unwanted sexual encounters will 
not be actionable. 
This observation is not a historical footnote. In March 2017, in People v. Brown, 
a California appellate court reversed a conviction involving a gang rape of a 
15-year-old girl.90 In that case, four gang members lured a teenager to their house, 
“got her falling-down drunk, [and] then had sex with her against her will.”91 A 
DNA test identified sperm found in the victim’s vagina to be from the defendant 
Darnell James Brown.92 A jury convicted Mr. Brown of rape in concert of a minor, 
forcible rape, rape of an intoxicated person, and rape of an unconscious person.93 
But on appeal, the conviction for forcible rape was reversed.94 The issue in the case 
was that there were two encounters, one in a bedroom in which five men, including 
84. For instance, CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5(a) (West 2014) defines a domestic violence crime involving the 
willful infliction of “corporal injury,” which is defined as one “resulting in a traumatic condition.” But “the 
‘traumatic condition’ element is not as stringent a requirement as it may seem. A traumatic condition is “a 
condition of the body, such as a wound, or external or internal injury, . . .  whether of a minor or serious nature, 
caused by a physical force.” People v. Trudell, No. E047860, 2009 WL 4931592, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 
2009) (quoting § 273.5(c)). 
85. People v. Anderson, 314 N.E.2d 651, 652 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 652–53. 
88. Id. at 654. 
89. Id. at 656–58. 
90. People v. Brown, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589, 596–97 (Ct. App. 2017). 
91. Id. at 591. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 597. 
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Mr. Brown, pushed the victim onto her hands and knees and held her in that 
position while penetrating her, and a second in a vacant apartment in which the 
victim pushed away Mr. Brown and then fell unconscious.95 The court agreed that 
the bedroom encounter involved sufficient force to uphold a rape conviction, 
but the second one did not on the basis that “[b]ecause [the victim] was 
unconscious, there was no need to use force or fear to overcome her will.”96 
Because the prosecution had argued both encounters met the definition for force, 
there was potential that the jury wrongfully considered that second encounter met 
the definition of a forcible rape. The court accordingly reversed the conviction.97 
There are three important points arising from the 1974 Anderson and 2017 
Brown cases. First, the level of force needed to support a crime of rape has lessened 
from the level of violence that it was required in the 1974 Anderson case. The 2017 
Brown case shows that in California, the act of physically restraining a woman was 
sufficient force to prosecute rape. This is an advance in that Mr. Anderson’s taking 
a teenager off the streets at gunpoint (even if the victim never sees the gun) and 
engaging in physical struggle that leaves bruises and abrasions is now enough to 
meet the level of force needed to prove that the sex was against the will of the 
victim. 
Second, forty-six jurisdictions (forty-five states and Washington, D.C.) define 
rape as involving an actus reus of force.98 When rape is defined in this manner, 
95. Id. at 594–95 (discussing whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the events met the 
legal definition of rape by force). 
96. Id. at 595. 
97. Id. at 596–97 (discussing the prosecutor’s failure to elect which facts met the rape definition, the unanimity 
requirement, and bar on retrial). 
98. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61(a)(1) (2017) (first degree rape, “forcible compulsion”); ALASKA STAT. 
§ 11.41.410(a)(2) (2016) (first degree sexual assault, “causes serious physical injury”); ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 5-14-103(a)(1) (2017) (rape, “forcible compulsion”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(2) (West 2014) (rape, “by 
means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury”); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 18-3-402(1)(a) (2017) (sexual assault, “causes submission of the victim by means of sufficient consequence 
reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim’s will”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-70(a)(1) (2017) 
(first degree sexual assault, “compels . . . by  the  use  of  force”), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 773(a)(1) (2017) (first 
degree rape, “[c]auses physical injury”); D.C. CODE § 22-3002(a)(1) (2013) (first degree sexual abuse, “force”); 
FLA. STAT. § 794.011(3) (2017) (sexual battery, “uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon or uses actual physical 
force likely to cause serious personal injury”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(a)(1) (2017) (rape, “forcibly and against 
her will”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730(1)(a) (2017) (first degree sexual assault, “strong compulsion”); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-6101(4) (2017) (rape, “the victim resists but the resistance is overcome by force or violence”); id. 
§ 18-6101(5) (rape, “the victim is prevented from resistance by the infliction, attempted infliction, or threatened 
infliction of bodily harm”); id. § 18-6101(10) (rape, “the victim submits under the belief, instilled by the actor, 
that . . . the  actor will cause physical harm to some person in the future”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.20(a)(1) 
(2017) (criminal sexual assault, “uses force or threat of force”); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1(a)(1) (2015) (rape, level 3 
felony, “compelled by force or imminent threat of force”); id. § 35-42-4-1(b) (rape, level 1 felony, deadly force, 
presence of a deadly weapon, or serious bodily injury occurs); IOWA CODE § 709.2 (2017) (first degree sexual 
abuse, “causes another serious injury”); id. § 709.4(1)(a) (third degree sexual abuse, “by force or against the will 
of the other person”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(1)(A) (2015) (rape, “victim is overcome by force or fear”); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.040(1)(a) (West 2016) (first degree rape, “forcible compulsion”); LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14:42(A)(1)–(2) (2017) (first degree rape, “victim resists the act to the utmost, but whose resistance is overcome 
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Brown’s second instance of unwanted sex—intercourse with a woman who was 
unconscious and had not consented to the sex—will not meet the definition of a 
rape by force because engaging in unwanted sex alone is not the defining element 
of the offense. Jurisdictions that define acquaintance rape with the heightened 
actus reus of force will likely not have many false convictions. But, the downside 
is that the forty-six jurisdictions that define rape in such a limited manner will not 
prosecute the disturbing instance of unwanted sex by a criminal gang luring a 
teenager to their house, “g[etting] her falling-down drunk, [and] then ha[ving] sex 
by force” or “victim is prevented from resisting the act by threats of great and immediate bodily harm”); id. 
§ 14:42.1(A)(1) (second degree rape, “victim is prevented from resisting the act by force or threats of physical 
violence under circumstances where the victim reasonably believes that such resistance would not prevent the 
rape”); ME. STAT. tit. 17-a, § 253(1)(A) (2017) (gross sexual assault, “result of compulsion”); id. § 253(2)(B) 
(gross sexual assault, by threat); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-303(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2017) (first degree rape, 
“force, or the threat of force”); id. § 3-303(a)(2)(i)–(iii) (first degree rape, employ dangerous weapon, inflict 
serious bodily injury, threaten serious physical injury); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22(a) (2017) (rape, “submit 
by force”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b(1)(d)(ii) (2017) (first degree criminal sexual conduct, “force or 
coercion”); MINN. STAT. § 609.342(1)(c) (2017) (first degree criminal sexual conduct, “reasonable fear of 
imminent great bodily harm”); id. § 609.342(1)(e) (2017) (“causes personal injury”); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 97-3-65(4) (2017) (statutory rape, “forcible sexual intercourse”); MO. REV. STAT. § 566.030(1) (2017) (first 
degree rape, “forcible compulsion”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.366(1)(a) (2017) (sexual assault, “forces . . .  against 
the will of the victim”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(a) (2015) (aggravated felonious sexual assault, 
“overcomes the victim through the actual application of physical force, physical violence or superior physical 
strength”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(a)(6) (West 2017) (sexual assault, first degree “actor uses physical force or 
coercion and severe personal injury is sustained by the victim”); id. § 2C:14-2(c)(1) (sexual assault, second 
degree, “actor uses physical force or coercion, but the victim does not sustain severe personal injury”); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 30-9-11(D)(2) (2017) (criminal sexual penetration, first degree “use of force or coercion that results in 
great bodily harm or great mental anguish to the victim”); id. § 30-9-11(E)(3) (criminal sexual penetration, second 
degree, “use of force or coercion that results in personal injury to the victim”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35(1) 
(McKinney 2017) (first degree rape, “forcible compulsion”), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.22(a)(1) (2017) (second 
degree forcible rape, “force and against the will of the other person”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03(1)(a) (2017) 
(gross sexual imposition, “compels the victim to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily 
injury, or kidnapping, to be inflicted on any human being”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1114(A)(5) (2017) (first degree 
rape, “accomplished with any person by means of force, violence, or threats of force or violence accompanied by 
apparent power of execution regardless of the age of the person committing the crime”); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 163.375(1)(a) (2016) (first degree rape, “forcible compulsion”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121(a)(1) (2017) (rape, 
“forcible compulsion”); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2(2) (2017) (first degree sexual assault, “force or coercion”); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-654(1)(a) (2017) (third degree criminal sexual conduct, “force or coercion to accomplish 
the sexual battery in the absence of aggravating circumstances”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1(2) (2017) (rape, 
“force, coercion, or threats of immediate and great bodily harm against the victim or other persons within the 
victim’s presence”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503(a)(1) (2017) (rape, “[f]orce or coercion is used to accomplish 
the act”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(1) (West 2017) (sexual assault, “actor compels the other person to 
submit or participate by the use of physical force, violence, or coercion”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(2) 
(2017) (sexual assault, “threatening or coercing the other person”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A)(i) (2017) (rape, 
“against the complaining witness’s will, by force, threat or intimidation of or against the complaining witness or 
another person”); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.050(1)(a) (2017) (second degree rape, “forcible compulsion”); W. 
VA. CODE § 61-8B-4(a)(1) (2017) (second degree sexual assault, “forcible compulsion”); WIS. STAT. § 940.225(1)(a) 
(2017) (first degree sexual assault, “causes pregnancy or great bodily harm to that person”); id. § 940.225(2)(a) 
(2017) (second degree sexual assault, “use or threat of force or violence”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2­
302(a)(i) (2017) (first degree sexual assault, “the actual application, reasonably calculated to cause submission of 
the victim, of physical force or forcible confinement”). 
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with her against her will.”99 These jurisdictions continue to define rape without 
targeting the social harm of unwanted sex. When a rapist has sex with another 
person, motivated by entitlement, trickery, confusion, or callousness, those acts of 
unwanted sex also are not crimes when rape is defined with the heightened element 
of force. Thus, forty-six jurisdictions that define rape by force do not capture the 
social harm that occurs in the more than three-fourths of rapes in which the victim 
knows his or her assailant. 
It is important to note that only three of these forty-six jurisdictions exclusively 
define rape as involving force.100 But of the thirty-six states that have also a 
subsection that defines rape as non-consent, as set forth in Section C, infra, those 
definitions do not reach all forms of unwanted sex.101 
Third, it is important to understand why rape was defined in this limited way. 
The answer is that, up until 1965, all sex outside of marriage was criminalized. In 
1965, the Supreme Court’s Griswold v. Connecticut102 decision first recognized a 
penumbra of federal privacy rights, which stitched together a shield against the 
general police powers of the states to criminalize intimacy.103 Sex outside of 
marriage continued to be criminalized after 1965, but Griswold became the 
foundation used to challenge those statutes.104 
Not all states have decriminalized, repealed, or struck down adultery, fornication, and consensual 
same-sex sodomy crimes. See Christina Oehler, 16 States Where You Can Get that Cheating Jerk Thrown in Jail, 
WOMAN’S DAY (June 23, 2015), http://www.womansday.com/relationships/dating-marriage/a50994/adultery­
laws/. 
In this context, rape was understood 
to be among the spectrum of unlawful acts that occurred outside of marriage. It 
was a crime that violated a marriage, not a person. As explained by Maine’s 
Supreme Judicial Court in 1922” “[T]he essence of the crime [of rape] is said to be, 
not the fact of intercourse, but the injury and outrage to the modesty and feelings 
of the woman . . . .”105 
All fifty states criminalized sex between adults, not with regard to consent, but 
based on marital status: adultery was the crime of sex between a married person 
99. People v. Brown, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589, 591 (Ct. App. 2017). 
100. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(a) (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 § 22(a) (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 14-27.22(a)(1) (2017). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has modified the force element in limited 
contexts, which other states codified expressly. See Commonwealth. v. Blache, 880 N.E.2d 736, 745 (Mass. 2008) 
(“A case in which the jury find[s] that the complainant lacked the capacity to consent obviously represents one 
instance where the Commonwealth has no obligation to prove the use of force by the defendant beyond what is 
required for the act of penetration.”). 
101. See infra Part I.C. 
102. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
103. Griswold was the first case to establish a fundamental right to privacy in the context of a married couple’s 
access to procreation. Over the next forty years, the Supreme Court struck down other criminal statutes that were 
determined to trample on conduct involving adult, consensual intimacy. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 
(1967) (striking down crime of interracial marriage); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (striking down 
criminalization of providing contraception to unmarried persons); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 
(2003) (striking down state sodomy laws that only targeted conduct involving intimacy shared by same-sex 
couples). 
104. 
105. State v. Castner, 119 A. 112, 112 (Me. 1922) (emphasis added). 
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and a single person, and fornication was sex between two single people.106 Sex 
that did not lead to procreation also was criminalized: sodomy was the crime that 
also included consensual acts not involving vaginal intercourse because such sex 
was “unnatural,”107 and doctors were punished for providing birth control to 
married couples.108 And other forms of sex that occurred outside of social norms of 
racial and religious castes were crimes: anti-miscegenation laws made marriage 
between individuals of different races a crime;109 bigamy and polygamy crimes 
were enacted alongside of campaigns meant to disadvantage those worshipping the 
religion of the Latter Day Saints (“LDS”), known colloquially (and inaccurately) 
as Mormonism;110 and cohabitation was the crime of adults living together outside 
of marriage, which targeted interracial couples and those who practiced the LDS 
religion.111 
In this context, the elements of force and resistance in rape law were necessary 
to separate rape from the other crimes that violated the norms of marriage. In the 
1977 State v. Sauders case, the New Jersey Supreme Court struck down its crime 
of fornication laws as violating privacy.112 Of note, the trial judge tasked the jury 
in a rape trial with considering whether the defendant was guilty of the lesser-
included offense of fornication—a crime to which the jury found Mr. Saunders 
guilty after acquitting him of rape.113 When rape was simply a crime along the 
spectrum of unlawful acts outside of marriage, the force and resistance elements 
also prevented a rape victim from being charged with the crimes of adultery or 
fornication. This observation is not glib. In 2013, a Norwegian tourist who was 
106. See State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 346 (N.J. 1977) (Schreiber, J., concurring) (discussing the origins of 
fornication law, including its inclusion in the law called “An Act for the Punishment of Crimes (Revision of 
1898)” and commenting that “there is no evidence that this statute was intended as anything but an attempt to 
regulate private morality”). 
107. See Cohen v. Cohen, 103 N.Y.S.2d 426, 427–28 (Sup. Ct. 1951). Cohen was a petition for fault divorce, in 
which a wife presented evidence that her husband was gay and had been prosecuted under the state’s sodomy law 
for having consensual sex with another man. The court denied the request for marriage because the crime of 
adultery—a basis for divorce—was different from the crime of sodomy. Id. 
108. See Buxton v. Ullman, 156 A.2d 508, 514 (Conn. 1959) (upholding a law preventing use of contraception 
by married couples because “the greater good would be served by leaving the statutes as they are”). 
109. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 
70–92 (2003) (discussing various laws and cases criminalizing interracial relationships from 1876 to the 1950s). 
110. See generally State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 764, 772–73 (Utah 2006) (Durham, C.J., dissenting) 
(discussing the history by which the federal government conditioned Utah’s statehood on its criminalization of 
polygamy within the LDS church). 
111. United States v. Higgerson, 46 F. 750, 751 (D. Idaho 1891) (“The crime of unlawful cohabitation is the 
living with two or more women as wives; of treating and associating with them as such; the giving to the world the 
appearance that the marital relation exists with them. It is the living with them in the habit and repute of 
marriage.”); see also N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 625 N.W.2d 551, 555 (N.D. 2001). In 1882, the 
Edmunds Act criminalized unlawful cohabitation in the United States. Erin P. B. Zasada, Case Comment, Civil 
Rights—Rights Protected and Discrimination Prohibited: Living in Sin in North Dakota? Not Under My Lease, 78  
N.D. L. REV. 539, 541 (2002). 
112. State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 339 (N.J. 1977). 
113. Id. at 334. 
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raped in Dubai was charged and convicted of adultery when she reported being 
raped in public.114 
See Nicola Goulding et al., Dubai Ruler Pardons Norwegian Woman Convicted After She Reported Rape, 
CNN (July 22, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/22/world/meast/uae-norway-rape-controversy/index.html
(discussing how after international outcry, a rape victim was pardoned for unlawful sex outside of marriage, and 
thus her rapist was also released from prison). 
In sum, the actus reus of rape by force was not concerned about unwanted sex, 
instead targeting the social harm of sex outside of marriage that beseeched a 
woman’s chastity. The 2017 Brown case shows that when rape is defined as rape by 
force the crime does not capture the social harm of unwanted sex. Forty-six 
jurisdictions (forty-five states and the District of Columbia) continue to define rape 
by force.115 As will be explored in Section II, it then is essential to investigate why 
states are continuing to define rape in a manner that does not criminalize the social 
harm of unwanted sex. 
C. The Contemporary Actus Reus of Rape by Non-Consent Is Underinclusive to 
the Social Harm of Unwanted Sex 
One of the most important reforms in rape law was the introduction of the actus 
reus of consent—or more specifically, non-consent, because the crime was finally 
defined as engaging in sex without the consent of another.116 This reform was a 
significant break from the framework that criminalized sex outside of marriage 
because, for the first time, it contemplated the crime of rape involving the social 
harm of violating a person’s determination over whom she will or will not engage 
in intimacy with. 
The reform probably came too early to be as revolutionary as promised because 
there were many powerfully situated individuals who feared that men would be 
victimized if they could be falsely accused of rape by aggrieved wives, girlfriends, 
and co-workers.117 As a result, in many states that define rape by the actus reus of 
non-consent, the crime is limited to very specific power imbalances rather than a 
114. 
 
115. See supra note 98. 
116. There are numerous scholars and feminist activists who pioneered and defended rethinking rape as a 
crime involving non-consent. Catharine A. MacKinnon was one of the most powerful ones. See CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 183 (1989). MacKinnon argues: 
The deeper problem is the rape law’s assumption that a single, objective state of affairs existed, one 
that merely needs to be determined by evidence, when so many rapes involve honest men and 
violated women. When the reality is split, is the woman raped but not by a rapist? Under these 
conditions, the law is designed to conclude that a rape did not occur. 
Id.; see also SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 69 (1987); SCHULHOFER, supra note 60, at 15. But see Jed Rubenfeld, 
The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1443 (2013) (focusing 
on the problem of rape by deception to question the scope and limit of importing sexual autonomy into the 
criminal law of rape). 
117. See Patricia J. Falk, “Because Ladies Lie”: Eliminating Vestiges of the Corroboration and Resistance 
Requirements from Ohio’s Sexual Offenses, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 343, 346 (2014) (“Despite rampant rape reform, 
these old-fashioned requirements [of evidentiary corroboration and resistance] have been remarkably persistent, 
and vestiges of them remain in twenty-first-century statutory enactments.”). 
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generalized crime that responds to unwanted sex.118 
As proof of this anxiety of false accusations, one need look no further than the 
Model Penal Code’s current definition of rape and other sexual crimes, which were 
created in 1962, revised in 1980, and as will be discussed in Section II, are the 
subject of continuing debate. Others have explained how the Model Penal Code’s 
definition of rape is a glaring aberration in its otherwise influential role in 
understanding and formulating criminal laws. Over a dozen years ago, Professor 
Deborah Denno wrote an article criticizing the provisions in detail and calling for 
“the Model Penal Code’s sexual offense provisions . . . be  pulled, revised, and 
replaced.”119 
The Model Penal Code repeats the universally rejected myths that rape involves 
heterosexual sex, all rapists are men, all victims are women, and husbands cannot 
rape their wives by starting its definition of rape under Model Penal Code § 213.1 
with the limitation that “[a] male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his 
wife . . . .”120 This limitation is deliberate. The very next sex crime in the Model 
Penal Code, “deviate sexual intercourse,” does not contain such a limitation, but 
instead criminalizes the conduct regardless of the victim’s gender and relationship 
to the perpetrator.121 Maintaining this archaic limitation that rape must occur 
outside of marriage prevents wives from making false accusations against their 
husbands. 
Even more telling, the Model Penal Code’s definition for all of its sexual 
offenses keeps a heightened evidentiary requirement, preventing a woman’s 
testimony alone from being sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.122 The 
Model Penal Code proposes that “the jury shall be instructed to evaluate the 
testimony of a victim or complaining witness with special care in view of 
the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining the 
truth with respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private.”123 Since at 
least 1972, the Model Penal Code has been criticized for the requirement that a 
rape victim corroborate her accusation because “throughout the country, the word 
of the victim of a robbery, assault, or any other crime may alone constitute 
sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.”124 
The anxiety over false accusations is not rooted in fact. “[F]alse accusations are 
rare—only between 2% and 10% of all reports [of rape] are estimated to be 
118. See infra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
119. See Denno, supra note 42, at 207. 
120. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (rape). 
121. Id. § 213.2 (deviate sexual intercourse). 
122. See id. § 213.6(5). 
123. Id. 
124. Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365, 1365 (1972). 
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false.”125 
Sandra Newman, What Kind of Person Makes False Rape Accusations, QUARTZ (May 11, 2017), 
https://qz.com/980766/the-truth-about-false-rape-accusations/. 
But nonetheless, this anxiety, on explicit display in the Model Penal 
Code definition, casts a long shadow on how states define the crime of rape. 
In a notable break from the sexist iterations of the crime, Montana defines 
“sexual assault” (its term for rape) as a crime targeting all unwanted sex with its 
definition of “[a] person who knowingly subjects another person to any sexual 
contact without consent commits the offense of sexual assault.”126 But Montana’s 
definition is rare. Among the states, only eight define rape by non-consent this 
broadly.127 With only eight states defining rape to be simply unwanted sex, the 
majority of states do not define the social harm in rape to be unwanted sex. For 
instance, of the thirty-six states that used non-consent as an actus reus in defining 
rape, twenty-eight limit non-consent only when there are specific circumstances 
unique to the victim or defendant.128 There are four general categories in which 
these limiting circumstances fall: 
First, states will often limit the context of non-consent to power imbalances 
between the victim and defendant. For instance, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
Ohio, Rhode Island, and Washington criminalize unwanted sex if the offender is a 
health care worker or employee of a state-licensed facility or program, and the 
125. 
126. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502(1) (2017). 
127. In addition to Montana, the other states that define rape as sex without consent are ALASKA STAT. 
§ 11.41.410(a)(1) (2016) (defining first degree sexual assault as occurring when “the offender engages in sexual 
penetration with another person without consent of that person”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406(A) (2017) 
(defining sexual assault as “intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with 
any person without consent of such person”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319(1)(a) (2012) (defining first degree sexual 
assault as “sexual penetration without the consent of the victim”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503(a)(2) (2017) 
(defining rape as occurring when “[t]he sexual penetration is accomplished without the consent of the victim and 
the defendant knows or has reason to know at the time of the penetration that the victim did not consent”); TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(A)(i) (West 2017) (defining aggravated sexual assault as “caus[ing] the 
penetration of the anus or sexual organ of another person by any means, without that person’s consent”); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-402(1) (LexisNexis 2017) (defining rape as occurring “when the actor has sexual intercourse 
with another person without the victim’s consent”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(1) (2017) (defining sexual 
assault as “compel[ling] the other person to participate in a sexual act without the consent of the other person”). 
Other states may criminalize unwanted sex, but it is not in the definition of rape or sexual assault. Rather if it does 
exist, it falls under a less serious crime such as sexual battery or unwanted contact. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11, § 767 (2017) (defining third degree unlawful sexual contact as occurring “when the person has sexual contact 
with another person or causes the victim to have sexual contact with the person or a third person and the person 
knows that the contact is either offensive to the victim or occurs without the victim’s consent”); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 130.20(1) (McKinney 2017) (defining the misdemeanor of sexual misconduct as occurring when “[h]e or she 
engages in sexual intercourse with another person without such person’s consent”). 
128. The jurisdictions that limit the circumstances of non-consent are Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsyl­
vania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming. See infra notes 129–30 and accompanying text (status 
of victim or offender); infra note 158 (when consent secured by fraud is actionable); infra note 159 (when 
intoxication results in incapacity to consent). 
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victim is receiving medical treatment, under the statutory duty of care, or in 
custody of the state.129 Michigan and Ohio criminalize unwanted sex by certain 
family members.130 
Second, states also will limit non-consent to the status of the victim. At least 
twelve states choose to define rape not based on whether the victim consented, but 
rather based on whether the victim was rendered incapacitated (such as by mental 
disability, mental disease, unconsciousness, or the influence of substances) and 
thus unable to provide consent.131 The problem with limiting rape to these 
circumstances is that a defendant’s culpability will be based on the proof of the 
existence of those circumstances rather than evidence of whether the sex was 
unwanted. 
In Commonwealth v. Blache, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court re­
versed a police officer’s rape conviction for instructional error.132 In Blache, a  
5’2”, twenty-six-year-old woman weighing 110 pounds spent hours consuming 
alcohol, smoking marijuana, and ingesting Klonopin.133 At 2 a.m., she was at her 
boyfriend’s house, very intoxicated and behaving “belligerently.”134 After she 
drove her truck into his fence and then backed up into his house, her boyfriend and 
his friend called the police, requesting assistance in removing “an unwanted and 
129. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410(a)(3) (2016) (victim in state facility); id. § 11.41.410(a)(4) (offender is 
health care worker or victim is under professional treatment of offender); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-124(a)(1)(A) 
(West 2017) (offender is employed by department of corrections or jail); id. § 5-14-124(a)(1)(B) (offender 
supervising minor who is on probation or parole); id. § 5-14-124(a)(1)(C)(2) (teacher, principal, coach, 
counselor); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(f) (2017) (victim is in legal custody or detained in a hospital or other 
institution); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-731(1)(c) (2017) (offender employed by state facility or private facility that 
operates as a correctional institution); IOWA CODE § 709.4(1)(b)(3)(c) (2017) (offender “is in a position of 
authority over the other person and uses that authority to coerce the other person to submit”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 510.060(1)(e) (West 2016) (offender is employee of Department of Corrections or detention facility); ME. STAT. 
tit. 17-a, § 255-A(1)(I) (2017) (victim is on parole, probation, or detained in a hospital, prison, or other institution 
and offender has supervisory or disciplinary authority); MINN. STAT. § 609.344(1)(h) (2017) (victim is current or 
certain former patient of psychotherapist); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(g) (2015) (offender is therapist to 
victim); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(c)(2) (West 2017) (victim is on probation or parole or in custody of institution, 
hospital, or prison); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(E)(2) (2017) (victim is an inmate and offender is in a position of 
power); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(10)–(12) (2017) (sexual battery is defined as occurring when the 
offender is a mental health professional, a correctional officer, or clergy); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2(4) (2017) 
(offender providing medical care for purposes of sexual arousal); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.050(1)(c)(i)–(ii), (d) 
(2017) (offender is health care provider, victim is resident of treatment facility, or offender was providing 
transportation to victim with developmental disabilities in the course of offender’s employment). 
130. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(5) (LexisNexis 2017) (criminalizing sexual conduct between 
certain family members, regardless of consent); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520e(1)(d) (2017) (criminalizing sexual 
conduct between persons related to one another to the third degree unless married to one another); see also 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.20(a)(3) (2017) (criminalizing sex with family members who are minors); IOWA CODE 
§ 709.4(1)(b)(3) (2017) (same). 
131. See infra note 159 and accompanying text (listing states defiddefining rape based on intoxication that 
impairs victim’s ability to give consent). 
132. Commonwealth v. Blache, 880 N.E.2d 736, 738 (Mass. 2008). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 739. 
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very intoxicated female guest.”135 David Blache was the responding police officer 
who witnessed the woman engage in “sexually aggressive behavior” toward him 
and erratic behavior such as urinating in public and twice turning on the cruiser’s 
lights and sirens.136 Officer Blache requested permission to transport the woman 
home, which was granted.137 
Officer Blache had sexual intercourse with the woman in her home, which he 
claimed was consensual.138 But she described it differently, testifying that she 
communicated her non-consent and tried to kick him.139 Although she did not 
recall the phone calls, later that night, there were two recorded calls to 911 in 
which she sarcastically said that the officer had given her the “best fuck of [her] 
life” and later calling back, “I’m going to go for the whole rape thing.” Expert 
testimony established that the woman’s blood alcohol level at that time of the 
alleged rape was between 0.176% and 0.24%.140 
In Massachusetts, the crime of rape is defined only by an element of force, 
specifically the actus reus of physical force or violence.141 Taking the woman’s 
testimony as true, the facts established unwanted sex (saying no and trying to kick 
the officer), but these facts were insufficient to establish rape by force, defined as 
unwanted sex accompanied with physical force or violence.142 The Supreme 
Judicial Court explained that Massachusetts has an alternative means of defining 
force. When “the consumption of drugs or alcohol or for some other reason (for 
example, sleep, unconsciousness, mental retardation, or helplessness)” results in 
the complainant being incapable of consenting to intercourse, the force element 
need only be the level of force necessary to accomplish intercourse.143 As a 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 739–40. 
140. Id. at 740. 
141. MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22(a) (defining rape as occurring when a person “has sexual intercourse or 
unnatural sexual intercourse with a person, and compels such person to submit by force and against his will, or 
compels such person to submit by threat of bodily injury”). 
142. As noted in Blache, even taking the victim’s account as true, the facts did not meet the statute’s force 
requirement. This is why the conviction was analyzed under an alternative definition of rape that exists in the 
absence of force but in the presence of facts showing that the victim was incapable of consent. See Blanche, 880 
N.E.2d at 741. 
143. Id. at 743. The court added: 
While generally for the crime of rape the Commonwealth must prove that the alleged sexual 
intercourse occurred by force and without the complainant’s consent, where the complainant is 
“wholly insensible so as to be incapable of consenting,” (a) the element of lack of consent is 
satisfied; and (b) the only force required for proof of the crime is “such force as was necessary to 
accomplish” the act of intercourse—that is, only the force necessary to effect penetration. 
Id. at 741 (quoting Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376, 380–81 (1870)). This alternative definition of rape 
is a judge-created doctrine in Massachusetts. New Jersey has codified this definition of force in its statute and jury 
instructions. See State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992) (discussing statute and jury instructions 
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corollary, the prosecution must also prove that the defendant knew that the victim 
was impaired and was thus incapable of consent.144 When states define rape as a 
crime lacking consent, the vast majority of states limit the reach to specifically-
defined instances of incapacity. The qualified nature of consent—to the character­
istics of the victim, status of the offender, or reason for victim’s inability to 
consent—does not seek nor does it reach all instances of unwanted sex. 
Third, the mistake-of-fact defense is another means by which rape defined by 
non-consent is limited by the crime’s mens rea. The Blache decision explained 
how due process demands that a defendant must be aware of the facts of a victim’s 
incapacity before finding him guilty of rape.145 Some states codified this defense 
by statute,146 and others, starting with California in 1975, have had their courts 
write in the defense to save the statute.147 Defining the crime of rape as requiring 
that the defendant knew of the facts of incapacity is yet one more layer of proof 
that removes the crime from targeting unwanted sex. 
For instance in White v. Commonwealth, a man had sex with a fourteen-and-a­
half-year- old girl.148 In Virginia, rape is defined in three instances: (1) physical 
that provide that “physical force in excess of that inherent in the act of sexual penetration is not required for such 
penetration to be unlawful”). 
144. See Blache, 880 N.E.2d at 741–72. According to the court: 
The second premise is perhaps more implicit than explicit. It is this: Where the Commonwealth 
uses proof that the complainant has been rendered “incapable of consenting” to establish the 
necessary element of her lack of consent and to reduce the degree of required force, the 
Commonwealth should also prove the defendant’s knowledge of the complainant’s incapacitated 
state. Id. 
145. See id. at 744–45 (limiting that requirement to incapacity cases by stating “Massachusetts has not 
recognized the ‘defense’ of mistake of fact in rape cases generally”). In February 2018, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court again “h[e]ld open the possibility that a mistake of fact instruction may be an appropriate 
and fair defense” but noted that the facts in that case before it, which involved indecent assault and battery, did not 
support it. Commonwealth v. Kennedy, No. SJC-12345, 2018 WL 794506, at *5 (Mass. Feb. 9, 2018). 
146. See Commonwealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 967 (Mass. 2001) (“States that recognize a mistake of fact 
as to consent generally have done so by legislation.”). These statutory provisions include: COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 18–3–402(1) (2017) (“Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion . . .  .”); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.115(2) 
(2016) (“[I]f a statute defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, culpability is nonetheless 
required and is established only if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negli­
gence.”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(A)(i) (West 2017) (“A person commits an offense if the person 
intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of another person by any means, 
without that person’s consent”). 
147. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d at 968 (citing People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975) (en banc)); see also State 
v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713, 717 (Conn. 1989). The court stated: 
We arrive at that result, however, not on the basis of our penal code provision relating to a mistake 
of  fact . . . but  on  the  ground that whether a complainant should be found to have consented 
depends upon how her behavior would have been viewed by a reasonable person under the 
surrounding circumstances. 
Id. (citation omitted); State v. Koonce, 731 S.W.2d 431, 437 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (construing rape statute to 
require defendant have acted at least recklessly as to consent). 
148. White v. Commonwealth, 478 S.E.2d 713, 713 (Va. Ct. App. 1996). 
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force; (2) “through the use of the complaining witness’s mental incapacity or 
physical helplessness”; and (3) with a child under the age of thirteen years old.149 
The victim was over thirteen years old and no physical force was used, so the 
prosecution presented evidence that the girl had a mental disability to meet the 
second category.150 The court explained that the prosecution then must prove “(1) 
that the complainant was mentally incapacitated at the time of the offense; (2) that 
her condition prevented the complainant from understanding the nature and 
consequences of the sexual act; and (3) that at the time of the offense appellant 
knew or should have known of complainant’s condition.”151 The court reversed the 
conviction because generalized evidence from the school’s school counselor did 
not meet this standard.152 Of import to this Article, there was no investigation into 
whether the sex at issue was wanted or not—the only question was whether the 
young girl was mentally impaired and did the defendant have cause to know of it. 
Fourth, states further limit the crime of rape when consent is secured by fraud. 
As developed in the larceny cases, theft was initially defined as the taking of an 
item without permission.153 Shoplifting a coat from a store was a quintessential 
example of the crime. But larceny did not reach instances of a wrongful disposition 
of property when a store clerk gave a coat to a customer because the customer 
misrepresented either the price (by switching price tags), her identity (falsely 
claiming to be a person authorized to who was authorized to take possession), or 
that the presented payment was valid (by bouncing a check). The English 
Parliament, and later American legislatures, developed “larceny-by-trick,” to then 
make a taking by consent secured by fraud to be invalid consent, and thus a 
crime.154 
Not all rape statutes, however, recognize that consent to sex that was induced by 
fraud is in fact invalid consent.155 Michigan limits consent secured by fraud to be 
actionable only if someone is impersonating a medical professional or misrepre­
senting that the sexual conduct is a medical procedure.156 Before a 2013 case 
149. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A)(i)–(iii) (2017); see also id. § 18.2-67.10(3) (defining mental incapacity). 
150. White, 478 S.E.2d at 713–14. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 715. The court stated: 
We hold that this record fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the time of the alleged 
rape, complainant suffered from a mental incapacity that prevented her “from understanding the 
nature or consequences of the sexual act involved in such offense and about which [appellant] 
knew or should have known.” 
Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–67.10(3)). 
153. See Hong, supra note 83, at 193–94 (discussing cases and commentary on the evolution of larceny into 
larceny by trick). 
154. See id. 
155. See Rubenfeld, supra note 116, at 1443. 
156. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b(1)(f)(iv) (2017) (first degree criminal sexual conduct includes 
“[w]hen the actor engages in the medical treatment or examination of the victim in a manner or for purposes that 
are medically recognized as unethical or unacceptable”). 
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revealed the sexist origin of this limitation, California was one of the few states 
that invalidated consent if the person was impersonating a spouse.157 At least two 
states define rape as actionable if a person induced the consent of 
another.158Although the factual scenarios that present this issue are admittedly 
few, it does illustrate that the crime of rape by non-consent does not extend to all 
who engage in the social harm of unwanted sex. 
Fifth, twelve states define intoxication as a form of non-consent.159 Some 
jurisdictions, like Vermont, attach liability only if the defendant administers the 
157. See People v. Morales, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 929 (Ct. App. 2013). Because the plain meaning of the 
statute limited deceit to impersonating a person’s spouse, and because the legislature undertook many reforms to 
the statute without disturbing this limitation, the court “reluctantly h[e]ld that a person who accomplishes sexual 
intercourse by impersonating someone other than a married victim’s spouse is not guilty of the crime of rape . . . .”  
Id. Within nine months, the California legislature enacted a new provision providing: “Where a person submits 
under the belief that the person committing the act is someone known to the victim other than the accused, and this 
belief is induced by any artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced by the accused, with intent to induce the 
belief.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(5) (West 2014). 
158. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b(1)(f)(iv) (2017) (first criminal sexual conduct includes “[w]hen the actor 
engages in the medical treatment or examination of the victim in a manner or for purposes that are medically 
recognized as unethical or unacceptable”); id. § 750.520b(1)(f)(v) (“When the actor, through concealment or by 
the element of surprise, is able to overcome the victim”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(i) (2015) (aggravated 
felonious sexual assault includes “[w]hen the actor through concealment or by the element of surprise is able to 
cause sexual penetration with the victim before the victim has an adequate chance to flee or resist”). 
159. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(3) (West 2014) (rape includes “[w]here a person is prevented from resisting by 
any intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance, and this condition was known, or 
reasonably should have been known by the accused”); D.C. CODE § 22-3002(a)(4) (2013) (first degree sexual 
abuse includes “administering to that other person by force or threat of force, or without the knowledge or 
permission of that other person, a drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance that substantially impairs the ability 
of that other person to appraise or control his or her conduct”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730(1)(e) (2017) (first 
degree sexual assault includes when “[t]he person knowingly subjects to sexual penetration another person who is 
mentally incapacitated or physically helpless as a result of the influence of a substance that the actor knowingly 
caused to be administered to the other person without the other person’s consent”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21­
5503(a)(2) (2015) (rape when one party is “incapable of giving consent because of mental deficiency or disease, 
or when the victim is incapable of giving consent because of the effect of any alcoholic liquor, narcotic, drug or 
other substance, which condition was known by the offender or was reasonably apparent to the offender”); LA. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:42.1(A)(2) (2017) (second degree rape includes “[w]hen the victim is incapable of resisting or of 
understanding the nature of the act by reason of stupor or abnormal condition of the mind produced by a narcotic 
or anesthetic agent or other controlled dangerous substance administered by the offender and without the 
knowledge of the victim”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65(4)(a) (2017) (criminalizing “sexual intercourse not 
constituting forcible sexual intercourse or statutory rape with any person without that person’s consent by 
administering to such person any substance or liquid which shall produce such stupor or such imbecility of mind 
or weakness of body as to prevent effectual resistance”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(f) (2015) (aggravated 
felonious sexual assault includes “[w]hen the actor, without the prior knowledge or consent of the victim, 
administers or has knowledge of another person administering to the victim any intoxicating substance which 
mentally incapacitates the victim”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03(1)(b) (2017) (gross sexual imposition 
includes when “[the offender] or someone with that person’s knowledge has substantially impaired the victim’s 
power to appraise or control the victim’s conduct by administering or employing without the victim’s knowledge 
intoxicants, a controlled substance . . . or  other means with intent to prevent resistance”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 3121(a)(4) (2017) (rape includes “[w]here the person has substantially impaired the complainant’s power to 
appraise or control his or her conduct by administering or employing, without the knowledge of the complainant, 
drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652(1)(c) 
289 2018] A NEW MENS REA FOR RAPE 
drug or alcohol to the victim.160 Other jurisdictions write these statutes more 
broadly to criminalize sex with someone who is “incapable of giving consent 
because of the effect of any alcoholic liquor, narcotic, drug or other substance, 
which condition was known by the offender or was reasonably apparent to the 
offender.”161 This definition becomes difficult because there often is the mistake-
of-fact defense and the reality that “a person who is experiencing [an alcohol 
induced] blackout may walk, talk, and fully perform ordinary functions without 
others being able to tell that he is ‘blacked out.’”162 Further, in the context of 
voluntary intoxication, as commented by an Ohio court, “there can be a fine, fuzzy, 
and subjective line between intoxication and impairment.”163 The end result is that 
consent defined by intoxication is again underinclusive to unwanted sex, attaching 
liability instead to evidence of the degree of impairment and defendant’s knowl­
edge of it. 
D. The Contemporary Actus Reus of Rape By Intoxication Is Overinclusive to the 
Social Harm of Unwanted Sex 
As mentioned above, the crime of rape by intoxication is underinclusive. In 
fourteen states, an additional or supplemental actus reus was added to criminalize 
having sex with someone who was intoxicated.164 For two of those states, 
administering the drugs that lead to intoxication is equated with force.165 For three 
states, the victim’s state of intoxication is a sufficient basis to attach criminal 
liability.166 But for nine of these states, the legislatures attached a more narrow 
liability, arising only if the offender had sex with someone after administering the 
(2017) (first degree criminal sexual conduct includes instances where “[t]he actor causes the victim, without the 
victim’s consent, to become mentally incapacitated or physically helpless by administering, distributing, 
dispensing, delivering, or causing to be administered, distributed, dispensed, or delivered a controlled substance, 
a controlled substance analogue, or any intoxicating substance”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1(4) (2017) (rape 
includes when “the victim is incapable of giving consent because of any intoxicating, narcotic, or anesthetic agent 
or hypnosis”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(b) (2017) (sexual assault includes when an offender “impair[s] 
substantially the ability of the other person to appraise or control conduct by administering or employing drugs or 
intoxicants without the knowledge or against the will of the other person”). 
160. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(b). 
161. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(2) (2015). 
162. State v. Doss, No. 88443, 2008 WL 323168, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2008) (quoting Peter Westin, 
Egelhoff Again, 36  AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1203, 1231 (1999)). 
163. Id. 
164. See supra note 159 (listing states and statutes). 
165. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:42.1(A)(2) (2017) (defining second degree rape to include “[w]hen the victim is 
incapable of resisting or of understanding the nature of the act by reason of stupor or abnormal condition of the 
mind produced by a narcotic or anesthetic agent or other controlled dangerous substance administered by the 
offender and without the knowledge of the victim”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.030(1) (2017) (“Forcible compulsion 
includes the use of a substance administered without a victim’s knowledge or consent which renders the victim 
physically or mentally impaired so as to be incapable of making an informed consent to sexual intercourse.”). 
166. The statutes that attach liability to the vulnerability of the victim are: CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(3) (West 
2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(2) (2015) (includes express mistake of fact defense); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 22-22-1(4) (2017). 
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drugs, instead of criminalizing the state of the victim’s vulnerability.167 
There is no doubt that defining rape by intoxication as a crime expanded the 
crime to reach victims of unwanted sex who, under the prior definitions of the 
crime, would not have had recourse. However, this definition of rape still fails to 
target the social harm of unwanted sex. 
The status of intoxication, in and of itself, lacks the ability to meaningfully 
distinguish wanted sex from unwanted sex. In a February 2014 Cosmopolitan 
Magazine article, the author listed “16 Problems We All Have During Drunk 
Sex.”168 
Anna Breslaw, 16 Problems We All Have During Drunk Sex, COSMOPOLITAN (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www. 
cosmopolitan.com/sex-love/advice/a5750/drunk-sex-problems/. 
This glib article glorified drunken sex, without concern for the risk of rape 
when one party is intoxicated. In a marked contrast, a 2017 Teen Vogue article, “Is 
Drunk Sex Considered Rape?”, dealt with the topic in a much more nuanced 
manner. Teen Vogue recognized that even though some drunk people had consen­
sual sex, it was still valuable to ask whether electing to have sex while drunk 
heightens the risk of being a victim or perpetrator of a crime.169 
Lena Solow, Is Drunk Sex Considered Rape?, TEEN VOGUE (Apr. 14, 2017), http://www.teenvogue.com/ 
story/is-drunk-sex-considered-rape. 
Of note, when 
discussing examples of criminal activity that may arise when the offender or 
victim is drinking to excess, the author noted that the defining feature of the crime 
was not intoxication. Rather, “[t]he reality is that people can use alcohol like a date 
rape drug. That means someone will either push alcohol on someone or seek out an 
extremely intoxicated person with the intention of taking advantage of that 
intoxication to cross boundaries.”170 The crime of rape arises not from intoxication 
but from predatory conduct targeting an incapacitated victim because she is 
intoxicated. 
The problem then of defining rape by intoxication is that the definition is not 
targeted to the predatory conduct that renders the conduct criminal. The overinclu­
sive focus on intoxication alone will sweep in some instances of consensual sex; 
but also, the crime defined in this way is underinclusive in not necessarily reaching 
predatory conduct when there is insufficient evidence of the nature of incapacity. 
No doubt that some victims of rape would benefit from this statutory definition of 
rape. But defining rape solely by whether the alleged victim is intoxicated does not 
adequately reflect the social harm of unwanted sex and predatory conduct that 
targets certain victims. 
167. The statutes that attach liability to the offender who administers the drug are: D.C. CODE § 22-3002(a)(4) 
(2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730(1)(e) (2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:42.1(A)(2) (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 97-3-65(4)(a) (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(f) (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03(1)(b) 
(2017); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121(a)(4) (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652(1)(c) (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 3252(b) (2017). 
168. 
169. 
170. Id. 
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Figure 3. Affirmative Consent Laws (all conduct to the right of the line would be 
convicted as a crime). 
E. The Proposed Reform of Rape by Affirmative Consent Is Also Overinclusive to 
the Social Harm of Unwanted Sex 
Much has been written about affirmative consent laws, which are also known as 
“yes means yes” laws.171 
See, e.g., Kevin de Leo´n & Hannah-Beth Jackson, Opinion, Why We Made ‘Yes Means Yes’ California 
Law, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/10/13/why-we-made­
yes-means-yes-california-law/?utm_term=.0f780d22026d. 
Although not yet codified in any criminal code, nearly 
2,000 colleges and universities have adopted this standard, which requires partici­
pants in sexual activity to engage in continuous communication regarding 
consent.172 
There is a robust debate over the benefits and drawbacks of this policy.173 
See Aya Gruber, Rape Law Revisited, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 279, 288–89 (2016) (“The preponderance­
of-the-evidence standard . . .  produces disproportionately frequent findings of guilt (in relation to other types of 
disciplinary allegations) when decision-makers are predisposed toward finding rape occurred, just as the 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard arguably permitted disproportionate acquittals, when criminal jurors were 
predisposed toward disbelieving or disliking rape complainants.”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, 
13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 443–44 (2016); Alan Dershowitz, Opinion, Innocent Until Proven Guilty? Not Under 
‘Yes Means Yes.’, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/10/14/ 
how-affirmative-consent-rules-put-principles-of-fairness-at-risk/?utm_term=.13ad024b772b. 
In 
discussing law as capturing social harm, these laws fail to target unwanted sex.174 
Instead, affirmative consent laws criminalize actors who have sex without the 
required type, manner, and duration of communication. This crime then sweeps 
wanted sex into its purview. 
Whatever social value these laws provide, defining rape through this means 
fails to meaningfully sort out wanted sex from unwanted sex. In this respect, 
rape by affirmative consent shares the same defect that rape by force and rape 
by non-consent do: they still do not define the social harm of wanted sex as a 
crime. 
171. 
172. Schow, supra note 44. 
173. 
174. See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 173, at 290 (“Is proceeding with sex without a ‘yes’ retributively 
wrongful?”). 
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II. RAPE BY MALICE CAPTURES THE CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL HARM OF UNWANTED 
SEX IN ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 
There is no doubt that a key function of criminal law is to influence (or control) 
behavior through expressive norms and punishment.175 But to maintain its public 
legitimacy, criminal law must engage in two practical functions: 1) enacting new 
legislation that addresses emerging social harms, such as those arising from new 
technologies (e.g., computer crimes) or new norms (e.g., domestic violence 
prohibitions); and 2) repealing criminal laws proscribing conduct that the public 
has no longer deems harmful (e.g., adultery, interracial marriages, or marijuana 
use). State legislatures have already engaged in this very project of reinvention 
when it comes to homicide, theft, and a body of inchoate and technology-related 
offenses. Our society’s understanding and negotiation of permissible sexual 
intimacy outside of marriage, the recognition of women’s equality and sexual 
autonomy, and the harm of rape to the actual victim have been radically trans­
formed in the past fifty years. The proposed crime of rape by malice that is set forth 
in this section is a long overdue update on how the crime of rape may also be 
redefined and reinvented to reflect contemporary values and norms. 
A. Legislatures Updated Other Offenses to Capture New Social Harms 
Criminal law has an important social function in creating new crimes and 
abandoning outdated ones. For instance, as society evolved when people acquired 
and used cars, homicide law also evolved and crimes were reinvented.176 In the 
early 1900s, there were 8,000 registered cars, and with Henry Ford’s affordability 
and automation model, by 1929 that number had grown to more than 23.1 
million.177 In California during this time period, deaths arising from the operation 
of a car were prosecuted under the general manslaughter statute.178 As that statute 
proved inadequate, in 1935, California first created a separate offense of vehicular 
175. See David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 386–87 (1976); Angela 
P. Harris, Rotten Social Background and the Temper of the Times, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 131, 132 (2011) 
(discussing ideas of Judge David Bazelon). 
176. See Carol Sanger, Girls and the Getaway: Cars, Culture, and the Predicament of Gendered Space, 144 U. 
PA. L. REV. 705, 706 (1995) (presenting a fascinating meditation on gender, privacy, and behavior as examples of 
how “[o]ur legal relations with one another are informed by our social relations to things in that we relate to one 
another through (in, on, and around) things and not merely to things themselves”). 
177. Sarah A. Seo, Antinomies and the Automobile: A New Approach to Criminal Justice Histories, 38 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 1020, 1030 n.3 (2013) (“One indication of the automobile’s affordability as early as the 1920s is the 
dramatic decrease in its cost after the mass production of the Model T.”). 
178. See People v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279, 283 (Cal. 1981) (“When the [California] Penal Code was enacted in 
1872, manslaughter was defined in section 192 as an unlawful killing of a human being without malice, and was 
characterized as being either voluntary or involuntary. A specific statute directed at vehicular homicides was 
enacted in 1935 as Vehicle Code section 500 . . . .  That section provided for imprisonment of one year in the 
county jail or three years in the state prison for deaths which occurred within one year as the proximate result of 
injuries caused by the negligent driving of a vehicle.”). 
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manslaughter punishing those who killed others while negligently driving cars.179 
In 1941, the legislature briefly narrowed the crime to cover only deaths arising 
from drivers who had a “willful indifference to, or a reckless disregard for, the 
safety of others,” but then it “speedily rejected” this heightened mens rea standard 
by broadening culpability to include drivers who caused death.180 
Over time, the social harm of deaths arising from drunk driving was met in the 
1980s with more serious crimes focused just on drunk driving.181 More recently, 
deaths stemming from distracted driving and texting rose, which in turn led to new 
codified criminal laws against that behavior.182 
See Amy Friedenberger, Virginia State Police Initiative Tackling Texting and Driving, ROANOKE TIMES 
(Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.roanoke.com/news/crime/virginia-state-police-initiative-tackles-texting-and-driving/ 
article_13f918d2-2c05-566c-9520-acd463393809.html (discussing scope of the law, enforcement obstacles, and 
enforcement strategies arising from policing those who drive while texting or while distracted); Cellular Phone 
Use and Texting While Driving Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 23, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
transportation/cellular-phone-use-and-texting-while-driving-laws.aspx (compiling state laws on driving while 
texting). 
And, now, commentators are 
already thinking about how laws will have to change to account for deaths that 
arise when the cars of the future—driverless cars—hit the road.183 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 283–84 (discussing the 1941 amendment that changed the criminal liability from “ordinary 
negligence” to a “reckless disregard of, or willful indifference to, the safety of others” and before the legislature 
“speedily rejected” the heightened standard). 
181. David Luria, Death on the Highway: Reckless Driving as Murder, 67 OR. L. REV. 799, 835 (1988) (“We 
are witnessing a change in attitude towards reckless and drunk driving. Tolerance of such behavior is diminishing, 
which will hopefully lead to a decrease in highway fatalities. Although vigorous prosecutions and stringent 
sentencing will not alone be effective, the law should do its part. In response to the changing popular attitude, the 
law must treat extremely reckless driving in the most rigorous manner and prosecute and sentence outrageous 
offenders as murderers. Codifying the vehicular murder doctrine would facilitate its use.”); Jennifer L. Pariser, 
Note, In Vino Veritas: The Truth About Blood Alcohol Presumptions in State Drunk Driving Law, 64 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 141, 142–44, 181 (1989) (discussing existing laws, prior laws, and potential reforms to law criminalizing 
drunk driving). 
182. 
183. See Sean Keach, Death by Driverless Car: Who’s to Blame When Robot Cars Get It Wrong?, TRUSTED 
REVIEWS (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.trustedreviews.com/news/driverless-autonomous-car-death-kill-accident­
liability-insurance-tesla-google (discussing potential liability for deaths from driverless cars); see also Joshua F. 
Cheslow, The Future of the Law: Four Practice Areas on the Horizon, N.J. LAW., Aug. 2013, at 35, 37 (“For 
practitioners, the short term means the inevitable legality of autonomous vehicles and adapting their advice to 
clients and their arguments in the courtroom. For instance, the New Jersey Cell Phone Law requires the operator 
of a motor vehicle using a hand-held wireless telephone keep one hand on the steering wheel. The law does not, 
however, require a person to actually steer the car. It is likely the advent of autonomous cars will change that 
analysis.”). For an argument that driverless cars may require reconsideration of DUI laws, see Patrick T. Barone, 
Navigating the Waters of DUI Vehicular Homicide Law, in DEFENDING DUI VEHICULAR HOMICIDE CASES 15 (2014 
ed.) (“Then there is the possibility of driverless cars—a possibility that cannot be ignored. Renault chief Carlos 
Ghosn promised that Nissan would bring affordable autonomous cars to the public by 2020. The promise of such 
technology is zero accidents. If this literally becomes reality, then ought not the laws be changed to allow the 
occupants of all motor vehicles to be intoxicated? For if the purpose of the law is to avoid the very crimes 
discussed in this book, namely accidents where alcohol is involved, then do driverless cars not make the law 
irrelevant?”). 
In each 
example, the elements of crimes relating to manslaughter and murder were added, 
modified, or created anew to respond to and capture the burgeoning social harms. 
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Theft crimes, too, have significantly evolved. In their early days, theft crimes 
were defined as simple larceny, which was the taking of property without the 
owner’s consent. However, theft crime has evolved to include larceny-by-trick and 
fraud (wrongful takings arising from the owner’s fraudulently secured consent), 
embezzlement (wrongful conversions), and, most recently, modern theft crimes 
that involve intangible property and computer technology.184 
Theft crimes also have evolved to closely demarcate criminal conduct of 
wrongful takings from desirable transfers of property that remain legal. For 
instance, a book can legally be purchased from a store, borrowed from a library, 
read by a reader, or found on the ground. However, a person will usually be 
charged with a theft offense if she shoplifts the same book from a store (lar­
ceny),185 writes another story substantially based on the original work (criminal 
copyright infringement),186 or downloads an electronic copy of the book from 
another’s computer.187 In all of these examples, a person has the means to read the 
contents of a book. However, the first three examples legally provide for the 
transfer of tangible and intellectual property to another, and the latter examples 
criminalize the same. The difference lies in what conduct—buying, borrowing, 
and finding—is considered socially desirable, and what conduct––taking without 
compensation, plagiarism, and downloading without permission––is not. In distin­
guishing lawful from unlawful conduct, the theft offenses in particular have 
developed sophisticated forms of mens rea and actus reus to carefully criminalize 
social harms. Borrowing a book is different from shoplifting because the borrower 
has a mens rea to only temporarily take the book with the owner’s consent. The 
nuanced definitions of which mental state was coupled with which conduct was 
necessary to reflect which transfers of property were socially desirable and legal 
and which ones were social harms met with criminal sanctions. 
By contrast, rape law is different in two notable ways. First, whereas theft 
offenses leave alone the socially-desirable conduct of buying, borrowing, and 
finding things, current definitions of rape leave alone many instances of unwanted 
sex, which is not a social good. Second, theft law is as precise as it is in separating 
morally objectionable behavior from desirable conduct because sophisticated 
mental states and varied actus reus updated the crimes to reflect evolving norms 
184. See Hong, supra note 83, at 193–96 (citing to commentary and cases establishing evolution of theft 
crimes from larceny) 
185. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. Giant Food Inc., 339 A.2d 688, 696 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (“[I]t is recognized 
that the owner of premises where personal property is mislaid by an invitee has a right to possession against 
everyone except the true owner.”). 
186. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012); see also Teich v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 339 P.2d 627, 635 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) 
(“The primary question is whether these similarities resulted from copying the story; if not, the similarities are 
without legal significance.”). 
187. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 697 N.E.2d 624, 628 (Ohio 1998) (“[U]nauthorized uploading and unauthorized 
downloading are unauthorized uses governed by the copyright laws and prosecution of state charges of 
unauthorized use for uploading and downloading is preempted.”). 
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and values.188 The proposed crime of rape by malice then is an effort to update the 
crime of rape to reflect the contemporary social harm of the offense. To do so, the 
new definition must rely on more sophisticated definitions employed by other 
offenses.189 
B. Statutes, Courts, and Jury Instructions Define Malice as Encompassing 
Multiple Mental States of Knowledge, Reckless, and Contempt For Others 
The mens rea of malice is a critical one to understand because it illustrates how 
powerful the criminal law can be when it invents a crime that captures the social 
harm it seeks to regulate. The following section explains what the term malice 
means, how juries understand and apply it, and examples of a killing by malice 
instead of a killing by purpose or a killing by recklessness. 
A primary criticism that people have against the term is that they do not 
understand what it means.190 The term malice is usually described as the mental 
state that one possesses when he or she acts with a “wicked and malignant heart” 
toward another in undertaking conduct that kills another.191 Like all terms of art, 
the starting point is to divest the term from its colloquial meaning. In 1921, the 
New Mexico Supreme Court explained that “[m]alice in the law of murder does 
not mean mere spite, ill will, or dislike as it is ordinarily understood.”192 Rather, “it 
means that condition of mind which prompts one person to take the life of another 
without just cause or provocation, and it signifies a state of disposition which 
shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief.”193 
Statutes and jury instructions from different states make this definition less 
abstract. Most states define a killing as actionable when an actor has either express 
188. See Robin Charlow, Bad Acts in Search of a Mens Rea: Anatomy of a Rape, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 268 
(2002) (“The mens rea of rape usually refers instead to the defendant’s mental attitude toward the element of 
nonconsent. Thus, what one cares about is whether the defendant, who had intercourse without consent, wanted to 
have sex without consent, knew he did not have consent, or was reckless or negligent as to whether he had the 
complainant’s consent. When I refer to the mens rea of rape, I mean to refer to whichever of these is required to 
prove a charge of rape.”); Kit Kinports, Rape and Force: The Forgotten Mens Rea, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 755, 759 
(2001) (“Very little attention has been paid to the mens rea applicable to the element of force, that is, the 
defendant’s state of mind with respect to the presence of force.”). 
189. A preliminary iteration of this Article was titled Rape As Theft: Rethinking Accidental Rapes and the 
Tangible Property Interest in Intimacy as an attempt to import theft crimes into rape law. The mens rea found in 
theft statutes—larceny (taking by trespass), larceny by trick (taking by fraud), and robbery (taking by 
force)—were helpful analogies that could be imported into rape. The experiment failed when attempting to create 
intimacy as a property right. White collar crime uses this legal fiction—intangible property interests such as 
“honest services”—to target corruption, but I was unable to meaningfully develop a definition of intimacy that 
improved the nuances found in consent (and arguably lacked a workable definition of consent). For that reason, 
turning to the mens rea of malice has been a more fruitful way to identify contemporary flaws with the crime of 
rape and potential solutions. 
190. See infra note 224 and accompanying text. 
191. State v. Smith, 194 P. 869, 872 (N.M. 1921). 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
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or implied malice.194 Express malice, in California, is defined when someone 
“unlawfully intended to kill” another.195 In Massachusetts, express malice is an 
intent to kill or an intent to inflict “grievous bodily harm” on another.196 In 
Washington, express malice is defined as “evil intent, wish, or design to vex, 
annoy, or injure another person.”197 Express malice is easy to understand—the 
mental state one has when there is an intent, desire, or will to kill or injure another. 
Implied malice is an alternative means of proving the mental state of malice that 
includes conduct understood to arise from an actor’s heightened recklessness or 
disregard of a risk. California defines implied malice as arising when: 1) The 
killing resulted from an intentional act; 2) The natural probable consequences of 
the act were dangerous to human life; 3) The defendant knew when he/she acted 
that the act was dangerous to human life; and 4) The act was deliberately 
performed with conscious disregard for human life.198 Massachusetts follows a 
similar definition, permitting a jury to infer malice if, in the circumstances known 
to the defendant, a reasonably prudent person would have known “there was a 
plain and strong likelihood that death would follow the contemplated act.”199 
Washington reaches the same sentiment, with slightly different language, that 
implied malice is found when the jury draws an inference based on the defendant’s 
act that was done “in willful disregard of the rights of another.”200 
As a quick aside, the drafters of the Model Penal Code rejected common law 
terms such as malice for being too imprecise.201 Instead, the Model Penal Code 
erected a four-tiered hierarchy consisting of the mental states—purpose, knowl­
edge, reckless, and negligence—and imported them to all crimes. For those who 
prefer the Model Penal Code formula, “express malice” tracks so far what would 
be purposeful or knowing killings (intentionally poisoning the neighbor), and 
“implied malice” tracks what is understood as reckless killings (shooting at a tree 
at the edge of your property after being informed that young children play nearby 
is an example of consciousness disregarding a risk of harm or death). 
194. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2014) (defining murder as an “unlawful killing . . .  with 
malice aforethought”); id. § 188 (“[M]alice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a 
deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when no considerable 
provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.”). 
195. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 520 (2017). 
196. Commonwealth v. Sneed, 597 N.E.2d 1346, 1349 (Mass. 1992); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 1 
(2017) (defining first degree murder as “[m]urder committed with deliberately premeditated malice afore­
thought”). 
197. WASH REV. CODE § 9A.04.110(12) (2017). 
198. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 520 (2017). 
199. Commonwealth v. Azar, 760 N.E.2d 1224, 1230 (Mass. 2002) (quoting Commonwealth v. Grey, 505 
N.E.2d 171, 173 n.1 (Mass. 1987)). 
200. WASH REV. CODE § 9A.04.110(12). 
201. V.F. Nourse, Hearts and Minds: Understanding the New Culpability, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 361, 371 
(2002) (commenting that drafters of the Model Penal Code rejected the term and the notion of malice “because 
they saw this phrase as a sentimental, ambiguous, holdover of an ancient common law”). 
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Malice captures these mental states of knowing and reckless killings, but its 
alternative and additional definitions of malice as “malignant heart” or “wanton 
disregard” of another also reaches one more type of killing that is not found on the 
Model Penal Code’s hierarchy. Stated another way, malice is not confined to just 
one of these three mental states. Rather it is “more accurate to speak of it as a label 
which is placed upon a group of states of mind, any one of which is sufficient for 
murder.”202 
It is true that malice lacks the appearance of tidiness that the Model Penal Code 
offers for its definitions of purpose, knowledge, reckless, and negligence. But 
malice offers the benefit of mirroring the messiness that arises in the world around 
us. People do not always act with purpose, intent, and with specifically defined 
(and confined) risk. They do act with disregard towards others as well in ways that 
endanger others, and even while holding contempt towards the lives and well­
being of others. As explained by Professor V.F. Nourse, the term malice also 
captures the mental state that arises when an actor engages in anti-social behavior 
that holds others in contempt.203 According to Nourse, “[a] man was also depraved 
or of ‘bad heart’ who could not recognize the appropriate limits of his relations to 
others or who simply acted for no reason at all.”204 
In criminal law textbooks, United States v. Fleming205 serves as an example of 
implied malice that captures murder by malignant heart.206 In Fleming, a drunk 
driver had a head-on collision with another car, killing the driver.207 Normally, this 
car collision would be prosecuted as vehicular homicide or perhaps negligent 
homicide, and the defendant would be sentenced accordingly. Unique to this case, 
though, the prosecutor deemed the actions, judgment, and decision of Mr. Fleming 
to drive to have been so wanting with respect to the regard of others, that he elected 
to prosecute the car collision as second-degree murder.208 
See Lena H. Sun, Drunk Driver Guilty of Murder, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 1984), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/archive/politics/1984/01/05/drunk-driver-guilty-of-murder/4f68c07c-b498-4431-b9be-0a95566aec59/ 
?utm_term=.64ace193869a. 
Specifically, Mr. 
Fleming was driving 70 to 100 miles per hour in a 45 mile-per-hour zone, at 3:00 
p.m., in congestion that the prosecutor claimed was “rush hour” traffic, at times 
against traffic, swerving to avoid other cars, all with a 0.315 blood alcohol 
content.209 In rejecting Mr. Fleming’s argument that his lack of an intent to kill 
shields him from a murder prosecution, the court explained: 
202. Rollin M. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 568 (1934). 
203. Nourse, supra note 201, at 372–73. 
204. Id. at 376. 
205. United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1984). 
206. See, e.g., CRUMP ET AL., supra note 41, at 69 (introducing case under section entitled “The Blurry Line 
Between Depraved-Heart Malice and Involuntary Manslaughter”). 
207. Fleming, 730 F.2d at 946–47. 
208. 
209. Fleming, 739 F.2d at 947. According to the prosecutor, Mr. Fleming was “going south in a northbound 
lane during rush hour, and he was driving at speeds of more than 80 miles per hour . . . . He  behaved so grossly 
you can imply the malice that is necessary in second degree murder.” Sun, supra note 208. 
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In the vast majority of vehicular homicides, the accused has not exhibited such 
wanton and reckless disregard for human life as to indicate the presence of 
malice on his part. In the present case, however, the facts show a deviation 
from established standards of regard for life and the safety of others that is 
markedly different in degree from that found in most vehicular homicides. In 
the average drunk driving homicide, there is no proof that the driver has acted 
while intoxicated with the purpose of wantonly and intentionally putting the 
lives of others in danger.210 
The Fleming case illustrates how “[m]alice is not a conclusion of law, but an 
inference from the facts.”211 Moreover, Fleming is an example of how malice 
captures and criminalizes those who have a callousness towards life and others, 
which is a different social harm than simply a reckless disregard of the risk that 
one’s conduct may present. 
The brutal death of Diane Whipple serves as another important example of how 
malice, defined as having an abandoned heart, is proven by both a disregard for 
risk and anti-social behavior. Diane Whipple lived in the same apartment building 
as Marjorie Knoller and her husband Robert Noel, who owned two Presna Canario 
dogs—one of which mauled Ms. Whipple to death in their shared hallway.212 
Owning an aggressive dog that kills usually does not result in murder charges; 
indeed, Mr. Noel, who was not present during the attack, was charged and 
convicted of the lesser crimes of involuntary manslaughter and ownership of a 
mischievous animal causing death.213 But the prosecutor charged Ms. Knoller with 
murder alleging that the facts before, during, and after the attack proved implied 
malice.214 As a legal matter, California law provides that implied malice is proven 
by 1) a subjective component, which is met when the defendant has the mens rea of 
awareness that she engages in conduct that endangers the life of another;215 and 2) 
an objective component, which is met when the jury finds that a reasonable person 
would find that “[t]he natural consequences of” the act were “dangerous to life.”216 
The latter prong, which measures what conduct constitutes a “‘high probability of 
death’[,] is the objective, not the subjective” part of the crime.217 Stated another 
way, malice is met when the defendant is aware that she engages in certain conduct 
and a reasonable person would find that such conduct has a high probability of 
resulting in death. That definition is different from recklessness, which requires 
210. Fleming, 739 F.2d at 948. 
211. State v. Smith, 194 P. 869 (N.M. 1921). 
212. People v. Knoller, No. A123272, 2010 WL 3280200, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2010). 
213. Id. at *1 n.2. 
214. Id. at *1. 
215. People v. Knoller, 158 P.3d 731, 742 (Cal. 2007) (“The subjective component . . . is  whether the 
defendant acted with ‘a base, antisocial motive and with wanton disregard for human life.’” (quoting People v. 
Thomas, 261 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1953) (en banc))). 
216. Id. at 742. 
217. Id. 
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that a person is aware of a risk and chooses to disregard it.218 
The jury convicted Ms. Knoller of having the mental state of implied malice 
when her dog killed Diane Whipple.219 After numerous appeals, the appellate court 
upheld the conviction based on a damning recitation of facts that the two dogs 
were an aggressive breed raised without habituation to people. The veterinarian 
who examined the dogs before Ms. Knoller and Mr. Noel took them home wrote a 
letter—the first one he had written in his forty-nine years of practice—warning 
them that the dogs weighed 100 pounds, were not trained, and could maul children 
or others.220 Over a period of years, there were thirty times in which the dogs 
lunged, snapped, and growled at people, and not once did Ms. Knoller apologize to 
the person targeted.221 And finally, Ms. Knoller knew the damage her dogs were 
capable of when she observed the injury to Mr. Noel’s hand caused by a bite from 
one of her dogs that resulted in a four-day hospital stay.222 
These facts no doubt meet the subjective and objective prongs describing the 
requisite risk to meet implied malice. But implied malice is a powerful mental state 
because it responds to the social harm arising from people who engage in the world 
without regard for others. When upholding the verdict, the court made a note that 
after the dog mauled Ms. Whipple in the hallway, there were facts showing that 
Ms. Knoller had a malignant heart: “Her disregard for Whipple’s life was inferable 
from the fact that she never called 911 for help, never asked after the attack about 
Whipple’s condition, and returned to the scene of the attack, not to assist the dying 
Whipple, but to find her keys.”223 As discussed below, the advantage that malice 
has over recklessness is that it takes into account a defendant’s actions after the 
harm occurred, whereas recklessness looks only at what the defendant knew about 
the risk, the likelihood of that risk, and what a reasonable person would have done. 
Implied malice broadens the evidentiary sweep to render relevant after-the-fact 
conduct that proves the callousness, wantonness, or contempt a person has towards 
others. 
C. Responses to Criticisms that the Term Malice Is Vague, Confusing, Recasting 
Recklessness, or Criminalizing Character 
I wish to start with three likely and reasonable criticisms of malice’s use and its 
meaning. 
218. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 790 F.3d 951, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2015) (reversing conviction for 
attempt to interfere with safe operation of an aircraft because there was no proof the defendant knew that shining a 
laser at an airplane presents a risk of interfering with the pilot’s vision). The court added: “Rodriguez’s conduct 
cannot accurately be compared to that of someone who shines a bright spotlight through the windshield of passing 
cars: the effect of bright lights on automobile drivers at night is a matter of common knowledge.” Id. at 960. 
219. Knoller, 2010 WL 3280200, at *1. 
220. Id. at *4. 
221. Id. at *42. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at *43. 
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First, some critics contend that the term malice in the homicide context (let 
alone introducing it into the rape context) is vague and confusing.224 As to the 
former, defining a crime to be broad in its reach is different from defining that 
crime to be vague. Racketeering statutes, for instance, are exceptionally broad in 
reaching a wide array of conduct—from drug dealing, pornography, robbery, 
extortion, and murder—and criminalizing two of these acts if they occur within a 
ten-year period.225 Despite their vast reach across time and in numerous types of 
conduct, these statutes are not vague in that they proscribe conduct that persons of 
ordinary intelligence understand.226 
As to the latter criticism, charges that the concept of malice is confusing are 
dispelled by the term’s unusual longevity and practical efficacy in countless 
contemporary criminal prosecutions. As set forth above, jury instructions are quite 
precise in defining the term, which has been used in criminal prosecutions since 
1389, well before America was even a colony.227 Of note, the concerns over 
vagueness are not coming from the judges, jurors, and lawyers who use this term 
on a daily basis. Rather, it is often leveled by those who prefer the Model Penal 
Code’s proposed streamlined homicide scheme that eschews the common-law 
degrees of murder for the two general categories of murder and manslaughter.228 
In 1962, the Model Penal Code initially recommended that states abandon 
degrees of homicide to punish intentional killings as murder and unintentionally 
killings as manslaughter.229 The states did not adopt this recommendation because 
separating some intentional killings into first degree murder maintained capital 
224. See Suzanne Mounts, Malice Aforethought in California: A History of Legislative Abdication and 
Judicial Vacillation, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 313, 315, 374 (1999) (offering a damning critique of malice as lacking 
“intelligibility, coherence and proportionality”). Although Professor Mounts claims that the term is confusing and 
unworkable, she does not reconcile how the term has persisted in defining murder since California’s first use of the 
term in 1872. 
225. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1962 (2012). 
226. See United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting vagueness challenge), 
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 1997). 
227. State v. Smith, 194 P. 869, 871 (N.M. 1921). 
228. See Robert Weisberg, Impulsive Intent/Impassioned Design, 47 TEX. TECH L. REV. 61, 65 (2014) (“[T]he 
premise of the homicide law in the [Model Penal Code] was that intentional (i.e., unjustified and unexcused) 
killing should be a singular category of murder, and the key consequence of the traditional degree distinction— 
eligibility for the death penalty—should turn on the more complex and calibrated aggravating-and-mitigating­
circumstance structure of modern capital punishment law.”). Professor Weisberg continued to note that “the old 
premeditation doctrine, [which has malice at its core] with all the moral and literary artistry it generates, has 
persisted.” Id. at 66; see also Charles L. Hobson, Reforming California’s Homicide Law, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 495, 507 
(1996) (“The problem with malice is that it is an archaic, artificial label divorced from any notion of common 
sense. It has allowed California’s homicide law to evolve into a needless web of artifice and complexity. 
Removing malice from homicide law will help untangle this web and bring some needed consistency and 
common sense to the law of homicide.”). 
229. Hobson, supra note 228, at 526 (“The notion of dispensing with degrees of murder is most forcefully 
asserted in the Model Penal Code. The Code focused on the Pennsylvania model, which used premeditation and 
deliberation to distinguish first- from second-degree murders. It found premeditation too difficult to deter­
mine and an insufficient indicator of culpability to distinguish between capital punishment and a prison 
sentence.”). 
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punishment.230 The Model Penal Code also proposed to eliminate what it called 
the archaic and sentimental term of malice from definitions of murder.231 The 
Model Penal Code did not rely on its hierarchal scheme of mens rea divided into 
the four states of purpose, knowledge, reckless, and negligence, which it used in 
defining other crimes. Rather, for homicide, the Model Penal Code recommended 
using an additional mens rea of “extreme indifference,” which attaches liability for 
killings “committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indiffer­
ence to the value of human life.”232 The drafters intended mens rea to be easier to 
prove than knowledge and more serious than recklessness, and they left the jury to 
determine whether facts fit this term’s meaning.233 Thirty-six states adopted it 
into their own codes.234 This definition sounds remarkably similar, if not identical, 
to the concept expressed in implied malice. 
Because common-law jurisdictions have used malice since before the founding 
of the country (or the founding of their state)235 and many Model Penal Code 
jurisdictions have elected to import the analogous phrase into their scheme for 
homicide, it is untenable to suggest that the term malice is difficult to understand, 
apply, or use in an effective manner. Those familiar with its usage—the legisla­
tures, judges, jurors, and attorneys who are immersed in criminal law—are 
embracing it as an important contribution to our understanding of when people 
should be liable for the death of another. For instance, a defendant convicted under 
California’s second-degree murder statute challenged the given jury instructions’ 
definition of implied malice, arguing that an alternative instruction provided a 
230. Id. at 527 (rejecting the Model Penal Code’s recommendation and noting that “since distinguishing 
between capital and noncapital murder is the original reason for dividing murder into degrees, murder should 
retain degrees”). 
231. John C. Duffy, Note, Reality Check: How Practical Circumstances Affect the Interpretation of Depraved 
Indifference Murder, 57 DUKE L.J. 425, 428–29 (2007); Nourse, supra note 201, at 371 (“Modern drafters rejected 
the idea of a ‘depraved heart’ because they saw this phrase as a sentimental, ambiguous, holdover of an ancient 
common law.”). 
232. Duffy, supra note 231, at 429 (citing commentary to Model Penal Code section 210.2(1)(b)). 
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 433–44 (discussing debate over the term and providing a thirty-six-state survey of how states vary in 
their definitions of “depraved indifference” in their jurisdictions). See generally STATE BAR OF ARIZ., REVISED 
ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) § 11.04 (4th ed. 2017) (second degree murder defined when the 
defendant purposefully caused the death, knowingly caused the death, or “[u]nder circumstances manifesting 
extreme indifference to human life, the defendant recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of death 
and thereby caused the death”); SUPREME COURT OF COLO., COLORADO CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3-1:04 
(2016) (extreme indifference with respect to first degree murder arises when the defendant caused the death of 
another “knowingly” and “under circumstances evidencing an attitude of universal malice manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life generally”); UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL, MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
§ CR1403 (2d ed. 2014) (defining aggravated murder as arising when one causes the death of another with 
“reckless indifference to human life”). 
235. See Eric A. Johnson, The Crime that Wasn’t There: Wyoming’s Elusive Second-Degree Murder Statute, 7  
WYO. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2007) (discussing use of malice in the 1869 statute when Wyoming was a territory and in 
Ohio’s 1815 statute). 
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better definition.236 The appellate court recognized how the different formulations 
could cause confusion but noted that “the California Supreme Court considers both 
formulations to be essentially correct articulations of the applicable standard, 
including the physical component.”237 The defendant had cited two law review 
articles criticizing malice as vague and unworkable, which the court dismissed, 
commenting that the defendant’s “discussion of those articles does not convince us 
that our analysis in [sic] incorrect or that the court erred in rejecting his proposed 
instruction.”238 
Second, another criticism of malice is that it is a more confusing term for what 
really is either recklessness or negligence. Such criticism misapprehends that 
malice encompasses multiple mens reas. As noted in 1934 by Professor Perkins, it 
is “more accurate to speak of [malice] as a label which is placed upon a group of 
states of mind, any one of which is sufficient for [criminal liability].”239 Most 
states then choose to define malice as encompassing one or more mens rea.240 The 
term “express malice” attaches liability for mental states that align with knowledge 
and at times recklessness. But the “implied malice” term that is used in common 
law jurisdictions or “extreme indifference” used in Model Penal Code states, 
reaches facts that are outside these two mental states that prove that the defendant 
acting with an extreme indifference towards the safety and well-being of others. 
This last mental state does not make it more difficult to secure convictions. To the 
contrary, it leads to more convictions because liability will attach when any of the 
three mental states (knowledge, reckless, or extreme indifference) are proven by 
the facts that are present. 
As for negligence, there is much debate over whether negligence, as a normative 
matter, is a proper mental state on which to attach criminal liability.241 Malice does 
236. People v. Morales, No. H030193, 2009 WL 1227954, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. May 6, 2009). 
237. Id. at *17. 
238. Id. at *18 n.12 (first citing Hobson, supra note 228; then citing Mounts, supra note 224); see also Morales 
v. Noll, No. C 10-01199 EJD (PR), 2012 WL 1710967, at *27 n.11 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2012) (quoting this 
footnote when affirming the state court’s decision). 
239. Perkins, supra note 202, at 568. 
240. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (2017) (defining first degree murder as arising when any of the 
subsections are met, including an intentional killing under subsection (a) or a murder by malice under subsection 
(d) defined as “[u]nder circumstances evidencing an attitude of universal malice manifesting extreme indifference 
to the value of human life generally, [the offender] knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of 
death to a person, or persons, other than himself, and thereby causes the death of another”); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF 
CAL., CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 520 (2017) (defining express malice as when there is an intent to kill and 
implied malice as when there is an extreme disregard for life, and instructing the jury to convict if either is found). 
241. See Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632, 
641 (1963) (“The theory of deterrence rests on the premise of rational utility, i.e. that prospective offenders will 
weigh the evil of the sanction against the gain of the imagined crime. This, however, is not relevant to negligent 
harm-doers since they have not in the least thought of their duty, their dangerous behavior, or any sanction.”). 
California, like other states, has codified the principle that civil negligence is not actionable in criminal law. See 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 2014) (stating that no crime occurs if the act or omission arises “through misfortune 
or by accident, when it appears that there [is] no evil design, intention, or culpable negligence”). 
303 2018] A NEW MENS REA FOR RAPE 
not stretch so far as to reach negligence. There must be a subjective awareness, 
subjective disregard, or subjective indifference before crimes are prosecuted under 
this mental state. 
Third, a final criticism for using malice as a mental state is that it serves as a 
stand-in for criminalizing character. This criticism is the most compelling one, but 
also, engagement with this charge provides an important insight into the term’s 
value. Professor Kenneth Simons has written numerous articles on this subject.242 
One of his most persuasive critiques of the mens rea of culpable indifference— 
which is one of the mental states captured by the malignant heart standard—is that 
“[f]ree-floating desires, intentions, beliefs, or attitudes, without more, do not 
justify criminal liability.”243 Stated another way, his concern is that taking into 
account Ms. Knoller’s indifference towards Diane Whipple and Mr. Fleming’s 
callous disregard for others on the road, however morally reprehensible that 
behavior was, is an indictment of their character and actions but not a proper basis 
to attach criminal liability. In the 1966 case People v. Phillips, the California 
Supreme Court grappled with a similar accusation, that “[t]he charge in the terms 
of the ‘abandoned and malignant heart’ could lead the jury to equate the malignant 
heart with an evil disposition or a despicable character; the jury, then, in a close 
case, may convict because it believes the defendant a ‘bad man.’”244 
A response to this criticism is that malice does not attach liability to bad 
character any more than a purposeful intent attaches liability to thoughts of 
harming another. Returning to the neighbor wishing that her neighbor dies, 
criminal liability would never attach to wishing another person dead, however 
strong, detailed, and repeated, unless and until those thoughts are accompanied by 
action. In the same respect, Ms. Knoller was not guilty of murder simply because 
she had no concern or care over whether Diane Whipple was killed by her dog, and 
Mr. Fleming was not guilty of murder simply because he had no regard for the 
well-being of countless persons placed in his path. Rather, Ms. Knoller and Mr. 
Fleming became guilty of murder when their extreme indifference toward human 
life was coupled with action—not being able to manage a vicious dog unhabituated 
to humans and choosing to drive in a state of intoxication that places countless 
lives at risk—that caused the death of others. 
242. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Should the Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea Provisions Be Amended?, 1  
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179 (2003); Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable?, 5 CRIM. L. &  
PHIL. 97 (2011). Other scholars have written about this as well. See, e.g., Matthew R. Ginther et al., The Language 
of Mens Rea, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1327 (2014) (studying whether jurors understand the four Model Penal Code 
mental states). 
243. Kenneth W. Simons, Does Punishment for “Culpable Indifference” Simply Punish for “Bad Charac­
ter”?: Examining the Requisite Connection Between Mens Rea and Actus Reus, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 219, 230 
(2002). 
244. People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 363 (Cal. 1966) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by People v. 
Flood, 957 P.2d 869, 882 (Cal. 1998). 
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Assigning criminal liability to the mental state of malice does not convict bad 
men (and women) based on their morally reprehensible character alone. To the 
contrary, the mental state of malice recognizes that the people whose character is 
so bereft of concern over others—once combined with conduct that causes 
death—present a social harm of a senseless loss of life. 
Without the mental state of malice, only the law of averages would protect 
anyone from the harm arising from people who make countless decisions that are 
infused with anti-social conduct. Neither Ms. Knoller nor Mr. Fleming formulated 
a specific desire to kill their victims akin to the abusive husband planning the 
murder of his wife. Neither Ms. Knoller nor Mr. Fleming knowingly disregarded a 
specific risk that their dog or car posed to their victims akin to a sharp shooter 
ignoring his neighbor’s warning that children played next to his practice range. But 
both made numerous decisions to benefit themselves at the expense of the safety 
and well-being of those around them, and those decisions caused the senseless 
death of their victims. The genius of the term malice is that it considers the abusive 
husband and sharp shooter to be just as morally blameworthy as the callous 
narcissist. In homicide, this capacious mens rea has properly criminalized malig­
nant heart killings as murder. Rape law can also benefit from malice’s expanded 
reach to capture defendants who engage in sex with extreme indifference towards 
whether their partner is consenting. 
D. The Proposed New Offense of Rape by Malice Will Lead to More Convictions 
Weaving together strands of thought from this Article, it is important that rape 
law evolve to both capture the contemporary social harm of unwanted sex in rape 
and utilize more sophisticated mens rea that other crimes currently employ. The 
proposed new offense of rape by malice is defined by the elements of: (1) a person 
who has sexual contact (2) with another, and (3) has the intent to have sexual 
contact without consent, is reckless whether the sexual contact is without consent, or is 
extremely indifferent about whether the sexual contact occurs without consent. 
This crime is designed to police the social harm of unwanted sex. Returning to 
the discussion of the ideal definition of rape, the elements of rape by malice greatly 
increase the number of instances of unwanted sex that will be criminalized by this 
term. But as an important corollary, even a substantially improved definition of 
rape cannot—and should not—criminalize all instances of unwanted sex. Rather 
the focus will be on criminalizing defendants who have sexual contact with 
another and know, are reckless to, or have a callous indifference toward whether 
the other person has consented. The following section discusses four aspects of the 
proposed new offense that improve upon existing definitions by: selecting an actus 
reus of consent without force, a broad mens rea that captures knowledge, 
recklessness, and malice, the resulting increased relevance of evidence that a jury 
can consider under the malice mens rea, and despite its breadth, the crime does not 
reach wanted sex. 
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1. A Broad Actus Reus of Non-Consent Is Without Force 
The actus reus of “rape by malice” would be an unqualified, unconditional 
element of non-consent, which is currently used in the felonious definitions of rape 
in only eight states.245 As explained in Part I, the actus reus of an unqualified 
non-consent rejects the actus reus of force used in forty-six jurisdictions and the 
actus reus of non-consent that is used in twenty-eight jurisdictions, which attach 
liability only when the non-consensual sex occurs within specific power imbal­
ances or victim has certain codified vulnerabilities. An unqualified non-consent 
actus reus is driven by an aspiration to criminalize the highest number of instances 
of unwanted sex, without regard to circumstances that derived out of concerns of 
sexual morality or false accusations. 
The element of “sexual contact” is also a rejection of traditional rape that limited 
rape to vaginal intercourse, reflecting the presumptions that only women could be 
victims and men could be rapists. The majority of—but not all—jurisdictions have 
this expanded definition to ensure that the targeted conduct is unwanted sexual 
contact rather than limited definitions arising from outdated assumptions of 
gender, morality, or sexual mores.246 
2. A Broad Mens Rea of Malice Captures Knowledge, Recklessness, and
 
Extreme Indifference
 
The mens rea used in the proposed offense “rape by malice” uses the term 
malice, which is used in the homicide context. As illustrated above, this term 
captures the mental state of a defendant who knows she does not have the consent 
of her partner, is reckless towards whether she might have her partner’s consent, or 
is extremely callous or indifferent towards whether she has the consent of her 
partner to engage in sexual contact.247 This expanded mens rea will capture the 
existing cases where knowledge and recklessness are established. But also, introducing 
malice will permit convictions to arise from instances of a malignant heart. 
When rape is defined only by the heightened mens rea of knowledge or 
recklessness, many instances of unwanted sex fall outside the reach of criminal 
law. In his book Missoula, Jon Krakauer looks at the campus rape epidemic and 
profiles half a dozen instances of sexual assault, some of which were prosecuted 
and convicted, some never prosecuted but adjudicated by the university, and some 
never prosecuted or adjudicated but described unequivocally by victims as being 
unwanted sex.248 As an author, Krakauer had access to victims and abusers and 
245. See supra notes 126–27 (listing states and statutes). 
246. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (citing language from two states that continue to limit rape to 
vaginal intercourse and heterosexuality); supra note 82 (discussing the now abandoned marital rape exemption 
that was part of traditional original rape statutes). 
247. See supra Sections II.B, II.C (discussing the meaning of malice in homicide context). 
248. KRAKAUER, supra note 18, at xiii–xiv. 
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portrayed a complicated picture of rape and rapists. One of the men who had 
unwanted sex was a predator, both in terms of attacking a friend while asleep and 
having a history of attacking other women.249 This man who was convicted of rape 
engaged in intercourse with a woman he had known since childhood while she was 
sleeping on his couch.250 When she woke up and ran away, he chased after her 
down the street.251 Another man, against whom charges were never brought, was a 
clueless young virgin who lacked basic understandings of intimacy and a woman’s 
anatomy, most likely arising from his sex education apparently coming from 
pornography.252 Upon meeting a woman at a bench late at night, he followed her 
back to her dorm room, and violated her orifices, producing copious blood and 
bruising. He later defended his conduct, believing that all women “squirted” when 
pleasured and he was simply trying to figure out how to make that happen.253 
Another man profiled by Krakauer was the quarterback of his school’s football 
team. In that case, the young man also demonstrated that he had a malignant heart, 
seeking out sex with an acquaintance without regard and in complete indifference 
to whether she consented.254 His trial received the most attention in the book and a 
jury acquitted him of rape. Krakauer interviewed a juror who explained that the 
jurors believed the woman’s account that she had unwanted sex.255 But the jurors 
did not convict because the prosecution did not present proof that the quarterback 
had knowledge that he was engaging in unwanted sex.256 
Unwanted sex arises from multiple motivations. A mens rea for rape should be 
flexible and responsive enough to criminalize as much unwanted sex as possible 
without criminalizing wanted sex. Krakauer’s profiles of sexual assault reveal that 
someone who sexually assaults another may be a predator, a fool, or somewhere in 
between. But, the current definitions of rape do not reach all of these unwanted 
sexual encounters. Other crimes such as homicide have expansive definitions to 
capture all killings made by predators, fools, and the careless. Under rape by 
malice, so too would the crime of rape finally be able to reach all who knew, or 
deliberately did not care to know, if their advances were consented to. 
249. Id. at 12–15 (discussing convicted rapist Beau Donaldson’s sexual assault of a childhood friend while she 
was sleeping); id. at 153–57 (describing Donaldson’s unreported rape of another woman that stopped when 
friends knocked down a locked door in responses to her screams). 
250. Id. at 12–13. 
251. See id. at 14–15. 
252. Id. at 69–70, 74–83 (discussing Calvin Smith, who had been a virgin, who sexually assaulted a woman by 
engaging in aggressive, unusual conduct he learned from pornography that he thought was commonplace). 
253. Id. at 80–81. 
254. See id. at 133–50, 176–87, 225–289, 299–305 (discussing in depth the alleged rape by Jordan Johnson, 
the University’s findings and appeal process, and criminal trial that resulted in acquittal). 
255. Id. at 302 (“[The juror] found ‘Ms. Washburn completely credible. She seemed invested in her studies and 
focused on her career. I did not believe she manufactured her story of vengeance or malice of any kind. She 
seemed far too intelligent to have attempted to profit by false claims . . .  .”). 
256. Id. at 302–03. 
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3. Malice Will Render Evidence of Callousness After the Attack Relevant to 
Whether the Offender Had Extreme Indifference Before the Attack 
Returning to the profile of the quarterback who was acquitted for lack of 
evidence that he knew he was having sex without his partner’s consent, the 
proposed rape by malice could have led to his conviction. As a preliminary matter, 
the interviewed juror correctly assessed that there was no evidence that the 
quarterback knew he was having sex without consent. The woman testified that the 
sex was unwanted.257 The quarterback gave a conflicting, more favorable account 
of the interaction. Significantly, in his version, the woman had no outward signs of 
resistance or non-consent.258 When rape is defined as knowingly having sex 
without consent, as it was here, this evidence is unlikely to lead to a conviction. 
Just as Knoller and Fleming demonstrated malignant hearts with their callous 
conduct after their victim died, so too would rape by malice expand the universe of 
relevant evidence. For the quarterback, under his account of what occurred, he 
testified that he had no prior sexual contact with the woman, he showed up 
intoxicated to watch a movie in her room, he did not use a condom, and 
immediately after ejaculating, he cleaned off his hand and put on his clothes.259 He 
testified that the woman did not have an orgasm, they did not kiss or cuddle 
afterwards, and he never attempted to call or text, despite nonstop texts and 
interactions—infused with flirtations—that preceded their date.260 
None of these facts were relevant to proving what the quarterback knew while 
having intercourse. To reformulate the Fleming standard, the facts would be highly 
relevant to the question concerning what he cared, or did not care, to find out about 
whether his partner was consenting to their interaction. Rape by malice has the 
evidentiary benefit of directing a jury to consider what actions and omissions the 
accused undertook after the sexual encounter and to then make inferences from 
this conduct to assess whether he assumed that the prior sexual encounter had been 
consensual or not. 
Under this inquiry, the quarterback’s testimony certainly paints a picture that is 
at odds with someone who believed his sexual conduct was welcomed in the midst 
and immediate aftermath of the encounter. The quarterback’s lack of interest in his 
partner’s desires or sexual gratification during sex (no condom and no orgasm), his 
lack of desire for any intimacy in the form of kissing or cuddling afterwards, and 
his sudden stop of flirtatious and all communication after numerous text exchanges 
is—as a whole—a callous indifference towards whether she was engaged in 
consensual activity.261 Returning to the homicide context, malice is not a legal 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 279–81. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. at 280–82. 
261. See id. at 278–82 (detailing Johnson’s trial testimony describing the sexual encounter). 
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conclusion but an inference from the facts. In this respect, jerks and bad lovers will 
not be convicted as rapists unless their flaws are accompanied by indicia of 
indifference toward and contempt for whether their sexual contact was without 
consent. Akin to Ms. Knoller’s behavior of returning to the crime scene only to 
search for her lost keys, the quarterback provided no testimony showing any 
interest or assumption that his partner had engaged in sex that was wanted, 
enjoyable, or worthy of repetition. Rape by malice considers a wider universe of 
facts, which will result in more convictions. 
4. The Breadth of the Offense Still Has Limits to Prevent an Overinclusive 
Reach 
Despite the likelihood that more unwanted sex is actionable under rape by 
malice than under existing definitions of rape, this new offense will not—and 
should not—criminalize all unwanted sex. Returning to Figure 1, because of the 
reasonable doubt standard, even the ideal crime of rape should not be able to 
criminalize all forms of unwanted sex. Unlike rape by intoxication or affirmative 
consent laws, rape by malice is focused on elements that sort out unwanted sex 
from wanted sex. 
Rape by malice will be akin to murder by malice in that different facts will be 
newly relevant to judge callousness. The legal standard will present a different 
inquiry for the jury than just the question of whether a defendant did or did not 
have certain awareness that the sexual encounter was without his partner’s 
consent. Expanding the evidence and legal inquiry will lead to more convictions 
for rape. This result will be a normative good in that the crime of rape will finally 
align with the social harm of stopping unwanted sex. But also, as set forth in 
Section III, it will present a new problem of what then is the appropriate 
punishment for the increased number of people convicted for felonious rape. 
III. THE NORMATIVE CASE TO PUNISH ACQUAINTANCE RAPE WITH A MAXIMUM 
FIVE-YEAR SENTENCE 
In April 2015, Justice Anthony Kennedy and Justice Stephen Breyer appeared 
before a House appropriations subcommittee to discuss issues relating to the 
American criminal justice system.262 
Editorial, Justice Kennedy’s Plea to Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/201 
5/04/05/opinion/sunday/justice-kennedys-plea-to-congress.html?_r=0. 
In addition to serving as a Supreme Court 
justice, in the 1980s, Justice Breyer had been a member on the commission that 
helped design the federal sentencing guidelines.263 It was quite notable for Justice 
Kennedy to candidly counsel the congressional representatives that, “[i]n many 
262. 
263. Id. (“Justice Breyer . . .  before joining the court helped design the modern federal sentencing guidelines 
in the 1980s . . .  .”). 
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respects, I think [the criminal justice system is] broken.”264 When asked about 
prison overcrowding, Justice Kennedy was even more pointed in saying “[t]he 
corrections system is one of the most overlooked, misunderstood institutions we 
have in our entire government.”265 He further lamented that the legal profession 
focuses on guilt and innocence and ignores the consequences: “We have no interest 
in corrections . . . .  Nobody looks at it.”266 
Part III of this Article takes up Justice Kennedy’s challenge to think comprehen­
sively about punishment when discussing crime. Given that this Article asserts a 
need for and proposes a solution to increasing rape convictions, it would be remiss 
to ignore the consequences of such a proposal. Moreover, as a practical matter, the 
topic of punishment cannot be divorced from statutory reform. As illustrated by the 
May 2017 American Law Institute conference, the needed reforms to rape law will 
not occur without addressing what happens to those who will—and should 
be—convicted for sexual assault.267 The American Law Institute, states on its 
website that its own definition of rape is “outdated and no longer a reliable guide 
for legislatures and courts.”268 
Sexual Assault and Related Offenses, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/sexual-assault-and­
related-offenses/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2017). 
Despite condemnation of its own definition, 
members of the American Law Institute voted down reforms to change the model 
definition, rejecting proposals to add the mens rea of purpose or recklessness to the 
crime.269 Commentators claimed that a contributing factor that blocked any reform 
effort arose from those concerned about overcriminalization and adding more 
prisoners to the carceral system.270 
To think comprehensively about crime then demands a focus not just on 
catching the bad guys but on thinking seriously about what impact punishment has 
on the offender, victim, and society. In 1897, Oliver Wendell Holmes stressed, “[i]t 
is  said . . .  that we must consider the criminal rather than the crime.”271 This 
Article attempts to do both. Our society is painfully aware of how the Tough-on-
Crime era increased our prison population by 400% in only one generation.272 
Starting with U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, the federal government re­
sponded with Smart on Crime measures to reduce the prison population and 
sentence length for numerous offenders.273 Holder’s successor, Jeff Sessions, 
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. 
267. See Schow, supra note 44. 
268. 
269. See id. 
270. Schow, supra note 44. 
271. Holmes, supra note 26, at 470. 
272. See supra notes 27–28 (citing statistics about the U.S. incarceration rates before and after the 
Tough-on-Crime era). 
273. See U.S. DEP’T OF  JUSTICE, SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2013) (explaining alternative programs to tough sentencing, providing policy documents and fact 
sheets, and showcasing local successful reentry programs). 
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rejected these initiatives and is seeking to revive prosecutorial practices that 
imprison drug offenders, which is contrary to the contemporary trend to respond to 
drug addiction with treatment instead of incarceration.274 
Donna F. Edwards, Opinion, What Ever Happened to Mass Incarceration Reform?, HILL (Aug. 9, 2017) 
(“[W]ith the confirmation of Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who ushered in a 1980’s throw-back Department of 
Justice directive on low-level drug offenses, it remains unclear whether there might be a return to a bipartisan 
approach to criminal justice reform in the 115th Congress.”); Nancy Gertner & Chiraag Bains, Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences Are Cruel and Ineffective. Sessions Wants Them Back., WASH. POST (May 15, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/05/15/mandatory-minimum-sentences-are-cruel­
and-ineffective-sessions-wants-them-back/?utm_term=.9a3e3d555581. 
Despite the policy 
change at the federal level, states—which are responsible for nearly 90% of the 
nation’s prison population—continue to pursue policies defined by Smart on 
Crime movement, which promote rehabilitation and offender re-entry services 
over longer prison sentences.275 States that have invested in offender integration 
efforts have realized financial and community gains that result from lowering 
recidivism rates.276 
Samantha Finch, America’s Recidivism Problem Will Be Fixed Through Prison Education Programs, 
PARENT HERALD (June 21, 2016), http://www.parentherald.com/articles/50251/20160621/america-s-recidivism­
problem-will-fixed-through-prison-education-programs.htm (discussing offender reentry programs that are pre­
venting recidivism in California, Texas, and Idaho); Eric H. Holder, Jr., Opinion, We Can Have Shorter Sentences 
and Less Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2016); Maggie Kreins, Opinion, Is Proposition 47 Working the Way It Was 
Sold to Voters?, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.dailynews.com/opinion/20160224/is-proposition­
47-working-the-way-it-was-sold-to-voters-guest-commentary (discussing successes and drawbacks of Proposi­
tion 47, which reduced the prison population and promised community resources to prevent crime). 
As set forth below, this Article proposes a maximum prison term of five years 
for those who are convicted of rape by malice. Excluded from this proposal are 
rapes involving aggravating factors such as child victims, weapons, or sadism. 
States can increase punishment for those factors as need be, but for the 80% of 
rapes that occur between adults in the absence of these factors, no prison term in 
excess of five years should be imposed.277 
The initial problem in discussing this issue is the distressing lack of data. Only 
six states and the federal government collect and publish data on the number of 
convictions and length of sentences for rape.278 Nonetheless, the limited data that 
exists shows a disturbing reality that approximately 90% of those convicted of rape 
in state courts serve prison sentences, and 95% of those convicted of rape in 
federal courts serve prison terms.279 
274. 
275. See PETER WAGNER & BERNADETTE RABUY, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, MASS INCARCERATION: THE WHOLE 
PIE 2017 (2017). 
276. 
277. See supra note 4. 
278. See infra notes 327–34 and accompanying text. 
279. In 2016, 95% of federal sexual abuse convictions received prison terms. 2.9% had a split sentence of 
prison term, and 1.6% received probation. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Offenders Receiving Sentencing Options in 
Each Primary Offense Category, INTERACTIVE SOURCEBOOK FED. SENT’G STAT., https://isb.ussc.gov/USSC?userid= 
USSC_Guest&password=USSC_Guest&toc-section=0 (last visited Jan. 19, 2018). In 2009, where data is 
available from only the seventy-five largest counties, 89% of rape convictions resulted in prison terms. See 
Danielle Paquette, What Makes the Stanford Sex Offender’s Six-Month Jail Sentence so Unusual, WASH. POST 
(June 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/06/06/what-makes-the-stanford-sex­
By contrast, approximately 40% of those 
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offenders-six-month-jail-sentence-so-unusual/?utm_term=.3d292fcb32bd. From data made available in 2013, 
85% of the felony rape convictions were punished with prison term. See RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK 
(RAINN), supra note 1; see also DUROSE & LANGAN, supra note 7. 
convicted of other state felonies are sentenced to prison.280 And as set forth in 
detail below, from the states that collect data, the actual sentences range from eight 
to thirty years. This rate of incarceration is excessive and counterproductive. 
“Excessive” is a normative term that must be proven by persuasion rather than 
quantitative data. In some jurisdictions, an actual sentence for the crime of 
acquaintance rape is a thirty-year prison term. It is difficult to justify that sentence 
length, given that it is longer than sentences imposed for many second-degree 
murders, which are often punished with twenty-year sentences.281 Moreover, 1/3 
of all states punish rape with a maximum term of life, 99 years, or 100 years. 
Seeking lengthy punishments is counterproductive to many important aspects of 
criminal justice. Overpunishment leads to fewer convictions, lengthier sentences 
do not make the community safer because more prison time contributes to 
recidivism, and the international community punishes rape, on average, with 
between one- and five-year sentences. 
Setting aside facts and figures, many Americans love prisons and measure 
justice with retribution and the wrongdoer’s suffering. This gut instinct shared by 
many is misguided. Criminal law is not like contracts. A breach of contract is 
remedied with equitably devised remedies—specific performance or compensa­
tion—that attempt to make a victim whole. There is no symmetry in criminal 
courts. Victims of violent crimes and rapes do not receive any more solace or 
healing or safety with any additional time added to a prison term. But crime 
victims do ask for justice in the form of ensuring their offender does not commit 
that crime again and inflict the same harm on another.282 
In this respect, proven methods to reduce recidivism are rehabilitation during 
prison terms and upon release, and reintegration of the offender into the commu­
nity. A lighter sentence is the first step in recognizing that society and victims are 
better off if resources are spent in preventing a repeat offender instead of making 
the wrongdoer suffer for the sake of suffering.283 The wrongdoer in rape— 
280. In 2006, 41% of convicted felonies were punished in state prison and 28% in local jails. ROSENMERKEL ET 
AL., supra note 7, at 1. 
281. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a) (West 2014) (fifteen years to life); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/5-4.5-30 (2017) (four to twenty years), MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103(4) (2017) (two to forty years); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 18.2-32 (five to forty years). 
282. See DAVID BINDER RESEARCH, supra note 57, at 5, 7 (national surveys of crime victims lend support to the 
policy goals of rehabilitation over lengthier sentences: 82% support “[i]ncreasing education and rehabilitation 
services for people in the justice system” and only 4% of all surveyed crime victims attribute “too few people in 
prison” as a cause of crime). 
283. Michelle Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of 
Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1324–37 (2000) (discussing the Model Penal Code’s rejection 
of retribution as a reason for punishment and the handful of states that followed that recommendation). Professor 
Cotton argues that the States’ preferences for non-retribution was supplanted “through judicial activism, violation 
of the doctrine of separation of powers, dismissal of constitutional supremacy, transgression upon the principle of 
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however despicable and depraved—remains redeemable, and our public safety 
needs demand that efforts be made toward that goal. 
A. Mass Incarceration: Origins and Contemporary Practices 
The facts of mass incarceration, also appropriately labeled overincarceration, 
are widely known. In 1973, there were 96 prisoners per every 100,000 people in 
the United States.284 At the time, there was a viable movement that advocated for a 
moratorium on prisons, and even the abolishment of prisons.285 Arising out of 
concerns that prisons were not effective in ending crime, political activists, 
religious groups, and government officials advocated for reforms that promoted 
rehabilitation over incarceration.286 Although the anti-incarceration reforms had 
an arguably lasting impact on how juvenile offenders were treated, there was a 
quick reversal and return to promoting incarceration for adults.287 
A number of factors led to a dramatic change in American prison practices. In 
the 1970s, harsher responses to prisoners were endorsed—and accepted—to 
punish or prevent prison riots.288 In 1971, President Richard Nixon launched the 
war on drugs, which increased the size and presence of federal agencies, manda­
tory sentences, and no-knock warrants.289 
A Brief History of the Drug War, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE http://www.drugpolicy.org/facts/new-solutions­
drug-policy/brief-history-drug-war-0 (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) (“In June 1971, President Nixon declared a ‘war 
on drugs.’ He dramatically increased the size and presence of federal drug control agencies, and pushed through 
measures such as mandatory sentencing and no-knock warrants.”). 
The states—which ultimately are the 
site of most prisons and criminal prohibitions—followed suit. In 1973, New York 
federalism, and abandonment of the usual rules of statutory construction.” Id. at 1314; see also Matthew D. 
Moyer, Free Will’s Enormous Cost: Why Retribution, Grounded in Free Will, Is an Invalid and Impractical Penal 
Goal, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2231, 2234 (2017) (“Unlike the other penological justifications of rehabilitation, 
deterrence, and incapacitation, retribution is not aimed at any practical social good.”); Thomas E. Robins, 
Retribution, the Evolving Standard of Decency, and Methods of Execution: The Inevitable Collision in Eighth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 885, 886 (2015) (“The tension between retribution and the 
evolving standard of decency in method of execution jurisprudence has yet to be fully explored, but will be the 
future of death penalty litigation.”). 
284. JEFFREY REIMAN & PAUL LEIGHTON, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON: IDEOLOGY, CLASS, 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 150 (11th ed. 2017) 
285. DANIEL W. VAN NESS & KAREN HEERTDERKS STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 14–15 (5th ed. 2014). 
286. Id. 
287. See Jasmine Duel et al., Restorative Justice: Restoring California Juvenile Justice System and Abolishing 
Juvenile Life Without Parole, 3 L.A. PUB. INT. L.J. 68, 86 (2010–2012) (discussing how California policy makers 
changed juvenile justice from rehabilitation to incarceration in the California Youth Authority and charging 
juveniles as adults for certain crimes); Julianne Feliz-Kidd, Case Comment, Diatchenko v. District Attorney for 
the Suffolk District, 466 Mass. 655 (2013), 97 MASS. L. REV. 38, 40 (2015) (commenting on how in the 1990s, 
states also reversed course and eschewed rehabilitation for prison sentences for juveniles). 
288. Adam Gopnik, Learning from the Slaughter in Attica, NEW YORKER (Aug. 29, 2016) (“The uprising at 
Attica was, in the not very long run, one of the things that stopped prison reform dead in its tracks. The fear that 
Attica generated among prison administrators and the American public pointed the way to the supermax and 
permanent solitary, emboldening the most reactionary forces in the government to begin the program of mass 
incarceration that remains the moral scandal of our country.”). 
289. 
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led the way with the highly influential—and controversial—Rockefeller Drug 
Laws, which epitomized the “tough on crime” philosophy that introduced lengthy 
and mandatory sentences for the possession of a small amount of drugs.290 
The Rockefeller laws were met with skepticism from the start, as medical experts were unsure of how 
longer sentences would stop addiction and prosecutors—at the beginning—noticed the racial disparities in who 
was arrested and prosecuted under the laws. See Brian Mann, The Drug Laws that Changed How We Punish, NPR 
(Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/02/14/171822608/the-drug-laws-that-changed-how-we-punish. 
Michigan followed, introducing life sentences for certain drug crimes.291 
In 1978, Michigan enacted its infamous “650-lifer law,” introducing a life sentence, without the 
possibility of parole, for the sale, manufacture, or possession of at least 650 grams (1.43 pounds) of cocaine or 
Schedule I and Schedule II opioids. Michael Gerstein, New Law Means Less Prison for Repeat Drug Offenders, 
DETRIOT NEWS (Dec. 28, 2017), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2017/12/28/michigan-law-drug­
offender-parole/108976500/. In 1998, the mandatory sentence was moderated to a twenty-year mandatory 
minimum. Id. In 1992, the Supreme Court struck it down as unconstitutional. See Court Overturns a Tough Drug 
Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/17/us/court-overturns-a-tough-drug-law. 
html. 
Like 
most parts of United States history, a zig follows a zag. 
The 1970s saw an intense but brief movement to decriminalize marijuana, 
which resulted in thirty-two states reducing penalties for marijuana possession, 
eleven states decriminalizing possession, 60% of the population supporting 
decriminalization, and in 1977, President Jimmy Carter endorsing 
decriminalization.292 
By the 1980s, public opinion changed and tougher drug laws were enacted by 
federal and state governments. At the federal level, President Ronald Reagan 
revived the war of drugs with the “Just Say No” propaganda campaign that was 
backed up by numerous policy initiatives targeting drug dealers and mostly users. 
Congress enacted a number of laws that created lengthy mandatory sentences for 
federal drug crimes.293 At the state level, the Rockefeller laws—which called for 
“mandatory prison sentences of 15 years to life for drug dealers and addicts, 
[including] those caught with small amounts of marijuana, cocaine, and 
heroin” —were adopted in some form in most states.294 
Outside of drug offenses, mandatory minimum sentences and three-strikes laws 
also contributed to lengthy sentences of offenders who had, in previous decades, 
otherwise received lighter sentences. In 1984, the federal government enacted the 
Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), which imposed mandatory and lengthy 
sentences if the person arrested for a federal firearm offense had prior state 
290. 
291. 
292. KENNETH MEIER, THE POLITICS OF SIN: DRUGS, ALCOHOL, AND PUBLIC POLICY 43–45 (1994). 
293. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of U.S.C. (2012)) (mandatory sentences and immigration consequences); Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. (2012)) 
(criminalizing crack cocaine more severely than powder cocaine and imposing mandatory sentences); see also 
MEIER, supra note 292, at 50–52. 
294. Mann, supra note 290. The laws were met with skepticism from the start as medical experts were unsure 
of how longer sentences would stop addiction and prosecutors—at the beginning—noticed the racial disparities in 
who was arrested and prosecuted under the laws. 
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convictions involving elements of violence or drugs.295 In 1994, California 
introduced its own version of a three-strikes law, which lengthened sentences— 
first doubling and then cumulating with life terms—for recidivists who engaged in 
specific non-drug offenses.296 
California’s Three Strikes Sentencing Law, CAL. CTS., http://www.courts.ca.gov/20142.htm (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2017) (“The essence of the Three Strikes law was to require a defendant convicted of any new felony, 
having suffered one prior conviction of a serious felony to be sentenced to state prison for twice the term 
otherwise provided for the crime. If the defendant was convicted of any felony with two or more prior strikes, the 
law mandated a state prison term of at least 25 years to life.”). In 2012, the voters amended the law to require the 
third strike to be a serious or violent crime. Id. 
During this Tough-on-Crime era, juvenile offenders were no longer viewed as 
redeemable or worthy of rehabilitation. States passed laws to try children as adults, 
housed them in prisons filled with adults (as opposed to separate juvenile 
facilities), and opted for carceral institutions.297 
See Badger, supra note 29; Jessica Lahey, The Steep Cost of Keeping Juveniles in Adult Prisons, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/01/the-cost-of-keeping-juveniles-in­
adult-prisons/423201/. 
As reported by one article: 
“[n]early 200,000 youth enter the adult criminal- justice system each year, most for 
non-violent crimes. On any given day, 10,000 juveniles are housed in adult prisons 
and jails.”298 Many criticisms are leveled against these practices, most notably that 
they make children vulnerable to sexual assault.299 However, the most significant 
loss to any child tried or imprisoned as an adult is the loss of the presumption of 
reformation. Whereas juvenile adjudications are designed to provide educational, 
vocational, and rehabilitation services, adult prisons are dedicated to punishment, 
and often, only retribution.300 
Racial disparities—and racism—have been a driving force of mass incarcera­
tion. As other scholars, most notably Michelle Alexander, have argued racism has 
had an influential force in permitting Tough-on-Crime and the Drug War policies 
that disproportionately impact communities of color.301 The sentencing disparities 
between crack and powder cocaine is the most visible example of how state and 
federal drug crimes targeted individuals based on race rather than conduct.302 
Although the height of the federal disparity was at a 100:1 differential, contempo­
rary reform only reduced it to 18:1, despite the lack of dangerousness associated 
295. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012) (attaching sentencing consequences for three prior qualifying offenses). 
296. 
297. 
298. Lahey, supra note 297. 
299. Id. (“The National Prison Rape Elimination Commission described their fate in blunt terms in a 2009 
report: ‘More than any other group of incarcerated persons, youth incarcerated with adults are probably at the 
highest risk of sexual abuse.’”). 
300. Id. (“[Juveniles] are also more likely to benefit from rehabilitation . . . .  [I]t’s no surprise that juveniles 
who are released from adult facilities are in worse shape and are more like to reoffend, than their counterparts with 
similar criminal histories who are released from facilities designed with adolescents in mind.”). 
301. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 97–98. 
302. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007) (“Under the statute criminalizing the manufacture 
and distribution of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841, and the relevant Guidelines prescription, § 2D1.1, a drug 
trafficker dealing in crack cocaine is subject to the same sentence as one dealing in 100 times more powder 
cocaine.”). 
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with crack cocaine.303 In statistics cited by the Supreme Court, of those convicted 
of federal crack cocaine offenses and subjected to mandatory sentences 100 times 
longer than convicted of crimes involving powder cocaine, 85% of the offenders 
were black.304 
As a further poignant counterpoint to the irrationality of mandatory sentencing 
for drug crimes, incarceration is not the only societal response to drug crimes. Now 
that the opioid epidemic is ravaging white communities, the contemporary policy 
response calls for compassion, needle exchanges, and anti-addiction programs that 
promote rehabilitation instead of punitive incarceration.305 
See Editorial, Congress Wakes Up to the Opioid Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2016), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2016/05/16/opinion/congress-wakes-up-to-the-opioid-epidemic.html (discussing the eighteen bills 
Congress has passed and the proposed $1.1 billion in funding President Obama sought for drug treatment); Tom 
Howell, Jr., Senate Overwhelmingly Approves Bill to Fight Deadly Opioid, Heroin Epidemic, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 
10, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/mar/10/senate-passes-bill-fight-opioid-heroin-epidemic/ 
(reporting on Senate passing a bill by a 94-1 vote to support additional funding for opioid treatment); Robert Pear, 
Governors Devise Bipartisan Effort to Reduce Opioid Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2016/02/22/us/politics/governors-devise-bipartisan-effort-to-reduce-opioid-abuse.html (“Alarmed at an epi­
demic of drug overdose deaths, the National Governors Association decided over the weekend to devise treatment 
protocols to reduce the use of opioid painkillers.”); Katharine Q. Seelye, Massachusetts Chief’s Tack in Drug 
War: Steer Addicts to Rehab, Not Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/25/us/ 
massachusetts-chiefs-tack-in-drug-war-steer-addicts-to-rehab-not-jail.html (reporting on Gloucester, Massachu­
setts police department informing addicts that if they come to the station asking for help, the police will not arrest 
them but will direct them to a program that assists them in securing treatment). 
In August 2016, the 
United States Sentencing Commission recommended to Congress that it amend the 
ACCA to eliminate drug predicates in their entirety.306 Whether this is a sign of 
evolved thinking from mistakes from the War on Drugs or empathy granted only to 
white drug users, it is a marked shift from the prior practices that have incarcerated— 
and continue to incarcerate—millions of non-white drug users for the same 
conduct.307 
303. Id. (noting that even though the chemical composition between crack and powder campaign is similar, 
“[a]pproximately 85 percent of defendants convicted of crack offenses in federal court are black; thus the severe 
sentences required by the 100–to–1 ratio are imposed ‘primarily upon black offenders’”). In 2010, the U.S. 
Congress reduced the sentencing disparity to an 18:1 ratio. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. Law No. 
111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). However, any disparity between the two forms of cocaine is still questionable. 
304. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91. 
305. 
306. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CAREER OFFENDER SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS 2 
(2016). 
307. Reports from 2009 to 2011 document that approximately 20% of whites, compared with 10% of Black 
and Latino Americans, have used controlled substances such as cocaine, marijuana, hallucinogens, and 
methamphetamine. See Saki Knafo, When It Comes to Illegal Drug Use, White America Does the Crime, Black 
America Does the Time, HUFFPOST (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/17/racial-disparity­
drug-use_n_3941346.html. Despite the disparity in use, Black Americans are arrested for drug possession more 
than three times as white Americans. Id. According to 2011 data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, of the 
225,242 people serving state prison sentences for drug offenses, the racial composition of those prisoners was 
approximately 30% white, 41% Black, and 21% Hispanic. See E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 242467, PRISONERS IN 2012—ADVANCE COUNTS 11 (2013). 
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The last factor associated with mass incarceration has been the public support 
for building prisons. Whether it be from lobbying efforts from private prisons308 
There has been much attention and controversy surrounding private prisons. In August 2016, the federal 
government announced its intent to phase out private prisons due to pressure from advocates asserting moral and 
economic reasons. Senator Bernie Sanders and now-Senator Kamala Harris, the former Attorney General of 
California, argued against private prisons based on moral reasons, 2015 statistics showing higher rates of 
recidivism of those incarcerated by private prisons, and the documented abusive conditions. See CA-Sen: Kamala 
Harris (D) Builds Momentum for DOJ’s Call to Stop Using Private Prisons, DAILY KOS (Aug. 19, 2016), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2016/8/19/1561968/-CA-Sen-Kamala-Harris-D-Builds-Momentum-For-DOJ-s-C 
all-To-Stop-Using-Private-Prisons; Hanna Kozlowska, The US Government Says It Will End the Use of Private 
Federal Prisons, QUARTZ (Aug. 18, 2016), http://qz.com/761532/the-us-government-says-it-will-end-the-use-of­
private-federal-prisons. But see Hanna Kozlowska, The US Government Is Already Quietly Backing out of Its 
Promise to Phase out Private Prisons, QUARTZ (Nov. 27, 2016), http://qz.com/840337/the-us-government-is­
already-quietly-backing-out-of-its-promise-to-phase-out-private-prisons/. Although the industry is a multi-billion 
dollar one, in 2010 the two largest prison companies received $3 billion in revenue, the private prisons account for 
only housing around 5% of state prisoners and 15% of federal prisoners. Michael Cohen, How For-Profit Prisons 
Have Become The Biggest Lobby Nobody Is Talking About, WASH. POST. (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/04/28/how-for-profit-prisons-have-become-the-biggest-lobby­
no-one-is-talking-about/?utm_term=.768f74b89cf4; Federal Decision to Phase Out Private Prisons Has Limited 
Impact, Activists Say, GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/aug/19/private­
prisons-closure-limited-impact-justice-department As such, there is debate over whether private prisons were a 
contributing factor to or beneficiary of mass incarceration. 
and prison guard unions or simply a collateral aspect of the Tough-on-Crime era, 
the United States spends $80 billion each year on building or maintaining 
prisons.309 
Report: Increases in Spending on Corrections Far Outpace Education, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., (July 7, 2016), 
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/report-increases-spending-corrections-far-outpace-education. 
This amount is significant. In addition to a substantial increase from 
prior practices, the growth of this expenditure has vastly outpaced that of 
expenditures on public education.310 
U.S. DEP’T OF  EDUC., STATE AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES ON CORRECTIONS AND EDUCATION 1 (2016). Since 
1980, states have increased spending on K–12 expenditures 107% from $258 billion to $534 billion, and 
forty-eight states increased their spending on corrections from $17 to $71 billion. Id. Only New Hampshire and 
Massachusetts elected to increase spending in education rather than correctional spending. Id. at 6; see also 
Stephanie Kelly, The US Spends a Troubling Amount of Money on Prisons Compared to Schools, BUS. INSIDER 
(July 7, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-us-spending-on-prisons-grew-at-three-times-rate-of-school­
spending-report-2016-7. 
Seven states increased their corrections 
budget five times faster than public education expenditures.311 
These factors in combination resulted in the United States outpacing the world 
in locking up its own citizenry. Today, there are now 753 prisoners for every 
100,000 people—an increase of 400% from 1973.312 Of those prisoners, 60% are 
serving sentences for nonviolent crimes.313 
Kathleen Miles, Just How Much the War on Drugs Impacts Our Prisons, in One Chart, HUFFPOST (Mar. 
10, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/10/war-on-drugs-prisons-infographic_n_4914884.html. 
The end result is that the United States 
has 5% of the world’s population and over 20% of its prisoners.314 
308. 
 
309. 
310. 
311. Kelly, supra note 310. 
312. See JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF 
INCARCERATION 3 (2010). This current mass incarceration has not been the norm. See supra note 27 and 
accompanying text. 
313. 
314. ACLU, supra note 28. 
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The rate of incarceration is a break from past practices and is an anomaly from 
other countries’ policies. In a comparison among thirty-five other countries, the 
United States’ rate of incarcerating 753 prisoners for every 100,000 citizens is 
shockingly high. Iceland has the lowest rate at 44 prisoners for every 100,000 
citizens.315 Fifteen other countries, including Japan, Norway, Germany, France, 
South Korea, and Austria, incarcerate at a rate of 100 or fewer prisoners for every 
100,000 citizens.316 The next thirteen lowest rate countries, including Portugal, 
Canada, Australia, England, Turkey, China, Brazil, and Spain, incarcerate at a rate 
of 200 or fewer prisoners for every 100,000 citizens.317 
Id. The incarceration rate for each of these countries, per 100,000 citizens, is: Portugal (104), Greece 
(109), Canada (116), Australia (134), Slovakia (151), Hungary (152), England and Wales (153), Luxembourg 
(155), Turkey (161), Spain (162), New Zealand (197). In addition, China incarcerates 118 and Brazil 197 for 
every 100,000 persons. See World Prison Populations, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/06/ 
prisons/html/nn2page1.stm, (last visited Sept. 1, 2017). 
The remaining three 
countries, incarcerate at rates of 206 (Czech Republic), 209 (Mexico), and 224 
(Poland) prisoners for every 100,000 citizens.318 
B. From the Little Known Data that Exists, Rape Sentences Are Lengthy 
Given its leadership in rates of incarceration, it is not surprising that the United 
States has higher sentences for rapes than other Western countries. It is critical to 
consider the underlying reasons for the current sentence lengths and whether 
shorter sentence lengths are normatively valuable. 
An important caveat must be made in comparing the sentencing practices 
among states. Each state defines rape (or sexual assault) differently; some include 
aggravating factors such as rape against a child or rape involving weapons as its 
own crime, while others include it as a subsection of an offense that includes 
acquaintance rape. As discussed below, only six states and the federal government 
even compile and publish the actual sentence imposed for rape convictions.319 
See ROBERT R. FRIEDMANN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, 237988, IMPROVING CRIME DATA PROJECT 4 
(2010) (“Crime data are rarely compiled in standard formats suitable for multi-jurisdiction policy development or 
program evaluation without time consuming, repetitive, inefficient, and costly data collection and analysis 
efforts.”); Jeff Asher, Numbers Racket, SLATE (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
crime/2016/03/calls_for_service_data_are_the_best_way_to_analyze_crime_why_don_t_cities.html (“In an Oc­
tober 2015 address . . . FBI  Director James Comey spoke of an urgent ‘data shortage’ that was making it difficult 
for him to do his job. Addressing a room of law enforcement executives, Comey said, pointedly, ‘How can we 
address a rise in violent crime without good information? And without information every single conversation in 
this country about policing and reform and justice is uninformed.’”). 
Among such limited data, there is no means to determine which sentences attach to 
which conduct underlying the conviction. 
315. SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 312, at 3. 
316. Id. From data from 2008–2009, the incarceration rate for every 100,000 people, in order of low to high, is: 
Iceland (44), Japan (63), Denmark (66), Finland (67), Norway (70), Sweden (74), Switzerland (76), Ireland (85), 
Germany (90), Italy (92), Belgium (94), France (96), South Korea (97), Austria (99), Netherlands (100). 
317. 
318. SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 312, at 3. 
319. 
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Despite these limitations, analyzing what data is available is an essential 
undertaking. For starters, it highlights the need for more states to record and 
publish conviction and sentencing data. But also, the commonalities that do exist 
in the limited data that is available is an important jumpstart into long overdue 
conversations about proportionality, retribution, and offender reintegration. 
Looking to the data available from all fifty states and the District of Columbia, 
the potential sentences for rape are lengthy and substantial. Forty-three states 
punish rape with maximum sentences of twenty years to life.320 Of those states, 
nineteen provide that a maximum sentence for sexual assault may be up to 99 
years, 100 years, or life.321 In states that reject life sentences, twenty-three impose 
high maximum sentences that are twenty-, thirty-, and fifty-four-years long.322 
Minimum sentences are also incredibly harsh: although a small number of states 
have minimum terms that are under six years in length, twelve states have high 
minimum terms that begin at ten years and can be as high as twenty-five years.323 
320. See supra note 52 (listing nineteen states that have maximum terms of 99, 100 years, or life); infra note 
322 (listing twenty-three states that have high maximum sentences for sexual assault). 
321. Comparing the sexual assault statutes between states is difficult because there is no uniform definition 
distinguishing the most serious forms of rape from other forms. In divining the sentences, I excluded sentencing 
for any crime against a minor or involving specific aggravating factors, such as use of a weapon, that are not found 
in most acquaintance rapes. 
322. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406(B) (2017) (twenty-eight years); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730(2) (2017) 
(twenty years, per id. § 706-659); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.20(1) (2017) (thirty years, per 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/5-4.5-30); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1(b) (2015) (forty years, per id. § 35-50-2-4); IOWA CODE § 709.3 (2017) 
(twenty-five years, per id. § 902.9(1)(b)); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503 (2012) (fifty-four years, per id. § 21-6804); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.040(2) (West 2016) (twenty years, per id. § 532.020); ME. STAT. tit. 17A, § 253.6 (2017) 
(thirty years, per id. § 1252); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 § 22(b) (2017) (twenty years); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 750.520b(2) (2017) (life); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319(b) (2012) (fifty years, per id. § 28-105); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 632-A:10-a (2015) (twenty years); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 (McKinney 2017) (twenty-five years, per id. 
§ 70.00); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.21 (2017) (life, per id. § 15A-1340.17); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03 (2017) 
(twenty years); OKLA. STAT. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1114.21, 1115 (2017) (maximum fifteen years for second 
degree rape); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.375(2) (2016) (twenty years, per id. § 161.605); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121(b) 
(2017) (twenty and an additional ten years if person administered drugs to the victim, per id. § 1103); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 16-3-652(2) (2017) (thirty years); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1 (2017) (maximum sentence for rape by 
force is fifty years and maximum sentence for rape by intoxication or when the victim is mentally impaired 
twenty-five years, per id. § 22-6-1); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503(b) (2017) (thirty years, per id. § 40-35-111); 
W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-4(b) (2017) (maximum punishment for sexual assault in the second degree, which is by 
force or when the victim is physical helpless is twenty-five years); WIS. STAT. § 940.225 (2017) (second degree 
physical assault is classified as a Class B or C felony depending on whether pregnancy results, punished up to 
forty or sixty years respectively, per id. § 939.50); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2 -306(i) (2017) (fifty years). 
323. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61(b) (2017) (ten years, per id. § 13A-5-6); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1406(B) (2017) 
(5.25 to 28 years); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (2017) (ten years, per id. § 5-4-401); CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 
(West 2014) (three, six, or eight years); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 773 (2017) (fifteen years, per id. tit. 11, § 4205); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(b) (2017) (twenty-five years); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.20(1) (2017) (fifteen years, 
per 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-30); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1 (2017) (twenty years, per id. § 35-50-2-4); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-5503 (2012) (12.24 years, per id. § 21-6804); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.040(2) (2016) (ten years, 
per id. § 532.020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22(b) (2017) (zero to twenty years); MINN. STAT. § 609.342(2) 
(2017) (twelve years); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.366(2) (2017) (a life term with the possibility of parole at ten years); 
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-3 (2017) (ten years); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-4(b) (2017) (minimum punishment for 
sexual assault in the second degree, which is by force or when the victim is physical helpless is ten years). 
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Sentencing and conviction data in the States are much more difficult to come by. 
This is a glaring problem given that the vast majority of rape convictions occur in 
state courts. The FBI releases statistics reporting estimates on how many rapes 
likely occur in each state.324 
See Crime in the United States, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/ 
crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-4 (last visited Nov. 6, 2017). 
In 2015, the total number of estimated reported rapes 
in all fifty states was 124,047.325 In 2016, the number of federal rape convictions 
was 604.326 
This information is helpful in identifying which states have more or fewer 
reported rapes. But the FBI information does not track state convictions or 
sentences. Information about state convictions and sentencing, if collected at all, is 
collected based on the resources and interest of each state. Although efforts were 
undertaken to gather data from all states, only six had information that could be 
compared in a meaningful way. Where data was collected, the following informa­
tion is highly relevant: 
Y	 
Y	 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
In Alaska, for the 579 reported rapes in 2012, thirteen ended in convictions, 
and the average sentence imposed was 29.9 years.327 
In Illinois, more than 4,000 rapes were reported each year from 2009 to 
2016, an unknown number ended in convictions, and the average sentence 
in 2014 was 9.7 years.328 
In Massachusetts, 1,603 rapes were reported in 2012, twenty-one convic­
tions occurred in 2013, and the average sentence in 2013 was 7.95 years.329 
In Missouri, in 2012, 1,510 rapes were reported, 166 were convicted, and 
the average sentence was 25.2 years.330 
In North Carolina, in 2014, 1,741 rapes were reported, ninety-two were 
convicted, and the average term was set at a range of 20.41 years to 27.75 
years.331
In Pennsylvania, 4,499 rapes were reported (in 2016), 133 convicted (in 
2013), and the average sentence was set at a range of 7.65 to 16.9 years.332 
Focus Report, PA. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING SYS., http://www.paucrs.pa.gov/UCR/Reporting/Monthly/ 
Summary/MonthlySumOffenseUI.asp ((last visited Nov. 13, 2017). 
In the federal courts, in 2016, 620 rapes resulted in convictions and the 
average sentence was approximately ten years.333 
324. 
325. Id. 
326. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 279. 
327. ALASKA DEP’T OF  PUBLIC SAFETY, LENGTH OF IMPRISONMENT IN EACH PRIMARY OFFENSE CATEGORY FISCAL 
YEAR: 2016 (2017). 
328. ILL. STATE POLICE, CRIME IN ILLINOIS 2014: INDEX CRIME OFFENSE & CRIME RATE DATA 16 (2014). 
329. MASS. DEP’T OF  PUB. HEALTH, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT IN MASSACHUSETTS, 2011-2012, at 1 (2013). 
330. MO. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., CRIME IN MISSOURI 2012, at xiii (2012); MO. DEP’T OF  CORR., A PROFILE 
OF THE INSTITUTIONAL AND SUPERVISED OFFENDER POPULATION ON JUNE 30, 2012, at 75–75 (2013). 
331. N.C. STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN NORTH CAROLINA—2015, at 2 (2017). 
332. 
333. In 2016, there were 620 federal offenders convicted in the “sexual abuse” category, which is the closest 
category that covers the offenses of rape and sexual assault. The average mean sentence was 144 months and the 
average median length was 120 months. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Sentence Length in Each Primary Offence 
Significantly, for the 
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Category, INTERACTIVE SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT’G STAT. https://isb.ussc.gov/content/pentaho-cdf/RenderXCD 
F?solution=Sourcebook&path=&action=table_xx.xcdf&template=mantle&table_num=Table13 (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2018). 
federal offenders convicted of rape, 95 percent received a prison sentence 
for the crime and 1.6 percent received probation.334 
Data from only six states and the federal government are far from ideal when 
drawing conclusions about practices. However, these seven jurisdictions are 
consistent with the facts that the conviction rate for reported rapes is very low: by 
using the data from above, North Carolina convicted 0.048% of reported rapes; 
Alaska convicted 0.022% of reported rapes. But when the convictions are secured, 
heavy sentences are imposed: Of the six states with data, half punished rapes with 
sentences between twenty to thirty years. Illinois and Pennsylvania were roughly 
consistent with the federal practice of imposing terms of ten years. Massachusetts 
had the shortest sentences at eight years. The average mean for known sentences is 
sixteen years. 
C. Reduced Prison Terms For Rapists Are Consistent With International Norms 
This Article proposes a five-year maximum prison term for the crime of rape 
that occurs between adults and is without aggravated factors such as child victims, 
weapons, or sadism. 
The first reason for supporting this proposal is that a five-year sentence for 
rape—which sounds incredibly light to Americans—is in keeping with interna­
tional practices. Returning to the thirty-five countries previously used in compar­
ing incarceration rates, the majority of those countries sentence rapists to a 
five-year prison term or less. 
The United States stands out from comparable Western democracies in contem­
plating maximum life sentences and minimum sentences of twenty-five years. The 
vast majority of Western countries provide for maximum terms for rape to be 
between one and fifteen years. Only four countries contemplate life sentences: the 
United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and China (death).335 
SENTENCING COUNCIL, SEXUAL OFFENCES DEFINITIVE GUIDELINE (2014) (U.K.) (4 years to life); CROWN 
PROSECUTION SERV., RAPE AND SEXUAL OFFENSES, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/rape_and_sexual_offences/ 
sentencing/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (U.K); T URK CEZA KANUNU [PENAL CODE] pt. 6, art. 102 (Turk.) (two years 
to life); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Falu¨ Huibian [CRIMINAL LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] ch. IV, 
art. 236 (China) (three years to death); CODE PENAL [C. P EN] [PENAL CODE] art. 222–223 (Fr.) (four years to life). 
And only three other 
countries have a maximum term over fifteen years: Brazil (thirty years), Norway 
(twenty-one years), and the Czech Republic (eighteen years).336 Of note, twelve 
countries start the potential punishment for rape at terms of zero months, six 
334. Of the 620 offenders sentenced in 2016, 589 received a term of incarceration and 10 received probation. 
See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 279. 
335. 
¨ 
´ ´ 
´ 336. CÓDIGO PENAL [C.P.] [PENAL CODE] ch. I, art. 213–215 (Braz.) (two to thirty years); Z ´ AKON TRESTNI 
´ Z´ AKONIK [CRIMINAL CODE] ch. III, art. 185 (Czech) (six months to eighteen years); ALMINDELIG BORGERLIG 
STRAFFELOV [CRIMINAL CODE] ch. 19, § 192 (Nor.) (two to twenty-one years). 
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months, and two years.337 
The United States is also exceptional among its peers in imposing actual terms 
for rape that exceed ten years (ranging from eight to thirty years in any of the given 
seven jurisdictions). Although data was difficult to locate for all countries on the 
previously-used list of thirty-one countries, where data is available, the actual 
imposed sentence is closer to five years.338 The majority of countries fall well 
under the ten-year term and many favor a two- to five-year prison term. For 
purpose of comparison, three countries imposed actual terms between ten and 
fifteen years (Iceland, Greece, and France),339 
Iceland imposes one to sixteen years potential and 14.53 actual years, GENERAL PENAL CODE OF ICELAND 
ch. XXII, art. 194. Greece imposes an actual sentence of ten plus years. House of Commons Library, Comparative 
Prison Sentences in the EU, U.K. PARLIAMENT, http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7218/ 
CBP-7218.xlsx (last visited Nov. 6, 2017). France imposes a potential term of four years to life and actual term of 
´ ten plus years. C. P EN, art. 222-223 (Fr.). 
two countries imposed actual terms 
up to ten years (United Kingdom and Hungary),340 and nine countries imposed 
sentences five years or less (Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ger­
many, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, and Sweden).341 This limited data on 
international rape sentencing practices is consistent with general comparison in 
which a defendant in the United States will receive a sentence two to five times 
longer than the same crime receives in Western Europe.342 
This international norm begs the question: why is the United States imposing 
higher sentences for rape than are other countries? 
337.	 See C.P. ch. I, art. 213-215 (Braz.) (two years); Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, Sec. 271 
´ ´ (no minimum); Z ´ AKONIK [CRIMINAL CODE] ch. III, art. 185 (Czech) (six months); STRAFFELOVENAKON TRESTNI Z´ 
[PENAL CODE] ch. 24, § 216 (Den.) (no minimum); SUOMEN RIKOSLAKI [CRIMINAL CODE] ch. 7 § 1–2 (Fin.) (one 
year); STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 177 (Ger.) (six months); B UNTET¨ O˜ TÖRV ´ ENYKÖNYV [BTK.] 
[CRIMINAL CODE] Act C (Hung.) (one year); GENERAL PENAL CODE OF ICELAND ch. XXII, art. 194 (one year); 
KEIH   [KO EIHO] [PEN. C.] art. 176-78 (Japan) (six months); ALMINDELIG BORGERLIG STRAFFELOV [STRAFFELOVEN] 
[CRIMINAL CODE] ch. 19 § 192 (Nor.) (two years); CÓDIGO PENAL [C.P.] [CRIMINAL CODE] ch. I, art. 178–180 
(Spain) (one year); BROTTSBALKEN [BRB] [PENAL CODE] 6:1 (Swed.) (two years); SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZ­
´ BUCH, CODE P ENAL SUISSE, CODICE PENALE SVIZZERO [STGB, CP, CP] [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 190, § 1 (Switz.) (one 
year); T ¨ URK CEZA KANUNU [TCK] [PENAL CODE] pt. 6, art. 102 (Turk.) (two years). But see CODICE PENALE [C.P.] 
609-bis (It.) (five years); KODEKS KARNI [K.K.] [CRIMINAL CODE] ch. XXV, art. 197 (Pol.) (three years); CRIMINAL 
CODE OF SLOVAKIA tit. 2, § 199 (five years); SENTENCING COUNCIL, supra note 335, at 9 (U.K.) (four years). 
338. See chart of thirty-one countries’ sentencing practices (on file with author). 
339. 
340. CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., supra note 335 (U.K.) (four to life term potential and five to ten year actual). 
BTK. Act C (Hung.) (one to fifteen years potential, five to ten years actual); House of Commons Library, supra 
note 339 (Poland, three-ten years potential and two-five years actual). 
341. House of Commons Library, supra note 339. Austria imposes an actual term of one to two years, the 
Czech Republic two to five years, Denmark less than two years, Finland one to two years, Germany two to five 
years, Netherlands two to five years, Poland two to five years, Slovakia two to five years, and Sweden two to five 
years. Id. 
342. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 31, at 21–23. The shorter sentences are important because housing, 
feeding, and caring for elderly and ill prisoners comes at a steep financial cost to taxpayers. See DIRK K. 
GREINEDER, MASS(ACHUSETTS) INCARCERATION: HOW JUSTIFIED AND HOW MUCH PUBLIC SAFETY DOES IT 
ACTUALLY BUY? 24 (2011). 
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D. Reduced Prison Terms for Rapists Are Consistent with Reducing Recidivism 
The second reason for embracing lighter sentences is a more pragmatic one: 
lengthier prison terms are more likely to lead to recidivism than are lighter terms 
that are coupled with rehabilitation and reentry programs. Even though the 
conviction rate for rape is low, state and federal courts impose prison terms in at 
least 90% of the time when convictions are secured, compared to a rate of 40% 
prison terms for other felonies.343 This means that for rapists, no alternative 
sentencing is being considered or employed. Such an oversight is without rational 
justification. 
Researchers and policymakers agree that we are punishing more offenders for 
longer than any other country or any other time in our history, that recidivism 
accounts for prison overcrowding, and that the incarceration-only model imposes 
enormous fiscal constraints on state and federal budgets.344 Attorney General Eric 
Holder summarized the problem by describing that “the rate and length of 
incarceration in this country is unprecedented and unsustainable.”345 This is true 
because in addition to the routine costs of housing inmates for each year, as 
prisoners get older and sicker, additional costs of medical care are incurred. 
Although there is debate on what causes recidivism, states are finding success in 
using reentry programs to reduce recidivism. Idaho, for instance, invests resources 
in giving released offenders access to the community—such as short-term housing, 
food, and continuing relationships with community volunteers and law enforce­
ment members who assist in their reintegration.346 
Reentry Services, IDAHO DEP’T CORRECTION, https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/probation_and_parole/ 
reentry_services (last visited Nov. 24, 2017) (listing support and services that released offenders receive). 
The Idaho Department of 
Corrections claims that since these reentry programs were adopted in 2009, they 
have had an “important role” in reducing recidivism.347 Reformers argue that the 
current system utilizing lengthy sentences produces a 75% recidivism rate, a 
failure by any measure. “If any other institutions in America were as unsuccessful 
in achieving their ostensible purpose as our prisons are, we would shut them down 
tomorrow. Two-thirds of prisoners reoffend within three years of leaving prison, 
often with a more serious and violent offense.”348 
343. See supra notes 279–80 and accompanying text. In 2009, where data is available from only the 
seventy-five largest counties, 89% of rape convictions resulted in prison terms. See Paquette, supra note 279; see 
also RAPE ABUSE INCEST NATIONAL NETWORK (RAINN), supra note 1 (demonstrating, from data made available in 
2013, that 85% of the felony rape convictions were punished with prison term). 
344. ROGER K. WARREN, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM 8–15 
(2007). 
345. Holder, supra note 276 
346. 
347. Id. 
348. Gilligan, supra note 39. 
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Moreover, those who break the cycle of recidivism do so because they have the 
means or ability to reintegrate and attach into the community.349 Some argue that 
longer prison terms “increase[] the chances that inmates will reoffend later because 
it breaks their supportive bonds in the community and hardens their associations 
with other criminals.”350 
Prison Term Served and Recidivism, PEW CHARITABLE TR., (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/ 
research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2013/10/08/prison-time-served-and-recidivism (discussing studies that reach 
opposite conclusions with respect to prison terms and recidivism); see also PAUL GENDREAU ET AL., DEP’T OF THE  
SOLICITOR GEN. OF CAN., THE EFFECTS OF PRISON SENTENCES AND INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS ON RECIDIVISM: 
GENERAL EFFECTS AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 20–21 (2002) (Can.). 
Importantly, despite these cost factors and state success with reentry programs, 
there is no conclusive evidence that lengthy prison terms cause higher recidivism 
rates. That said, rehabilitation programs are proven to reduce recidivism. “[F]or 
appropriate offenders alternatives to imprisonment can be both less expensive and 
more effective in reducing crime.”351 A Department of Justice White Paper that 
was produced under President George W. Bush concluded that “even where 
alternatives to incarceration do not decrease recidivism, they often do not increase 
it either, thereby providing a cost-effective alternative to imprisonment without 
compromising public safety.”352 
E. Reduced Prison Terms Will Benefit Victims’ Interests in Public Safety 
A reasonable counterargument to reduced punishment for rape—or more 
precisely for rapists—is that overincarceration is due to nonviolent drug offenders. 
Rapists are depraved and dangerous individuals either in need of incapacitation or 
worthy of letting to rot. 
To respond to this counterargument, it is important to ask what punishment is 
appropriate for the crimes of rape and sexual assault. As we witnessed with the 
public outcry to the Brock Turner case, the initial answer appears to be one of 
retribution, a desire for punishment to be severe and harsh to serve the purposes of 
punishment, social condemnation, and outrage. Brock Turner, the former Stanford 
swimmer, attacked an unconscious woman behind a dumpster. The victim released 
a lengthy, powerful, and moving, statement capturing the harm of the attack and 
victimization during the trial and sentencing process.353 
See Andrew Buncombe, Stanford Rape Case: Read the Impact Statement of Brock Turner’s Victim, 
INDEPENDENT (U.K.) (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/stanford-rape-case-read-the­
impact-statement-of-brock-turners-victim-a7222371.html. 
When the judge imposed a 
sentence that amounted to probation with three months in jail that was actually 
349. NAT’L REENTRY RESOURCE CTR., REDUCING RECIDIVISM 2 (2014) (discussing factors employed by fifteen 
state programs that reduced recidivism). 
350. 
351. WARREN, supra note 344, at 2. 
352. Id. 
353. 
324 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:259 
served, public outrage ensued.354 Some attempted to remove the sentencing judge 
from office.355 
Lara Bazelon, Put Away the Pitchforks Against Judge Persky, POLITICO (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.politico. 
com/magazine/story/2016/08/recall-judge-persky-stanford-rapist-brock-turner-courts-214145 (stating that a mil­
lion people have signed a petition to recall Judge Persky, sixteen state legislators have requested an oversight 
board to launch a misconduct investigation, and prosecutors have filed a motion to disqualify him from another 
sexual assault case). 
Others, including state legislators in California, proposed legisla­
tion to impose increased and mandatory prison terms for those convicted of sexual 
assault or rape.356 
Emanuella Grinberg, California Lawmakers Pass Bill Inspired by Brock Turner Case, CNN (Aug. 30, 
2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/29/politics/california-mandatory-prison-unconscious-intoxicated-brock­
turner/index.html (reporting that in response to the light sentence in Brock Turner’s case, the California assembly 
introduced AB 2888 and passed it by a 66-0 vote). The bill was approved by Governor Jerry Brown on September 
30, 2016. 
But as relevant to this Article, the national outrage towards what was viewed as 
a light sentence is what is misguided. Brock Turner received probation when 95% 
of convicted rapists in federal court and around 90% of convicted rapists in state 
court face prison.357 The outrage is that convicted rapists are being disproportion­
ately sentenced to prison. In a notable contrast, prison time is meted out in the 
sentences for 40% of other convicted felons. If Brock Turner had committed any 
other violent felony, as a first offender, probation would have been the likely 
maximum sentence he would face. The football player Ray Rice, whose video­
taped attack on his fiance´ sparked national outrage, completed a pre-trial diversion 
program that erased his conviction and his arrest in its entirety.358 
354. Grinberg & Shoichet, supra note 54 (“The case drew national attention after the victim’s wrenching 
impact statement went viral. The brevity of Turner’s sentence triggered outrage against the judge and controversy 
over how the justice system treats sexual assault survivors.”). 
355.  
356. 
357. See supra note 279. 
358. James Brady, Ray Rice Completes Pretrial Intervention, Domestic Violence Charge Dropped, SB NATION 
(May 21, 2015), https://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2015/5/21/8634045/ray-rice-domestic-violence-charge-dismissed­
pretrial-intervention. 
In this respect, 
this Article’s proposed maximum sentence of five-years for rape is consistent with 
criminal justice goals of rehabilitation, which furthers actual public safety by 
ending recidivism. But the emotional impulse to make bad guys, especially rapists, 
pay for their crimes or be locked away because they are presumed dangerous, is 
real and must be addressed. 
The reality is that criminal law is not like contracts. Contract law aspires and 
provides remedies to breached contracts that are designed to make the parties 
whole. If four widgets were not made as provided for in a contract, the remedy is 
for the maker to produce the ordered widgets or pay for the value of the lost 
bargain. But criminal law does not have such symmetry. Its punishment for those 
who break laws is not commensurate to the breach of the victim’s well-being and 
violation of public safety. Rather, the punishment imposed on an offender is at best 
a partial salve, and at worst, entirely collateral to a victim’s ability to heal from the 
wounds of a criminal violation. The harm from surviving rape is horrific and 
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lasting. A sense of violation is real; a sense of security is gone. For many, 
consensual intimacy with others is compromised. The letter from Brock Turner’s 
victim describes the horror of what is lost and lasting from a sexual assault in both 
small and large ways.359 
If criminal law worked like contract law, every additional year a defendant 
served in prison would help the victim heal. But there is no such connection or 
capacity for the criminal law to do this. As has been illustrated in the capital 
punishment context, some victims who lose loved ones are not just disappointed, 
but wounded anew when the execution does not bring the closure that the family 
members are so desperately need and very much deserve.360 
See Jim Hall, Opinion, Commute All Death Sentences, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIB. (Dec. 27, 2016), 
http://www.columbiatribune.com/045535e0-f4a0-59d4-90bb-405fc0ceaaaa.html (father whose daughter was mur­
dered explains how he had “believed the myth” that an “execution would close our emotional wounds,” 
discovered it did not, and calls on the governor to commute all death row sentences). 
As some have noted, 
the remedy the families want is simply the return of the loved one or as explained 
by the father of a murdered woman, “through a protective and respectful process” 
an opportunity to exchange remorse and forgiveness.361 
Id. In particular, Hall wrote: 
Through a protective and respectful process, offenders can be a key element in helping crime 
victims rebuild their fractured lives. Sadly, one can only imagine. But I’m convinced significant 
healing would have occurred for us all if our family had engaged in a frank conversation with him 
at the prison. I wish I had had the chance— consistent with my Christian beliefs— to have told him 
in person that I forgave him for what he did to our innocent and precious daughter. 
Id; see also Sharon Risher, My Mom Was Killed in the Charleston Shooting. Executing Dylann Roof Won’t 
Bring Her Back, VOX (June 15, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/6/15/11894036/dylann-roof-death-penalty. 
Capital punishment 
ultimately does not abate the grief and loss the grieving families forever carry with 
them. 
Restorative justice efforts are attempting to rebut these limitations with creative 
solutions. But at a minimum, the demand for means, programs, and services that 
permit victims to heal, grieve, and hear remorse show that harsh punishments for 
their offenders are inadequate to make whole victims of violent crimes. This is 
why the crime victims who advocated for Proposition 47, California’s sentencing 
reform initiative that reduced incarceration, coupled funding for victim services 
with treatment for offenders.362 
When the punishment becomes excessive, no one is served. This Article is not 
arguing against any punishment for rapists, but it is raising the important point that 
the criminal justice system cannot presume success comes with lengthy 
terms —either in terms of needed services to victims or appropriate punishment to 
the offender. As argued by Professor Catherine Carpenter with respect to sex 
offender registries, “[i]t may feel good—even righteous—to single out sex 
offenders for particular treatment in an effort to protect the community. But, 
359. See Buncombe, supra note 353 (publishing the victim’s letter in its entirety). 
360. 
361. 
362. See infra note 370 and accompanying text. 
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history has shown that a collective response to a national problem concerning 
safety and security does not necessarily make it the right one.”363 
Returning to the section on mass incarceration, the lessons learned are not that 
we are now suddenly enlightened about drug use and are seeking to empty the 
prisons. But rather, the war of drugs used mandatory sentencing without thought of 
its consequences on offenders and the costs on society. The drive to punish and 
make drug users suffer arose from passion over reason. Our society believed that 
youth were “superpredators” and those who committed crimes were damaged and 
dangerous beyond repair.364 
Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator’ Fear, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-bus-recalls-superpredator-threat-of-90s.html. In rel­
evant part, the author stated: 
Social scientists like James A. Fox, a criminologist, warned of “a blood bath of violence” that 
could soon wash over the land . . . .  What happened with the superpredator jeremiads is that they 
proved to be nonsense. They were based on a notion that there would be hordes upon hordes of 
depraved teenagers resorting to unspeakable brutality, not tethered by conscience. 
Id. 
Those impulses are at work in branding all rapists as 
worthy of lengthy prison terms and nothing else. Sentencing drug users based on 
this impulse alone is an accepted failure.365 
See Jose´ Luis Pardo Veiras, Opinion, A Decade of Failure in the War of Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/opinion/a-decade-of-failure-in-the-war-on-drugs.html (arguing for decrimi­
nalization over incarceration). 
Sentencing rapists on this impulse too 
is without value. 
How then could success in sentencing be measured? The most obvious answer is 
public security defined by an offender never offending again. As poignantly noted 
by Brock Turner’s victim: 
The probation officer’s recommendation of a year or less in county jail is a soft 
time-out, a mockery of the seriousness of his assaults, and of the consequences 
of the pain I have been forced to endure. I also told the probation officer that 
what I truly wanted was for Brock to get it, to understand and admit to his 
wrongdoing.366 
The call for Brock Turner to understand and admit his wrongdoing lies in the 
assumption that such recognition will prevent its repetition. In his book Missoula, 
Jon Krakauer interviewed rape victims of assaults that were and were not 
convicted and punished.367 When the topic arose, those rape victims, too, spoke of 
363. Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex Offender 
Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1132 (2012); see also Michael Vitiello, Punishing Sex Offenders: 
When Good Intentions Go Bad, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 651, 654 (2008) (“Thus, the expansion of criminal law governing 
sex offenders is a cautionary tale about good intentions, legislation enacted in the heat of the moment, and the 
enactment of piecemeal legislation governing criminal sentences. The lessons are especially important for states 
like California where some of these laws are enacted through an initiative process, leaving less room for 
deliberation in their enactment.”). 
364. 
365. 
366. Buncombe, supra note 353 (emphasis added). 
367. See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
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the simple desire to make sure that their rapist did not rape another. In a dramatic 
scene at the sentencing hearing for a man who had been convicted for raping his 
childhood friend, another woman who had been raped by him but had never 
reported it, summoned the courage to testify at his sentencing hearing.368 When 
explaining why she did not report the attack when it happened but felt compelled 
to speak now, she explained that was testifying to “help prevent [a rape] from 
happening to someone else.369 
There is evidence to back these anecdotes. Proposition 47 is California’s voter 
initiative that reduced incarceration and increased treatment by reclassifying 
non-violent crimes from felonies to misdemeanors, authorizing expungement of 
old felonies, and requiring the State to allocate funds saved from prison costs to 
services for victims and treatment for offenders.370 
CALIFORNIANS FOR SAFETY & JUSTICE, SECOND CHANCES AND SYSTEMS CHANGE 4 (2017); Robin Respaut, 
California Prison Reforms Have Reduced Inmate Numbers, Not Costs, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.reuters. 
com/article/us-california-prison-budget-insight-idUSKBN0UK0J520160106 (discussing how California reduced 
its prison population by 30,000 within three years). 
The movement behind this 
reform came from crime victims seeking criminal justice reform.371 
Paige St. John, Different Kind of Crime-Victim Group Lobbies Against Rolling Back Prop. 47, L.A. TIMES 
(Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-ff-pol-prop-47-20150425-story.html (explaining 
how crime victims from communities of color recognized that offenders had often been crime victims themselves 
and those individuals mobilized the group that advocated for Proposition 47). 
These individu­
als did not want longer sentences for offenders, but called for services that would 
help victims heal and offenders reform.372 
A first instinct to punish crimes with lengthy prison terms is shared by many 
Americans. One only need to Google “Brock Turner” or “Judge Aaron Persky” to 
see the endless outrage condemning both the rapist for his depravity and judge for 
his inexplicable leniency.373 
Alex Johnson, Aaron Perksy, Judge in Brock Turner Assault Case, Faces Recall Petition, NBC NEWS 
(June 26, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/aaron-persky-judge-brock-turner-rape-case-faces-recall­
petition-n776996 (reporting on continued efforts to recall Judge Persky because “residents deserve a judge who 
will protect victims—not rapists”). 
Indeed, one author explained, “[t]he idea that the 
punishment for sexual assault should be only a summer in county jail has made 
national headlines because it instinctively elicits revulsion from people across the 
country, right and left, rich and poor. We should heed that revulsion—there is 
wisdom in it.”374 
368. KRAKAUER, supra note 18, at 194–97 (testimony); id. at 152–57 (prior unreported rape). 
369. Id. at 197. 
370. 
371. 
372. Id. 
373. 
374. Elliot Kaufman, Brock Turner and the Wisdom of Revulsion, NAT’L REV. (June 14, 2016), http://www. 
nationalreview.com/article/436561/brock-turner-stanford-rape-case-elicits-two-conflicting-responses-left. 
But Americans’ bloodlust for lengthy sentences should not be 
confused for wisdom. The existence of capital punishment in the United States is 
baffling, given that the other countries that execute its people include Iran, Sudan, 
Saudi Arabia, and China. Even when the United States ended the practice of 
executing juveniles, the United States and Somalia were the only countries in the 
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world that permitted this practice.375 And this practice, which the rest of the world 
condemned as unconscionable, ended through a 5-4 Supreme Court decision, not 
legislative or collective action.376 
The societal impulse to view all criminals with revulsion and call for the longest 
sentence possible is not innate.377 It is in part the product of the past forty years 
that has seen the rise of mass incarceration in our society, an impulse no doubt 
amplified by social media. The more recent and public advocacy by victims of 
actual crime offers a salient perspective that counters the reflexive call to 
incarcerate. Crime victims prefer rehabilitation over punishment, which suggests 
that a criminal justice system that returns to rehabilitation—if effective—offers a 
system with more advantages than our status quo. 
F.	 Reduced Prison Terms Will Lead to Rehabilitation for Sex Offenders and 
More Convictions by Juries 
To accept the premise of the former Section’s contention that lighter sentences 
also benefit violent offenders such as rapists, rehabilitation must work as an 
alternative to only-incarceration. Studies and scholars suggest that it does. In 
Canada, a ten-year study of 168 rapists, 59 pedophiles, 47 mixed offenders (those 
who harmed adults and children), and 32 child molesters strongly suggests that 
rehabilitation programs administered during a prison term were effective in 
reducing recidivism.378 The study created a control group and concluded that of 
those not given treatment, 33.2% of the prisoners reoffended with another sexual 
offense and of those given treatment, 14.5% reoffended with another sexual 
offense.379 Even more dramatically, of the first offenders who were given treat­
ment, 8.8% reoffended with another sexual offense and of first offenders without 
treatment, 27.3% reoffended.380 
By comparison, the United States has a 77% recidivism rate for all crimes.381 
Canada’s program that resulted in an 8.8% recidivism rate for first offenders for 
sex crimes and 14.5% recidivism rate for repeat offenders382 is astonishing, but not 
surprising. Offenders who are given evidence-based treatment to stop underlying 
criminal conduct have a greater chance of not offending compared with those who 
375. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005) (“Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, which every country in the world has ratified save for the United States and Somalia, contains an 
express prohibition on capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles under 18.”). 
376. See id. 
377. See Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other 
Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 44–51 
(1997) (describing the deeply held public fear of crime). 
378. Terry Nicholaichuk et al., Outcome of an Institutional Sexual Offender Treatment Program: A Compari­
son Between Treated and Matched Untreated Offenders, 12 SEXUAL ABUSE 139, 141, 145 (2000). 
379. Id. at 145. 
380. Id. 
381. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 34 (reporting a 77% recidivism rate). 
382. See supra note 350. 
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simply whittle away without treatment, skill development, or education, and 
without any means to return to reintegrate into society. Likewise, if the prison 
system chooses to simply let punishment be punitive, the most surprising part of 
the 75% recidivism rate is that 25% of offenders—without any rehabilitation— 
were able to not repeat the bad choices and bad impulses that led to prison in the 
first place. 
Additionally, overpunishment of rape in the United States likely leads to fewer 
convictions. Scholars in other contexts—notably drug offenses, capital punish­
ment, white collar crime, and DUIs—have strongly suggested that lengthy 
sentences may result in the unintended consequence of disincentivizing convic­
tions.383 Forty years ago, states had an analogous problem in figuring out the best 
punishment for a driver who killed another while operating a car. The prosecutors 
could either charge the driver with a misdemeanor offense or the serious crime of 
involuntary manslaughter, which carried a sentence of twenty years. “[P]rosecu­
tors faced with this choice hesitated to proceed on a manslaughter theory, even 
when the facts so warranted, because of the reluctance of jurors to convict fellow 
drivers on such a serious charge.”384 
It is remarkable that policy makers diagnosed the fears of the jurors, because in 
the courtroom, jurors often are either not informed of the potential sentence that 
the accused faces, or if they are, are routinely instructed to disregard the 
punishment as a factor when deciding guilt.385 Forty-years ago, policy makers 
properly divined that jurors relied on common sense when not convicting the 
guilty to avoid excessive punishment. What turned out to be the appropriate 
remedy was that state legislatures developed the crime of vehicular manslaughter, 
which carried approximately a two-year prison term instead of the twenty-year 
term accompanying involuntary manslaughter.386 Vehicular manslaughter, a crime 
with a lighter sentence, resulted in more convictions. 
The actual role that jurors’ knowledge of excessive sentences serves to deter 
convictions by juries and charges by prosecutors appears understudied in the rape 
383. See Frank O. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 351 (2000) (“[W]e are over-punishing drug offenders, and our 
excesses are undermining not only the credibility of the drug enforcement effort, but the entire federal sentencing 
reform project.”); Adam M. Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary Men: The Case for Eliminating Jury Trials in Drunk 
Driving Cases, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 984–86 (discussing whether juries may acquit DUI defendants out of 
concerns of overpunishment); Note, Go Directly to Jail: White Collar Sentencing After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1732–39 (2009) (arguing that the current sentencing model overpunishes small-scale 
offenders and leads to uneven outcomes); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441–45 (2008) 
(invalidating death penalty imposed for the crime of raping a child in part because capital punishment created 
“risks of overpunishment” and might discourage reporting of this crime). 
384. Commonwealth. v. Jones, 416 N.E.2d 502, 505 (Mass. 1981). 
385. See Fleischman, supra note 49. 
386. Jones, 416 N.E.2d at 505 & n.6 (“From this history, it seems clear that the purpose of [the vehicular 
manslaughter statute] was to provide a middle ground between the felony of manslaughter and the misdemeanor 
of driving so as to endanger.”). 
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context. But there is every reason to infer that the lessons learned from vehicular 
manslaughter context apply in equal force to rape adjudications. Indeed, the 
concerns over lengthy prison terms for convicted rapists casts a long shadow over 
discussions of visible cases. In Brock Turner’s case, his swimming times, Olympic 
potential, youth, and Stanford pedigree were discussed alongside the horrors of his 
crime. The sentencing judge relied upon them in justifying his three-month 
sentence, and critics were quick to mock their relevance to discussing rape. But it 
is a mistake to discount that what happens to an offender is a real and pressing 
concern that causes jurors, judges, and prosecutors to pause when given the 
unsavory choice between a grossly excessive sentence and none at all. 
Likewise, in the 2015 St. Paul Prep School case, an eighteen-year-old senior 
who had unwanted sex with a fifteen-year-old student was convicted not for rape, 
but for a felony crime of soliciting sex from a minor. He was punished with a 
one-year prison term, life-time requirement to register as a sex offender, and a 
rescission of his offer to attend Harvard University.387 
Jeannie Suk Gerson, St. Paul’s School and a New Definition of Rape, NEW YORKER (Nov. 3, 2015), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/st-pauls-school-and-a-new-definition-of-rape. 
Again, as much as many 
were quick to dismiss the adverse consequences the offender faced as not relevant 
or deserving for his depraved acts, Professor Jeannie Suk Gerson observed that the 
issue is more complicated.388 People do and should also have concern over the 
humanity and well-being of the young offender. Many feel “pity” for the shattered 
future he now faces, and believe that the rape conviction, however deserved, still 
results in two lives being “destroyed.”389 
Both trials revealed public outrage toward the wrongdoer and the privilege, 
entitlements, and advantages he possessed. But also present was a voice of pity for 
the offender, a mourning of a young life cut short by the criminal consequences the 
wrongdoer will face for life. A juror is not asked, or given the tools, to make the 
victim whole. If a juror could simply hand out monetary awards to compensate 
the victims for measured damages like they do in contract and tort cases, they no 
doubt would. 
But a criminal juror is tasked with the determination of guilt of the accused, not 
with the question of compensation. It is not unreasonable then for a juror to have 
ambivalence when assigning not just blame—but criminal liability with severe 
punitive consequences—in the unique context arising from intimate situations. For 
some jurors, believing that the culpability will be met with a maximum term of life 
and an actual term of ten-, twenty-, or thirty years gives them pause in the same 
manner that ambivalence about prosecuting a diver for involuntary manslaughter 
and the resulting twenty-year prison term did. It is reasonable to infer that the fear 
of overpunishment for rape weighs against a prosecutor charging and a juror 
voting for guilt. Given that the criminal justice system requires unanimity, if only 
387. 
388. Id. 
389. Id. 
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one judge, juror, or prosecutor is swayed by overpunishment, sentences will not be 
meted in a uniform standard, convictions not rendered, and charges not brought. 
Stated another way, rehabilitation is not inconsistent with punishment. To the 
contrary, if our correctional system permitted rapists to reform and reenter society, 
it is reasonable to expect more convictions for rape will occur, allowing offenders 
to be punished and reformed. 
CONCLUSION 
To most Americans, contemporary understandings over what defines rape is not 
about how much physical force or violence an offender uses or which power 
imbalances do or do not exist. Rather, the question presented by rape is whether or 
not there was consensual sex. As set forth above, the majority of states eschew 
defining rape as unwanted sex: only eight states define rape as sex without consent. 
Instead, forty-six jurisdictions opt for rape to be actionable if an additional element 
of force is present, and twenty-eight define rape as without consent only when 
certain power imbalances or victim characteristics exist. 
But this Article asks why must rape be defined in such limited ways? No doubt 
the sexist iterations of the crime—first as a crime against family honor, then as a 
violation of the social norm (and penal code codifications) that sex occur 
exclusively within marriage, and lastly out of fears that women will relish making 
false accusations—prevented the crime from responding to the contemporary 
social harm of unwanted sex. 
In the Post-Weinstein era, now that rape victims are believed, we have a unique 
opportunity to revisit rape law. In criminal law, state legislatures can easily rewrite 
statutes and create new crimes. Unlike the gridlock of federal government, state 
legislatures routinely, and quickly, enact new legislation in response to newly-
recognized harms. Stalking, computer crimes, and upskirting can—and should— 
result in immediate evolutions of the criminal code. Why has the crime of rape 
failed to evolve with the social norms around sex, gender, and unwanted sex? 
Rape by malice is a proposal to rewrite a crime that reflects the contemporary 
understandings of unwanted sex. It employs a more nuanced mens rea that is the 
hallmark of theft and homicide crimes. Existing rape statutes use elements that 
reflect anachronistic biases and fears. By contrast, rape by malice is defined by 
elements that reflect contemporary concerns over how to criminalize unwanted sex. 
The new crime of rape by malice would most certainly lead to more convictions. 
This fact is a cure for the unusually low conviction rates for acquaintance rape. But 
punishing more rapists, under our current criminal justice system, should not be 
welcomed. Unlike other felonies where convictions result in prison time around 
40% of the time, prison terms are imposed in at least 90% of rape convictions. 
Although comprehensive national sentencing data is missing, where available, the 
actual sentences for acquaintance rape then range from eight to thirty years in 
prison. Any reforms to the legal definition of rape that will punish more rapists 
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with lengthy prison terms must then be considered in light of our current mass 
incarceration problem. For the past forty years, our country’s Tough-on-Crime 
policies have locked up more people than any other country in the world—without 
regard to the billions of dollars spent each year on a system whose greatest 
accomplishment is producing a 75% recidivism rate. 
The proposed new reforms to rape then is accompanied with a maximum 
five-year sentence. This sentencing proposal does not extend to rape involving 
deadly weapons or children. Nonetheless, lessening punishment for acquaintance 
rape does not imply that the offender lacks depravity, that the crime is minor, or 
that the victim is not deserving of justice. To the contrary, lighter sentences for 
acquaintance rape—even when the offender is depraved and despicable—are 
critical to the idea that retribution is not achieved by lengthy sentences. A 
generation ago, juries hesitated to convict drivers of involuntary manslaughter 
charges that carried twenty-year prison terms. In response, states adopted vehicu­
lar manslaughter offenses that offered two-year prison terms, a reform that led to 
more convictions. Reducing excessive punishment for rape will also likely lead to 
more convictions. 
Moreover, unlike contract law, where a breach is remedied in full, more time 
that an offender spends in prison does not correlate with more benefits to the 
victim. Surveys of crime victims in fact show that they want services to rehabilitate 
and reform offenders so that, when released, which occurs in 95% of all sentences, 
the offender will not harm another. Lighter sentences also are a critical piece in 
successful offender reentry because more time in prison separates an offender from 
family, friends, employment, and opportunities to reintegrate upon release. 
Reforming rape law by increasing convictions and reducing punishment is an 
opportunity to recognize that rapes must be convicted and the resulting punish­
ment must be rational, fair, and effective. Ending mass incarceration is not simply 
for non-violent drug offenders. The purpose of the criminal justice system is not to 
simply inflict suffering on a rapist because he is believed to be dangerous, 
depraved, or irredeemable. Other countries use proven, evidence-based interven­
tions to rehabilitate rapists while they are in prison so that, when released, they do 
not commit another crime. There is every reason then for our country to also stop 
excessive punishment and offer actual services that rehabilitate and reform 
offenders. Holding the most number of wrongdoers accountable starts with a 
sensible penal system that has a more accurate definition of a crime and a genuine 
commitment to measure success by rehabilitation instead of excessive incarceration. 
